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FOREWORD
This Letort Paper assesses the prospects for further
turbulence and conflict in the Western Balkans and
weighs the implications for U.S. policy and for potential future military engagement. Although the region
has slipped off the American radar screen in recent
years, several unresolved disputes have the potential
of escalating. This Paper systematically describes numerous causes of domestic and regional tensions and
outlines a number of conflict scenarios.
Regional disputes are evident over the status of
specific territories, the validity of administrative borders, the credibility of specific governments, and, in
some cases, over the legitimacy of statehood itself.
Democratic progress is difficult where state building is
incomplete and contested. Furthermore, as the author
underscores, incomplete, conflicted, and contested
states present serious challenges for European Union
(EU, or the Union) enlargement and the institutional
absorption of the Western Balkans.
The region can become a gray zone where limited
progress in implementing reforms is followed by prolonged periods of stagnation or even reversal. Such
conditions provide fertile terrain for political and nationalist extremism and heighten exposure to destabilizing foreign influences. Although these are unlikely
to generate extensive armed conflicts, as witnessed in
the 1990s, they will create pockets of insecurity and
violence that would disqualify several states from the
prospect of EU membership. Such exclusion would, in
turn, prolong and exacerbate local disputes.
At the same time, the soft power capabilities of the
EU are weakening for a number of reasons, including
resistance among member states to further enlarge-
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ment given the Union’s economic problems; disappointment with the performance of recent members
Romania and Bulgaria, as well as with older member
states such as Greece, Italy, and Spain, which are encumbered by massive sovereign debts; and the unfulfilled commitments of several Western Balkan aspirants in their quest for EU accession.
Europe’s overall economic downturn will also have
negative consequences for the Western Balkans. It will
curtail investment and credits in the region, encourage EU enlargement exhaustion, and reinforce Balkan
reform fatigue. It will also create space for populists
and nationalists, who will benefit from economic stagnation and public anger to promulgate ethno-nationalist solutions to mounting domestic challenges. Economic hardship decreases trust not only in incumbent
governments but also in democratic institutions and
international agencies.
Such negative scenarios would place the onus on
key international actors to find credible solutions.
However, the EU’s effectiveness as an institution
builder is coming under increasing scrutiny at a time
when the United States is preoccupied with more
pressing crises outside Europe. While Washington
has spent the last decade extricating itself militarily
and politically from the Western Balkans and allowing EU institutions to assume the leading role, unresolved disputes that are mishandled by an indecisive
and divided Union could pull Washington back into
the region. This could be evidenced in more intensive
diplomacy and intrusive mediation or even in the context of new peacekeeping missions.
The Paper concludes by offering a number of concrete recommendations for the U.S. administration,
European governments, international institutions,
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and local political leaders to avoid the dangerous pitfalls of state paralysis, territorial fracture, and regional
destabilization. In particular, policies must be geared
toward preventing a scenario whereby U.S. ground
forces are called upon to participate in renewed peacemaking operations. The priorities must include more
comprehensive strategic intelligence gathering, the
identification and monitoring of local and foreign political actors promoting instability, early warning signals that can pinpoint and defuse impending conflicts,
a strong Allied diplomatic response to any deterioration of political conditions, and a firmer transatlantic
strategic commitment to bringing all countries in the
region into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and the EU.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Political developments in the Western Balkans
with a direct impact on regional security must be
closely monitored. In several countries, disputes continue over the validity of administrative borders and
the credibility of specific governments, and, in some
cases, over the legitimacy of statehood itself. Democratic progress becomes problematic where state
building is incomplete and contested. Furthermore,
internally conflicted and externally contested states
present challenges for European Union (EU) integration, where the focus of the EU must not only be on
democratic consolidation and economic reform but
also on institutional legitimacy, state building, and
regional security.
Economic stagnation throughout the EU will have
negative consequences for the Western Balkans. It
curtails investment and credits, raises opposition
to further EU enlargement, and reinforces Western
Balkan reform fatigue. Such developments provide
space for populists and nationalists who will benefit from economic stagnation and public frustration
and trumpet xenophobia as a solution to mounting
domestic challenges.
The political status quo controlled by entrenched
parties coupled with growing economic inequalities,
a lack of sufficient judicial reform, the pervasiveness
of official corruption, a sense of injustice, and unfulfilled economic and occupational expectations among
citizens all have a negative impact on stability. They
deepen public alienation, demoralization, resentment,
and anger; increase crime and lawlessness; provide
ammunition to new protest movements; and encourage extremism. Such sentiments can be turned against
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ethnic and religious minorities or toward broader
causes such as border revisions and territorial acquisitions that fuel conflicts with nearby states and with
international players.
The Western Balkan region has acquired a proliferation of precedents regarding national and territorial self-determination, autonomy, and secession that
could be adopted by current or aspiring ethno-national leaders. Minority representatives in a number of
states have viewed the fracturing of Yugoslavia and
the independence of seven of its eight federal units as
potentially repeatable precedents. Moreover, renewed
conflicts over territory will be generated if domestic
ethnic turmoil becomes increasingly interconnected
among neighboring countries.
The EU’s effectiveness as a promoter of reform will
come under growing scrutiny if economic prospects
in the Western Balkans diminish and disillusionment
with the Union as an institutional destination increases. Although EU membership is not the panacea
for resolving every conflict and eliminating all negative trends in the Western Balkans, the credible and
timely prospect of accession into the Union helps keep
democratic reforms on track as conditions for entry.
Without such reforms, much of the progress achieved
in the Western Balkans since the end of the Wars of
Yugoslav Succession (1991-99) can stall or even unravel, and U.S. disengagement from the region will
appear premature.
The EU has entered a period of prolonged economic uncertainty, social turmoil, political dispute, and
institutional confusion. While the Union’s limitations
as a hard power have been evident in its disjointed
foreign policies and restricted military capabilities, its
political and economic model may also fade as an in-
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strument of attraction if it closes its doors to further
enlargement and if the Union begins to splinter in the
midst of the expanding economic crisis.
In recent years, the United States has been preoccupied with pressing priorities outside Europe and
now plays a diminished role in the Western Balkans.
While Washington has spent the last decade extracting itself from the region and allowing EU institutions
to assume the leading role, renewed conflicts that are
mishandled by an indecisive and divided EU could
again pull the United States back into the region in
dealing more directly with a spiral of instability.
A number of policies must be pursued to prevent
a scenario whereby America’s European partners call
upon U.S. ground forces to participate in peacemaking or peacekeeping missions in the Western Balkans.
Such priorities must include more comprehensive
strategic intelligence gathering, the identification of
local and foreign political actors promoting instability,
early warning signals regarding impending conflicts,
a strong diplomatic response to any deterioration of
political conditions in each Balkan state, and a firmer
U.S. and Allied strategic commitment to bringing all
countries in the region into the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the EU.
October 2012
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RETURN OF THE BALKANS:
CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
AND U.S. DISENGAGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION: UNCERTAIN FUTURES
For the first time in its modern history, the entire
Balkan Peninsula has the opportunity to coexist under
one security and developmental umbrella combining
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
the European Union (EU). Unfortunately, European
and American leaders have been unable to complete
such a unique historic vision, while the progress of
several Western Balkan countries continues to be undermined by a plethora of political, social, economic,
and ethno-national tensions and disputes. This monograph focuses on the escalating security challenges
facing the Western Balkans, assesses the shortcomings
and deficiencies of current international engagement,
considers future prospects for U.S. military involvement, and offers recommendations for curtailing conflict and promoting the region’s international institutional integration.
The Failed State Index, an annual ranking of 177
states based on their levels of domestic stability and
institutional capacity, places Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia, Kosova, and Macedonia within the “warning”
category.1 In these countries, social, economic, and
political indicators highlight the potential for turmoil
and disruptions in the functioning of the state with
renewed bouts of inter-communal tensions, violence,
and possible insurgency.
Although EU membership is not the panacea
for resolving all conflicts and negative trends in the
Western Balkans, the credible and timely prospect of
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accession into the Union helps keep democratic reforms on track as conditions for EU entry. Without
such reforms, much of the progress achieved in the
Western Balkans since the end of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession (1991-99) can stall or even unravel,
and U.S. disengagement from the region will turn out
to be premature. Moreover, renewed conflicts will be
generated if domestic turmoil with ethnic dimensions in several Balkan states becomes increasingly
interconnected.
The EU’s limitations as a hard power have been
evident for many years in its disjointed foreign policies and restricted military capabilities. However, its
political and economic model may also be fading as an
instrument of attraction if it closes its doors to further
enlargement or indefinitely delays prospects for new
members. A sentiment of skepticism within the EU toward further enlargement has grown among EU publics during the era of austerity and as the budgetary
and debt crisis have propelled several Mediterranean
countries toward prolonged economic uncertainty
that generates social and political turmoil. Even more
ominously, if the Union itself begins to splinter in the
midst of its protracted economic crisis, the possibility
of institutional closure may leave the Western Balkan
states stranded.
The EU’s soft power capabilities are waning for
several reasons, including internal resistance among
member states to further enlargement, given the
Union’s relentless economic and financial problems;
disappointment with the performance of recent members Romania and Bulgaria, as well as with older
members such as Greece, Italy, and Spain, which are
encumbered by massive sovereign debts; and the
unfulfilled commitments of several Western Balkan
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aspirants in their quest for EU accession. Europe’s
economic downturn will have negative consequences
for the Western Balkans. It will curtail investment
and credits in the region, encourage EU enlargement exhaustion, and reinforce Western Balkan reform fatigue. It will also create space for populists
and nationalists, who will benefit from economic
stagnation and public anger and promulgate ethnonationalism and xenophobia as solutions to mounting
domestic challenges.
As economic prospects in the Western Balkans
are likely to diminish in the near term, disillusionment with the EU as an institutional destination may
also spread. The Union’s effectiveness as an institution builder and a factor of stability will come under greater scrutiny. This can occur at a time when
the United States is preoccupied with more pressing
crises outside Europe and calculates that it can only
play a secondary role in the Balkans. Increasingly
interconnected conflicts will undermine reformist
leaders and once again raise group identity and ethno-nationalism to the forefront. Recession and economic hardships decrease trust not only in incumbent
governments but also in democratic institutions and
international agencies.
Factors with a direct impact on Western Balkan security need to be closely monitored. Regional disputes
remain active over the status of specific territories,
the validity of administrative borders, the credibility
of specific governments, and, in some cases, over the
legitimacy of statehood itself.2 Democratic progress
is difficult where state building is incomplete and
contested. Furthermore, incomplete, conflicted, and
contested states present challenges for EU integration, where the focus of the Union must not only be

3

on democratic consolidation and economic reform but
also on state building, institutional legitimacy, and
regional stability.
For example, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a divided state whose legitimacy continues to be questioned
internally. Meanwhile, the EU is hesitant to press for
solutions without consensus among leaders of the
three major ethno-national groups. This position has
perpetuated the political and institutional stalemate
that blocks EU accession. At the same time, the EU has
failed to upgrade Kosova to the status of a contractual partner with prospects for Union entry.3 Five EU
members do not recognize Kosova’s statehood, and
EU representatives are fearful of alienating Serbia and
stimulating greater regional instability.
The Western Balkans have acquired a proliferation
of precedents regarding national self-determination,
territorial autonomy, and outright secession that
could be adopted by current or aspiring ethno-national leaders. Minority representatives in a number of
states have viewed the fracturing of Yugoslavia and
the independence of seven of its eight federal units as
potentially repeatable precedents. Moreover, renewed
conflicts will be generated if domestic turmoil with
ethnic dimensions becomes increasingly interconnected among neighboring countries.
For instance, the independence of Kosova, a formerly autonomous region of Serbia that also possessed federal status in Yugoslavia, has been claimed
as a usable precedent by the autonomous Serb entity in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and potentially by other minority enclaves in the region. The opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that Kosova’s declaration
of independence did not conflict with international
law has given ammunition to other separatist lead-
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ers and regions, even though the ICJ did not support
Kosova’s right to independence.4 However, in such
cases, perceived precedents are more important than
the implications of international law.
A plausible partition of Kosova, with four northern municipalities containing a Serbian majority that
does not recognize the legitimacy of Kosova’s independence and decides to detach from the state, could
spark demands for similar separation in Macedonia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. Even if
a territorial division was conducted peacefully and by
mutual agreement between the governments in Belgrade and Prishtina, it could encourage other minority populations to follow the Kosova Serb example.
Political intransigence and the creation of parallel and
separate administrative structures would be designed
to convince international actors that a joint state is not
feasible and ultimately destabilizing. Partition would
be presented as the only viable option even though
such territorial dismemberment would not comply
with any administrative borders inherited from the
former federal Yugoslavia.
In sum, the region can descend into a gray zone
where splutters of progress in pursuit of reform are
followed by prolonged periods of stagnation or even
reversal. Such conditions provide fertile terrain for varieties of political radicalism and nationalist extremism and heighten exposure to destabilizing foreign
influences. Although these are unlikely to generate
extensive armed conflicts, as witnessed in the 1990s,
they will create pockets of insecurity and violence
that can disqualify several states from any immediate
prospect of EU membership. Such exclusion would, in
turn, prolong and exacerbate local disputes.
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These negative scenarios would place the onus
on key international actors. While the United States
has spent the last decade gradually extricating itself
militarily and politically from the region and allowing
EU institutions to assume the leading role, unresolved
disputes that are mishandled by an indecisive and
divided Union could pull Washington back into the
region by having to deal more directly with a spiral
of instability. This could be evident in more intensive
diplomacy and intrusive mediation or even in the context of new peacekeeping missions.
Several urgent policies need to be pursued by
Washington to prevent a scenario whereby America’s
European partners call upon U.S. ground forces to
participate in renewed peacemaking or peacekeeping
operations in the Western Balkans. These priorities
must include more comprehensive strategic intelligence gathering, the identification and monitoring of
local and foreign political actors promoting instability, early warning signals that can pinpoint and defuse impending conflicts, a strong Allied diplomatic
response to any deterioration of political conditions
or inter-ethnic relations in each Balkan state and at
the interstate level, and a firmer transatlantic strategic commitment to bringing all countries in the region
into NATO and the EU.
This monograph assesses the prospects for further
turbulence and conflict in the Western Balkans and
the implications for U.S. policy and potential future
military engagement. It focuses in turn on Serbian aspirations, the Bosniak national revival, regional Albanianism, the Macedonian impasse, the shortcomings
of the EU, and the impact of U.S. and NATO downsizing in the region. It subsequently summarizes the numerous causes of domestic and regional disputes and
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outlines several negative consequences and conflict
scenarios. The analysis concludes by offering a number of prescriptions and recommendations for the U.S.
administration, European governments, international
institutions, and local political leaders to avoid the
dangerous pitfalls of state paralysis, territorial fracture, and regional destabilization.
II. SERBIAN ASPIRATIONS
In December 2011, Serbian President Boris Tadic
issued a warning that the country could again sink
into nationalism if there were long delays in Serbia’s
progress toward EU membership.5 Although the message was received with some skepticism as a ploy to
convince Brussels to give Serbia EU candidate status,
it also indicated some anxiety about the country’s political undercurrents.
In its progress report to the European Council on
October 12, 2011, the European Commission recommended that Serbia be granted the status of an EU candidate country. However, the report also concluded
that Belgrade’s accession process should be withheld
until it complied with EU requirements over Serbia’s
former province of Kosova by achieving “significant
progress” in normalizing relations with the government in Prishtina. This would entail Belgrade’s cooperation with the EU’s rule of law (EULEX) mission in
Kosova, respect for Kosova’s territorial integrity, and
agreement regarding Prishtina’s participation in all
regional forums.
The Serbian authorities did not meet all the EU
stipulations. Nevertheless, with the Tadic government staking its political future on Union accession
and arguing that any pre-election concessions over
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Kosova would provoke a nationalist backlash, EU
capitals became anxious that Serbia’s exclusion could
give fresh ammunition to radical parties. As a result,
Brussels, Belgium, granted Serbia EU candidate status
on March 1, 2012, on the eve of its general elections.
However, this decision proved insufficient to diminish public support for a more nationalist option in
both the presidential and parliamentary ballots.
Nationalist Undercurrents.
The presidential victory of former ultra-nationalist
Tomislav Nikolic on May 20, 2012, injected a dose of
uncertainty about Serbia’s political development. In
addition, on July 27, 2012, Ivica Dacic, the Socialist
Party leader and former spokesman for former dictator Slobodan Milosevic, was sworn in as Prime Minister in the new government, stoking fears that Belgrade could adopt a more assertive nationalism in its
foreign policy.
Several regional leaders refused to attend the inauguration of President Nikolic due to his controversial
past and inflammatory comments after the elections.6
Slovenian President Danilo Tuerk, the Chairman of
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Presidency Bakir Izetbegovic,
and Croatian President Ivo Josipovic boycotted the
ceremony. Nikolic sparked controversy with his postelection statements denying that genocide had been
perpetrated in Srebrenica in July 1995 and calling the
Croatian town of Vukovar a Serbian city to which displaced Croats should not return.
Three major dangers face Serbia at its most testing time since the fall of Milosevic in October 2000:
economic decline, political radicalization, and international isolation. Nikolic competed for the presidency
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primarily over prescriptions to rescue a faltering economy. The majority of impoverished citizens voted
against the incumbent President Boris Tadic, believing
that Nikolic could alleviate their material distress. His
Progressive Party vowed to invest in agriculture and
industry and increase taxes on the rich to fund state
pensions. However, such propositions may prove to
be unrealistic in practice.
Serbia’s economic performance is deteriorating
and a mood of public frustration and disenchantment
is spreading. Unemployment stands at around 25 percent and is rising, having almost doubled in 3 years,
while gross domestic product (GDP) growth is projected at a mere 0.5 percent in 2012 after falling below
2 percent in 2011. Meanwhile, Serbia’s foreign debt
has reached 24 billion euros and is steadily climbing.
Some local observers believe that Serbia could follow Greece toward insolvency and a potential social
explosion as high unemployment invariably drives
populism and youth radicalism.
Despite his bold election pledges, President Nikolic
has little room for maneuver during the Europe-wide
economic downturn. The new leadership will be expected to negotiate with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to unfreeze much-needed funding. Meanwhile, the EU will review Serbia’s qualifications to begin projected accession talks. However, both EU and
IMF conditions for Belgrade will necessitate financial
discipline, including public-sector wage freezes, redundancies, and even pension cuts. Moreover, any
major tax increases for entrepreneurs, as proposed by
the new President, are likely to scare off foreign investors. In fact, Serbia’s economic conditions are likely to
deteriorate further throughout 2013.
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Politically, whereas a broad coalition government seemed more likely to keep Serbia’s reforms on
track, it would enable Belgrade to better prepare for
accession talks with the EU, resume the suspended
dialogue with Prishtina, and implement the agreements already reached with Kosova, the more narrow
Progressive-Socialist coalition, led by Prime Minister
Ivica Dacic, could prove less accommodating.7 This
may exacerbate political polarization between reformist and nationalist camps and further divide society at
a time of growing economic frustration.
Economic distress, political division, and social
turmoil can inject stronger doses of nationalism into
foreign policy. During the election campaign, Nikolic
promised that Serbia would not stray from its “European path.” But remaining on this path will prove
problematic if the new President exploits the status
of both Kosova and Bosnia-Herzegovina to score domestic political points. Moreover, such an approach
would encourage Serbian leaders in northern Kosova
and in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (RS) to harden their
positions and press more resolutely toward autonomy
and even secession.
Serbia’s assertiveness would, in turn, provoke nationalist responses among neighboring states suffering from their own economic problems and political
disputes. It can also isolate Serbia, and instead of remaining on the European path, Nikolic could reach toward Russia to buttress his presidency. Instructively,
on his first foreign trip after the elections, President
Nikolic was warmly received in the Kremlin where
President Vladimir Putin asserted that the Serbs were
Russia’s “spiritual brothers.”
In reality, relations between Moscow and Belgrade
have been marked by mutual exploitation rather than
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solidarity. When Slobodan Milosevic captured the
Serbian state and destroyed the Yugoslav federation
in the early 1990s, he manipulated Russia to defend
himself against Western pressure. He needed President Boris Yeltsin to demonstrate that Serbia was not
alone, while carving up territories in neighboring
republics to create an ethnically homogenous state.
Yeltsin also needed Milosevic to prove that Russia remained a major power even though the Soviet Union
had disintegrated and Moscow had lost its East European satellites. Belgrade played on Russia’s superpower ambitions while Moscow exploited Serbia’s
mini-imperialist dreams.
However, unlike Milosevic who was manipulative
toward Russia, Serbian nationalists appear to be more
gullible. For instance, Nikolic once asserted that he
would prefer to see Serbia as a Russian province rather than an EU member. When Nikolic was Speaker of
the Serbian parliament, he also claimed that Moscow
was bringing together nations to stand up against the
hegemony of America and the EU.8
Former President Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic
Party of Serbia is a pivot of the Eurosceptic bloc and
will support the new government if it adopts a harder
line on the international arena. Additionally, the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) openly
sides with nationalist and social conservative political
groups.9 For example, the head of the church, Patriarch Irinej, has backed the unification of Serb-inhabited lands in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and
Kosova with Serbia. In seeking to reclaim its position
as the “state religion,” the church has been active in
the media, army, and educational system, and is publicly outspoken about government policy.
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However, following Irinej’s election as patriarch in
early 2010, differences have surfaced in the SOC hierarchy between a more modern stream that reaches out
to other denominations and a traditional conservative
institution represented by Bishop Artemije, the former
head of the Raška-Prizren Diocese in Sandzak and
Kosova. Artemije maintains close ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and appears supportive of the
Kremlin agenda in the Balkans. Disputes between the
two religious tendencies can also contribute to polarizing and radicalizing political discourse in Serbia.
Small ultra-nationalist groups have also emerged in
Serbia in recent years, including Obraz with a clericalmonarchist agenda; the ultra-nationalist Serbian National Movement (SNP) 1389, led by Igor Marinkovic;
the Ravna Gora movement that seeks to rehabilitate
the World War II Cetnik leader Draza Mihailovic
and upholds his Greater Serbia ideology; and the
pro-Church organization Dveri Srbske. These groups
view much of the Serbian political establishment as
national traitors over such questions as Kosova and
Bosnia’s RS. They popularize their extremist ideas and
recruit members primarily through the Internet and
the social media.
Serbia vs. Kosova.
One of the most persistent obstacles to security and
interstate cooperation in the Western Balkans is the
stalled relationship between Serbia and Kosova. The
two governments have diametrically differing positions on Kosova’s statehood. While Prishtina has tried
to leverage Washington and Brussels to gain more extensive international recognitions and enter the major
multinational institutions, Belgrade’s primary foreign
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policy objective has been to freeze Kosova’s status and
prevent its international inclusion.
Despite prolonged U.S. and EU involvement, little
progress has been visible in forging a rudimentary
partnership between the two countries. Moreover, the
focus on gaining or precluding international recognition and integration has contributed to obstructing
necessary economic and institutional reforms, constricted the process of state building in Kosova, and
oriented international attention toward crisis management rather than regional development and Euro-Atlantic assimilation.
The launching of a dialogue between the governments of Serbia and Kosova, mandated by the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2010,
sponsored by the EU, and supported by the United
States, was supposed to break the deadlock by unfreezing relations between the two capitals and developing points of cooperation. Although the talks were
initiated in March 2011, their purpose and outcome
has been subject to contradictory interpretations. They
are unlikely to either eliminate Serbia’s obstructive
opposition to Kosova’s sovereignty or provide impetus for transforming Kosova into a fully functioning
state and member of international organizations such
as the UN.
EU officials perceive the talks as a demonstration
that disputes and practical problems between Serbia
and Kosova can be resolved with the assistance of
Brussels. U.S. officials generally share the EU perspective but would like to see the dialogue as a steppingstone toward Kosova’s recognition as an independent
state by all European capitals, as this would help propel the country into international institutions.
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Serbia’s leaders have viewed the talks instrumentally both as a means for gaining EU candidate status and as a method for delaying any further recognitions for Kosova. The government in Prishtina has
been much less sanguine about the discussions with
Belgrade and was pressured into accepting the dialogue without the prospect of any tangible rewards.
The Tadic administration appointed political director
of the Foreign Ministry Borko Stefanovic as head of
the delegation for the talks. Belgrade’s team did not
include senior government officials to minimize the
appearance of legitimizing dialogue with a state that
Serbia does not recognize.
President Tadic was prepared to meet with Kosovar Prime Minister Hashim Thaci despite allegations
that the latter was involved in war crimes during the
NATO-Serbia conflict. In December 2010, Dick Marty,
a member of the Council of Europe (CoE) Parliamentary Assembly, issued a report alleging the killing of
prisoners and the removal and illicit trafficking of
human organs by members of the Kosova Liberation
Army (KLA), in which Thaci held a senior position.
The allegations remain under investigation, while
Tadic stated that unless Thaci was formally indicted,
he was prepared to meet with any credible Albanian
representative without recognizing the legitimacy of
the government in Prishtina. It will be instructive to
see if President Nikolic adopts the same approach as
his predecessor.
A second objective for Belgrade to engage in talks
is to halt any further recognitions for Kosova by making these seem contingent on the long-term outcome
of the dialogue. Belgrade does not consider Kosova’s
final status to be resolved and will studiously avoid
acknowledging its statehood. A third government
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goal is to ease domestic pressure from nationalists
who charge that officials have neglected the Kosova
question. Although Kosova does not figure as a hot
political issue on a daily basis, it can rebound against
the authorities if Belgrade is perceived as surrendering its claims to the territory or making major concessions to Prishtina.
Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic represented the less
compromising stream within the Serbian administration and protected the government’s flank from
nationalist attacks. He will continue to campaign
against Kosova’s international recognition after being
appointed President of the UN General Assembly in
June 2012. Jeremic periodically launched initiatives
to bring Kosova’s statehood into question, including
an International Court of Justice process to obtain a
ruling on Kosova’s declaration of independence, mobilizing the Yugoslav-era Non-Aligned Movement
against separatism, appealing to Russia to back Serbia’s diplomatic maneuvers, and focusing on the CoE
investigations of Prime Minister Thaci to delegitimize
the government in Prishtina.
The Tadic administration remained adamant that
direct negotiations with Prishtina did not signal recognition of Kosova as an equal partner or a fullyfledged state. Instead, Belgrade’s agenda for the talks
involved a number of practical issues supported by
the EU, including accounting for people missing following the 1999 war, resolving transport and telecommunications problems, and legalizing documents for
Serbs living in Kosova.
Prishtina’s agenda in the talks included the exchange of civil documentation such as the civil register and property records held by Belgrade; removing
obstacles to cooperation in the Central European Free
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Trade Area (CEFTA) and other regional initiatives
where Belgrade blocked Prishtina’s participation;
ensuring freedom of movement through the recognition of passports, customs stamps, license plates, and
driving licenses; the acceptance of school diplomas by
both states; developing telecommunications and energy links; and the return of looted property.
Local analysts believe that Thaci pushed ahead
with the dialogue to undo some of the damage to his
credibility stemming from allegations of war crimes.
The Marty report and the CoE investigations have
been strongly criticized by all political parties in
Kosova. There is a widespread supposition that the
main purpose of the report was to delegitimize the
new state and allow Serbian authorities to depict Albanians as co-responsible for war crimes. Opposition
parties also urged the government not to start talks
with Belgrade without the approval of the Kosova Assembly. Assembly speaker Jakup Krasniqi argued that
parliament should adopt a resolution to determine the
topics of the dialogue. His request was disregarded by
the government as pressures mounted from the EU to
launch the talks.
Washington stated that it would play a supportive
role in the dialogue, with the EU setting the agenda.
U.S. Ambassador to Kosova Christopher Dell declared
that the talks should not tackle the question of Kosova’s status or territorial integrity. The U.S. Department
of State may have calculated that a more prominent
American role could push Serbia into requesting that
Russia join the dialogue, thereby creating potential
rifts between Washington and Moscow.
Prishtina has been adamant on three questions:
that the talks cannot call into question Kosova’s final
status; that Kosova’s borders are inviolable; and that
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Serbia must have no say in Kosova’s administrative
structure. In the optimum scenario, Prishtina calculates that the discussions may begin a process that will
normalize relations with Serbia as an impetus for EU
integration. Kosova’s goal is for the dialogue to conclude with reciprocal recognition, the mutual acceptance of territorial integrity, and the affiliation of both
countries inside the EU. In reality, EU officials have
made no linkage between the talks and Prishtina’s integration in the Union.
Kosova’s political opposition challenged the legitimacy of any dialogue with Serbia without Belgrade’s
explicit recognition of Kosova’s statehood. This criticism was buttressed by the constitutional crisis in
April 2011 when Kosova’s President Behgjet Pacolli
had to resign because of procedural irregularities, and
fresh elections were held in parliament for the head of
state. The new administration planned to change the
constitution in favor of direct presidential elections.
According to the Kosovar opposition, Belgrade
and Prishtina should only conduct a dialogue as two
distinct and mutually recognizing states; otherwise,
the EU-sponsored talks favored Belgrade. Opposition
leaders contend that the EU has become “status neutral” vis-à-vis Kosova in an effort to pull Serbia closer
to the Union. Ultimately, the talks could delegitimize
the Kosovar administration domestically, especially if
Prishtina is pressed to make concessions that are seen
to subvert statehood.
An agreement reached on February 24, 2012, between Belgrade and Prishtina regarding Kosova’s
representation in regional organizations unleashed a
storm of controversy.10 According to the deal, Kosova
would be represented simply under the name “Kosovo,” not the Republic of Kosova, and with a footnote
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that appeared to challenge the country’s independence. The qualification read: “This label (Kosovo)
does not prejudge the status of Kosovo and is in accordance with Resolution 1244 and the opinion of the
International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration
of independence.” If the Kosova naming decision
is perceived as a victory for Serbia in undermining
Kosova’s independence, it may serve to embolden
rather than pacify nationalist demands on both sides.
Partition Proposals.
Kosova’s partition is not the official policy of the
Serbian government. Nonetheless, there are strong
indications that this is Belgrade’s ultimate objective.
Some Serbian analysts believe that the bilateral talks
may become a smokescreen for relinquishing Kosova,
while gaining its northern districts for Serbia. This
would not mean formal recognition of a rump Kosova
as an independent state but rather an impetus for the
eventual merger of a truncated Kosova with Albania
and the absorption of northern Kosova by Serbia.
Serbia’s promotion of Kosova’s partition is based
on the assumption that the EU is weak without intensive American involvement as well as by potential
Russian support for Serbian secession.11 In such a scenario, Belgrade would not surrender Albanian majority districts in southern Serbia as part of a potential
territorial exchange with Prishtina. Instead, Serbian
officials may be hoping for a future grand deal with
Tirana over the heads of Kosovar leaders. In a statement to the media on March 18, 2011, President Tadic
spoke about a “historic solution” between Serbs and
Albanians and hinted that this could be an agreement
to partition Kosova.12 Current Prime Minister Ivica
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Dacic openly stated on May 18, 2011, when he was still
the Interior Minister, that the only possible compromise was Kosova’s division.13
Approximately 60,000 Serbs live in northern Kosova alongside 4,000 Albanians and 3,000 members of
other ethnic groups. Serbs form majorities in four
municipalities—Leposavic, Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and
Kosovska Mitrovica. Serbs and Albanians have little
contact, as the latter live mostly in isolated villages
and the two communities are separated in Mitrovica,
the largest town.
While officially part of Kosova, the region has
been under the de facto control of separate institutions funded by Belgrade, including town councils,
health authorities, post offices, and schools. Several
local Serbian organizations are openly hostile to the
international presence and are considered illegal by
Prishtina. They include the Union of Serbian Districts
and District Units of Kosovo and Metohija, the Serbian National Council for Kosovo and Metohija, and a
Serbian Assembly. Officials in Belgrade calculate that
promoting parallel structures in the north will create a
fait accompli for the creation of a Serbian autonomous
region or for outright partition.14
During a visit to Belgrade on August 23, 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded that the
Serbian authorities assist in dismantling all parallel
structures in northern Kosova. Belgrade claims it has
little actual influence over the area and the minority
has established its own institutions. The abstention of
Serbs in the northern municipalities during Kosova’s
general elections and their boycott of Kosova’s institutions pose the greatest challenge for Prishtina. This
subregion has become the main source of instability
and is almost entirely outside of Kosova’s legal system.
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The Kosova government accepted the internationally
mandated Martti Ahtisaari plan, which stipulates elements of self-rule for the Serbian minority in cultural,
educational, social, and other affairs. However, this
has not satisfied Serbian activists who campaign for
full separation and union with Serbia.
Prishtina recognizes extensive decentralization,
but it will not countenance regional autonomy that
could turn Kosova into another Bosnia-Herzegovina
with two entities that paralyze the central government. Prishtina also rejects any form of northern autonomy with power-sharing arrangements between
Belgrade and Prishtina in which Serbia would play
a political role inside Kosova. Belgrade has also proposed a tripartite agreement with Prishtina and Brussels in which Serbia would “delegate” sovereignty to
Kosova. The other two parties rejected the scheme, as
it undermines Kosova’s independence.
According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon, both “partition and land swaps are unacceptable solutions. If any such process is set in motion, there is no way that it can be confined to a single
boundary line or that it can end peacefully.”15 Despite
such warnings, the division of Kosova and exchange
of territories have been discussed in both Prishtina and
Belgrade. The question will continue to surface in the
coming years. Kosovar Albanians are not prepared for
any border concessions but may be more open to territorial exchanges with southern Serbian municipalities
in the Presevo valley containing Albanian majorities.
Some analysts and officials privately assert that
without stronger U.S. involvement in the Serbia-Kosova dialogue and in canvassing for Kosova’s international recognition and membership of multinational
institutions, the EU could veer from “status neutral”
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to “status negative” regarding Kosova’s statehood.
With Brussels in the lead role, partition could then be
viewed as a viable option to placate Belgrade but may
unwittingly intensify Albanian nationalism throughout the region.
Serbia’s EU candidacy without commensurate
progress by Kosova could create new obstacles for
Prishtina by emboldening Belgrade to be more obstructive in future negotiations. Some EU officials and
former representatives have voiced support for broad
autonomy for northern Kosova, including Sweden’s
Foreign Minister Carl Bild.16 Tadic backed such suggestions by stating that potential models for northern
Kosova could be Northern Ireland within the United
Kingdom or South Tyrol within Italy.17 The former coordinator of the South East European Stability Pact,
Erhard Busek, reportedly stated that an exchange of
territory between Serbia and Kosova (Presevo valley
for northern Kosova) might be the best solution for the
region.18 Other analysts have dismissed such proposals as stimulating further demands for autonomy and
secession in several post-Yugoslav states.
Kosova’s Violent Prospects.
Without credible international deterrents, the
prospects for instability will accelerate in Kosova in
the midst of economic distress and social turmoil.
Numerous incidents of violence have occurred in recent years, including a standoff at two border crossings between Kosova and Serbia during the summer
of 2011 when Prishtina wanted to establish its control
by deploying units of the Kosova Police Force (KPF)
but was thwarted by local squads of Serbian civilians.
NATO eventually took over security along the border
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to prevent any escalation of violence while EULEX assumed control over the Jarinje and Brnjak border posts.
The border crossings continued to be flash points for
violence.19 In early April 2012, Kosovo Forces (KFOR)
peacekeepers informed Serb leaders that they planned
to close illegal roads used to bypass the official border
posts. Local Serbs blocked roads in the area for several
months protesting over the presence of Kosova police
and customs officials.20
On November 29, 2011, UN Kosova mission chief
Farid Zarif warned that serious violence could erupt
in the north at any time. This followed clashes between protesting Serbs and NATO forces that left 30
NATO soldiers and some 100 Serbs injured.21 KFOR
commanders issued alerts that conflicts could flare up
either as a result of actions by the Kosova authorities
or by groups of local Serbs.22 This could happen either
if the government in Prishtina attempted to establish
full authority in the north or if Serbs initiated violence
to provoke a crackdown and directly involve Belgrade
in the ensuing crisis. Kosova’s Interior Minister Bajram
Rexhepi warned that force may be required to restore
freedom of movement and the removal of barricades.
Local referenda or elections in northern Kosova
outside of Prishtina’s authority can also become a tripwire for violence. The four municipalities with a majority Serbian population held separate elections on May
30, 2010, unopposed by the international presence and
with Prishtina powerless to intervene. Nationalist Serbian parties, including the Serbian Progressive Party
and the Democratic Party of Serbia, dominate local
politics in the region. The northern mayors also reportedly defied Belgrade by holding a referendum on
self-determination on February 14-15, 2012, with over
99 percent of voters rejecting the authority of Kosova’s
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institutions. However, it was unclear whether local
leaders were pursuing separate policies or coordinating closely with Belgrade while creating the impression of a rupture so that Serbia would not be blamed
for supporting partition.
Belgrade has warned the government in Prishtina
against forceful intervention in the north. Internal Affairs Minister Dacic stated in October 2011 that an attack by Kosova security forces on Mitrovica would be
considered an attack on Belgrade.23 Tensions escalated
ahead of Serbia’s local elections on May 6, 2012, as
Belgrade planned to hold them on Kosova’s territory.
They included a series of arrests and abductions by
security forces in both countries in March and April
2012. Kosova’s police arrested four Serbs in possession
of voting lists and election material, while Belgrade
retaliated by arresting two Kosova Albanian police officers patrolling the border.24
Kosova Albanians in the Serb-run section of Mitrovica demanded an increased police presence in their
neighborhoods after a bomb blast killed an Albanian
on April 8, 2012. Since Kosova gained independence
in February 2008, Albanians in Serb-majority municipalities have been subjected to various pressures. The
opposition Movement for Self-Determination (MSD)
urged the President of Kosova to declare a state of
emergency in Mitrovica.25 It also demanded that
NATO protect Albanians in the north from violence,
while war veterans from the former KLA claimed that
if the situation was not resolved, they would “organize
the population” to protect itself.26 Opposition politicians blame the Prishtina government for tolerating
the existence of parallel institutions and armed units,
thus heightening the likelihood of Albanian retaliation.27 Serbian gangs prone to violence have formed in
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the north and are linked to ultra-nationalistic movements in Serbia whose representatives regularly visit
the area.
Other developments could also engender conflict.
For instance, Prishtina’s investment in reconstructing
houses for Albanians in the north may spark violence,
as Serbs view this as attempts to increase the Albanian
presence. At the same time, EULEX is not equipped
to respond effectively if violence were to break out.
Several countries have withdrawn their special police
units that could intervene in controlling crowds. The
burden in handling riots and street violence now rests
primarily with NATO’s KFOR, which is unsuited to
such tasks. Moreover, KFOR cannot cover the entire
country if violence were to spread beyond the northern municipalities.
During 2012, numerous violent ethnically motivated incidents took place in Kosova. In early April, this
included the stoning by Albanian youths of a Serbian
delegation attending talks with their Kosovar counterparts in Prishtina, clashes between Albanian and Serbian soccer fans in the Serb enclave of Gracanica, the
arrest of four Serbs by Kosovar police for transporting Serbian local election material, and the apprehension of selected Kosovar citizens along the border by
Serbian police.28
Following intense pressure from Brussels and
Washington, Serbia’s Minister for Kosova Goran Bogdanovic announced on April 15, 2012, that Belgrade
would not organize local elections in Kosova. However, he also asserted that Serbia would not close its
institutions in northern Kosova and that instead of
elected officials, the Serbian government would appoint municipal leaders.29 As a precaution against violent clashes during the May balloting, in which Serbs
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were allowed to vote for Serbia’s parliamentary and
presidential elections, a KFOR spokesperson requested that NATO send more troops to Kosova. At that
time, 550 German and 150 Austrian soldiers were deployed along the lines, dividing the two ethnic communities in Mitrovica.30
On June 28, 2012, there were clashes between
Kosova police and Serbian activists on the border at
Merdare and a subsequent attack on Serb buses in
Prishtina.31 A group of fans from Belgrade Football
Club Partizan entered Kosova without the permission
of the authorities to attend celebrations marking the
1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje. Kosova President Atifete
Jahjaga stated that the men had attacked police with
the intention of destabilizing the security situation.
Subsequently, Albanian youths attacked Serbs on a
bus in Gracanica, a mainly Serb municipality close
to Prishtina.
The granting of “special status” for northern Kosova, as demanded by some Serbian leaders, would leave
Serbs outside the four municipalities more vulnerable
to pressure from the Albanian majority. Kosova’s
Serbs may perceive such a status as a prelude toward
separation regardless of Belgrade’s agreements with
Prishtina. The achievement of enhanced autonomy
would also increase demands for a similar status
for the Albanian majority in three municipalities of
southern Serbia.
Ivica Dacic, Serbia’s incoming Prime Minister at the
time, provocatively claimed that the new government
would insist on stationing Serbian security forces in
Kosova to protect local Serbs.32 NATO peacekeepers
were also placed on alert in preparation for the opening of a Kosova government office in northern Mitrovica. The office would provide services and coordinate
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investment, while its head, Adrijana Hodzic, would
have the authority of a municipal president. Belgrade
described the office as a provocation. Oliver Ivanovic,
State Secretary in the Serbian Ministry for Kosova,
claimed the office would antagonize local Serbs and
that the separate local administration would increase
its authority in response.
Serbia vs. Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Milorad Dodik, the President of Republika Srpska
(RS), one of the two entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
has periodically asserted that the country will disintegrate.33 Dodik himself has contributed to promoting
such a scenario. In October 2011, he publicly claimed
that Bosnia-Herzegovina was a failed international
experiment and that the Serbs overwhelmingly supported secession.34 In response, on October 18, 2011,
Bakir Izetbegovic, the Bosniak member of Bosnia’s
three-member Presidency, published an open letter to
Dodik in which he accused him of sowing fear about
the future of the state.
Dodik claims that Bosniak Muslims seek political
dominance by creating a highly centralized Islamic
state while marginalizing the country’s Serbs and
Croats.35 Izetbegovic accused Dodik of responsibility
for the limbo that Bosnia found itself in by blocking
the formation of a central government after the October 2010 elections. Izetbegovic also addressed Dodik’s claim that polls showed almost 90 percent of
Serbs favoring secession by warning that such statements could precipitate new conflicts. Any attempt to
sabotage the territorial integrity of the country would
allegedly lead to clashes with “patriots” ready to defend the state. Dodik’s representatives subsequently
accused the Bosniaks of preparing for war.
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Among the potential triggers for conflicts is the
status of the Brcko district.36 In March 2000, Brcko was
proclaimed a neutral district by an international tribunal. It was subsequently placed under the authority of
Bosnia’s central government and run by a multiethnic
administration overseen by an international representative. Brcko sits astride a strategic crossroads between
the two entities and between Croatia and Serbia. If the
RS declares independence, Serbs will want to control
the town while the Bosniaks would attempt to sever
the entity at various choke points, including Brcko.
Bosniak Muslim and Croat politicians oppose
ending international supervision in Brcko, as this
could lead to disputes over its neutral status.37 The
Federation parliament accused Bosnian Serb leaders
of lacking commitment to respect their obligations
toward Brcko. Evidently, the RS government failed
to annul its declaration rejecting the international
arbitration’s decision to declare the district neutral.
Bosniak and Croatian leaders prefer that a “national
law” be adopted specifying Brcko’s representation in central state institutions before international
supervision terminates.
Interstate problems also remain between Sarajevo
and Belgrade, including incomplete border demarcations, unclear ownership of pre-war assets, the unresolved status of refugees, and untried war crimes
cases. Although these are unlikely to precipitate outright conflict, they contribute to the mistrust visible in
bilateral relations. Furthermore, the fact that Serbian
government officials meet primarily with RS leaders
in the entity capital of Banja Luka rather than with
Bosnian representatives in Sarajevo also contributes
to maintaining tensions.
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Serbia vs. Montenegro.
Frictions have persisted between Belgrade and
Podgorica since Montenegro voted for independence
in a national referendum on May 21, 2006. They have
revolved around several grievances, including Montenegro’s recognition of Kosova’s independence and
Serbian government support for nationalist Serbian
parties in Montenegro. Podgorica accused the Tadic
presidency of direct involvement in incidents designed
to undermine Montenegro’s independence.38 For instance, Belgrade supported street protests by Serbian
opposition parties and helped them in campaigns to
boost the number of people declaring themselves as
Serbs in the Montenegrin census of April 2011.39
To provide greater support for Serbian populations
in neighboring countries, the government in Belgrade
has pushed for the creation of a “unified cultural space
for Serbs” in the Balkan region and the establishment
of a regional board that would implement a national
strategy toward all Serbs in former Yugoslavia. Serbia’s parliament passed a law on the diaspora and
Serbs in the Region in January 2011 that envisages a
more intrusive role in nearby states.40
The document claims that Serbs are under-represented in public institutions such as central and local governments and that in several post-Yugoslav
countries, they are denied human, minority, and religious rights. The document affirms that the Serbian
government should play the role of a protector of all
Serbs abroad and must provide greater assistance to
the SOC for its cultural and educational role among
the diaspora and in building a regional network of
Serbian organizations.
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The text was critically received by governments
in Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
who viewed it as a prelude to more blatant interference in their domestic affairs. The law states that
Belgrade’s ultimate objective in Montenegro is for
Serbs to achieve “full national rights” as a constitutive and co-equal nation. Belgrade also requested
the opening of three consulates in Montenegro,
which Podgorica declined on the grounds that these
would serve as meeting points for opposition to
Montenegrin statehood.
Despite Serbian complaints, the EU Commission
declared in October 2011 that Montenegro was implementing its Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA) in the areas of democracy, the rule of law, and
minority rights. The new election law introduced affirmative action for the representation of all minorities in
parliamentary elections.41 In May 2012, the authorities
in Podgorica welcomed President Nikolic’s statement
that Montenegrin independence was not reversible,
thereby sending a message to Serbs to reconcile themselves to Montenegrin statehood.42 However, Nikolic
also denied that any differences existed between Serbs
and Montenegrins as nations, thereby provoking critical reactions in Podgorica.
Belgrade’s backing for the SOC, which claims jurisdiction over Montenegro and does not recognize the
Montenegrin Orthodox Church (MOC), also remains
a point of contention. Montenegrin officials charge
that SOC clergy endeavor to undermine Montenegrin
independence. Inter-church battles have revolved
around MOC attempts to recover property from the
SOC that was seized when the first Yugoslavia was
formed in 1918, the MOC was outlawed, and Montenegrin statehood extinguished.43 The dispute has led
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to violent clashes between clerics and has been inflamed by statements from Metropolitan Amfilohije,
the senior SOC cleric in Montenegro, who remains a
firm opponent of Montenegrin independence and has
tried to provoke disputes between Montenegrins and
Albanians to undermine the new state.
Tensions were raised during the holding of Montenegro’s census in April 2011 as Montenegrin and Serb
parties launched extensive campaigns to persuade citizens to unambiguously declare their identity. The results demonstrated that the number of Serbs declined
slightly and the number of Montenegrins increased
since the last census was taken in 2003.44 According
to the 2011 census, ethnic Montenegrins accounted for
44.98 percent of the population, followed by Serbs at
28.73 percent. During the previous decade, the number of Serbs had dropped by 3.26 percent, and the
number of Montenegrins rose by 1.86 percent.45
Officially recorded demographic trends and the
definition of the national language have been major
sources of dispute between Montenegrin and Serbian
leaders. In October 2007, Montenegrin was declared
as the official language of the state, and two new letters were added to the alphabet to distinguish it from
Serbian. Nonetheless, 42.88 percent of Montenegrins
still consider the language they speak as Serbian,
while under 37 percent consider it as Montenegrin.
Compared with the 2003 census, people speaking
Serbian dropped by 20 percent, and people speaking
Montenegrin rose by 14 percent. The language of education also became Montenegrin, and the Latin script
has been favored over Cyrillic. In reaction, Serb leaders have demanded that Serbian be declared as the
second official language, with the right to a distinct
Serbian education also recognized. This could lead to
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educational boycotts and growing animosity between
the two communities that could be exploited by radical political formations.
During 2012, periodic street protests were staged
in Podgorica in response to stagnant economic conditions and official corruption.46 The rallies were attended by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), students, and labor unions, calling for investigations into
all dubious privatizations of former state companies.
A protest march on May 15, 2012, ended in front of
the government building. Among the demands were
an effective campaign against corruption, respect for
students’ and workers’ rights, freedom of speech, and
the resignation of the government.47 Such unrest could
assume an ethno-political dimension, pitting Montenegrins against Serbs, if nationalist politicians decided
to exploit the protests.
Kosova has been another source of contention between Belgrade and Podgorica. Montenegro recognized Kosova’s independence in October 2008, and
2 years later, the two states established diplomatic
relations despite Serbia’s staunch opposition.48 Montenegro’s President Filip Vujanovic has hesitated in
appointing an ambassador to Prishtina until Montenegrins obtain national minority status in Kosova.
Kosova’s President Jahjaga pledged to meet these demands. According to the 1981 census, the last one recognized by the Kosova authorities, over 27,000 Montenegrins live in Kosova. Out of 120 seats in Kosova’s
parliament, 20 are guaranteed for Serbs, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians, Turks, Gorani, and Bosniaks. Montenegrins and Croats are to be included on this list.49
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Vojvodina Spotlight.
Vojvodina is a multiethnic region in northern Serbia in which autonomist sentiments are held across
the ethnic spectrum. According to the 2002 Serbian
census, from a population of two million, Serbs
form 65 percent and Hungarians 14.28 percent, with
the remainder divided between over a dozen ethnic
groups.50 Although separatist conflicts are not imminent in Vojvodina, frustration with Belgrade and the
lack of investment in the region’s economy are propelling sentiments toward greater self-determination and
even statehood. In opinion polls taken at the close of
2011, nearly 10 percent of inhabitants favored Vojvodina becoming a republic, with extensive autonomy
within Serbia or even a separate state.51 In earlier surveys, the number of supporters of the province’s independence only ranged between 1 and 2 percent.
On November 19, 2009, the Vojvodina Assembly
declared a new statute for the province, which was
accepted by the Serbian parliament. The statute has
been criticized by Vojvodinian autonomists as well as
by Serbian nationalists. The autonomists argue that
it fails to strengthen the province’s executive, legislative, and judicial powers and should be replaced by
a separate Vojvodinian constitution.52 They complain
that Belgrade’s failure to pass a law on funding Vojvodina has negatively affected economic development
and that the province should control all of its resources. The President of the Vojvodina Assembly, Sandor
Egereši, contends that Vojvodina’s constitutional jurisdictions need to be resolved by defining the model
of financing and allowing Vojvodina to form its own
police force.53 Vojvodina’s Prime Minister Bojan Pajtić
has stated that the territory acquired only two-thirds
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of its competencies in the process of transferring authority from the state to the province, as stipulated by
the new statute.54
Serbian nationalists expressed outrage over Vojvodina’s new autonomy statute, viewing it as the thin
end of a separatist wedge leading to independence.55
In particular, the Progressive Party, the Socialist
Party, and the Serbian Democratic Party, who favor
Serbia’s centralization, contend that Vojvodina is becoming a quasi-state that will lead to the further disintegration of the country. In protest against growing
autonomy, about 12 of 50 towns and municipalities
in the province refused to hoist the flag of Vojvodina
on their town halls, despite the stipulations of the
regional government.56
In another controversy, Serbian nationalists protested against the inauguration of a Brussels office
for Vojvodina on October 10, 2011, alleging that the
region’s leaders were implementing a separatist agenda.57 Vojvodina officials argued that the office would
enable the region to access European funds and foreign investment. In fact, over 300 regions from various
European states maintain offices in Brussels without
provoking accusations of separatism.
On July 10, 2012, Serbia’s Constitutional Court
ruled that a law granting Vojvodina autonomy was
unconstitutional.58 This ruling ensures that the province will no longer have jurisdiction over environmental, agricultural, and rural development policies.
Nationalist political parties welcomed the court’s decision. Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the Democratic
Party of Serbia, claimed the court had defended Serbia
from further separatism. The court also disputed the
designation of Novi Sad as the capital of Vojvodina
and the existence of Vojvodina’s offices in Brussels.
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Belgrade’s actions may have the reverse effect of the
one intended by mobilizing activists in Vojvodina to
demand more far-reaching self-determination and
thereby engendering new conflicts with the authorities in Belgrade.
III. BOSNIAK NATIONAL REVIVAL
Seventeen years after the end of the 1992-95 war,
Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to struggle with interethnic reconciliation and integrated statehood. The
country is divided along ethno-national lines, with
citizens polarized around their respective identities.59
The dysfunctionality of the Bosnian state, coupled
with Serbian support for full administrative autonomy
or even secession and Croatian dissatisfaction with
minority status, has spurred Bosniak nationalism as
a defense against rival political and territorial claims.
Moves toward Serbian separatism can both nourish
secular nationalism and raise religious identification
among Bosniak Muslims, which will breed radicalism
and provoke conflict. Bosnia’s institutional gridlock
and economic stagnation has resulted in growing disillusionment with multiethnicity or triethnicity, which
blocks decisionmaking at various administrative levels. Meanwhile, nationalist leaders perceive the civic
option, or the principle of citizenship not based on
ethnic identity, as harmful to the group interests of all
three major collectivities that they claim to represent.
Stalled State Building.
The state-building project in Bosnia-Herzegovina
has stalled. The country has entered an era of uncertainty and faces increasing threats to its stability
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and territorial integrity.60 The prevailing assumption
by EU leaders that the scaling down of international
supervision and the magnetic attraction of EU integration would convince Bosnia’s political leaders to
pursue the rigorous reforms necessary for accession
is proving illusory. On the contrary, in recent years,
Bosnia has regressed as a functioning state and is increasingly riven by disputes between leaders of the
three major ethno-national groups. The country faces
drift and division that could culminate in destructive
new conflicts that would impact negatively on the
wider region.
The Dayton Accords, signed under international
supervision in November 1995, were instrumental in
terminating armed conflicts and constructing an administrative structure that pacified the three major
ethno-national groups. One of the primary goals of
Dayton was to give the three nations a stake in remaining in a single country through a protective veto over
decisionmaking. However, the agreement was not designed to build an integral and effective state in which
the central government in Sarajevo possessed decisive
authority. Instead, it created a complex administrative
structure in which ethnic balancing predominated
and layers of governmental bureaucracy contributed
to inefficiency and budgetary burdens. This system
has obstructed decisionmaking where ethno-national
interests prevail over civic-state interests.
The Dayton process was overseen by the Peace Implementation Council (PiC) Steering Board, mandated
by international institutions. The main instrument for
pushing through reforms and upholding the unity of
the state has been the Office of the High Representative (OHR). When the OHR used the Bonn Powers,
approved by the PiC in December 1997 to enable more
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intrusive and effective intervention, Bosnia consolidated its statehood. When the OHR took a back seat
and urged dialogue and compromise between nationalist leaders, little progress was achieved.
However, the prominent OHR presence has also
provoked charges of international interference, which
fosters a dependency relationship and ignores the
democratic choices of Bosnian citizens. Indeed, international actors confront a major dilemma regarding
means and ends: whether it is preferable to impose a
more centralized state that can make progress toward
EU and NATO membership or if it is more empowering and democratic to permit local leaders to obstruct
the process and pursue essentially separate ethnonational agendas.
A limited and weak international role emboldens
Bosnian leaders to conclude that certain rules in pursuit of statehood will no longer be enforced. The major
nationalist parties are more interested in preserving
their particularistic interests than in constructing an
integral state. This was evident after the October 3,
2010, general elections when Serbian and Croatian
national parties blocked the creation of a new statelevel government by the election winners, the multiethnic Social Democratic Party (SDP), until the end of
December 2011.
Attempts at constitutional reform to prevent entity and ethnic blocking of state legislation and ensure
smoother government operations have been obstructed through entity voting. National leaders rejected the
April package of constitutional reforms proposed by
international mediators in 2006 and designed to make
the government more efficient. Renewed U.S. and EU
efforts for constitutional reform during the October
2009 Butmir Summit also failed to bring results.
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The debate between policymakers favoring international pressure on local leaders to push through
reforms and those who believe that nothing durable
will be achieved unless local leaders voluntarily agree
without foreign interference is a constant factor in Bosnian politics. Proponents of a strong OHR presence
contend that without internally generated progress,
the international office must be maintained to prevent
regression and damaging political conflicts. Indeed,
Western officials and analysts concerned about Bosnia’s survival favor a strong OHR or its replacement
by an equally effective EU High Representative.
The most destabilizing outcome would be the disappearance of the OHR and a weak and divided EU
mission that is unable to discourage Bosnia’s political
fractures. The OHR is seen by Bosniaks in particular
as a safeguard that ensures close U.S. involvement.
There are fears that the EU delegation in Sarajevo aims
to remove the Americans without an effective replacement. This may suit national leaders who discount
any mediating role for outside powers and believe
that, without international interference, Bosnia-Herzegovina will move toward a confederal arrangement
or an outright territorial division.
Ethnic and Civic Politics.
The EU is rhetorically supportive of Bosnia’s multiethnicity, but it has been critical of the multiethnic SDP
since the October 2010 elections, claiming that it could
destabilize the inter-ethnic or internationalist political
arrangements and prove troublesome for EU monitoring. Paradoxically, the EU endeavors to maintain the
status quo and uphold relative political stability even
if this disables progress on the reforms necessary for
Bosnia to enter the Union.
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Ethno-politics has dominated Bosnia’s governance
since the end of the 1992-95 war and has stymied the
development of state citizenship, programmatic pluralism, individual rights, and a competitive democracy. Ethno-nationalist parties, treated as the sole
representatives of ethnic collectivities by international
actors, are primarily based on patronage and clientelist networks, and their leaders are adamant that the
civic principle cannot be applied in Bosnia but only a
system of intergroup balancing can.
In October 2010, for the first time in 15 years, a
civic based party, the SDP, won the national elections.
This indicated a growing constituency for a nonethnic
vote that undermines the ethnic party stranglehold on
political institutions. Serb and Croat nationalist leaders claim that the civic project is primarily a cover for
pursuing centralization, promoting Bosniak domination, and ensuring the minoritization of the Serb and
Croat populations. Some analysts even contend that
the SDP’s focus on civic identity is provoking Serb
and Croat nationalist leaders to push for separation.
Paradoxically, the more successful the civic project becomes, even though it is based on EU norms, the more
it contradicts the principles of Dayton, particularly
the legitimacy of ethnic balancing and entity blocking,
and can precipitate national conflicts.
There is no single Bosnian political elite that transcends national divisions, and no common pan-Bosnian identity has emerged since the war.61 There is
also an absence of practical unification projects, such
as infrastructure construction, educational reform, or
common youth movements that would help bond the
three nations within a single state. Bosnian state identity remains shallow and artificial. The younger generation has no tradition of multiethnic Yugoslavism,
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and there is minimal interaction between ethno-national groups. For instance, Serbs from Banja Luka are
more likely to visit Belgrade or Zagreb than Sarajevo.
The educational systems are separated, and there is no
daily interaction between citizens in the two entities.
This leaves young people susceptible to indoctrination and political manipulation.
The new government of the Federation of BosniaHerzegovina (the joint Bosniak and Croat entity) was
constituted in March 2011 but not recognized as legitimate by the RS National Assembly or by the major Croatian parties, the Croatian Democratic Union
(HDZ), and the Croation Democratic Union (HDZ1990), the later having split from the former in April
2006. The HDZ-1990 protested their exclusion from
the cabinet although Bosnian Croats from other parties were represented in the administration. The two
nationalist parties, which captured almost 80 percent
of the Croatian vote, predominantly in western Herzegovina, asserted their political monopoly by arguing that only they could nominate genuine Croatian
representatives and demanded all five ministries assigned to Croat delegates. Nationalists do not consider Bosnian Croat politicians elected by members of
other ethnic groups as authentic national representatives. By contrast, the civic-focused SDP argues that
lawfully elected Croats, regardless of who voted for
them, can represent the community.
Croats have felt increasingly marginalized in the
Federation, which contains a larger Bosniak population, while more Croats have left the country. Croatian numbers in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole have
decreased from 17.38 percent of the population in 1991
to 15.4 percent in 2000.62 The Bosniak proportion rose
from 46 percent in 1991 to 48.3 percent in 2000, and
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the Serbian population also increased from 31.21 percent in 1991 to 37.1 percent in 2000, although largely
because of the declining Croatian proportion. In 2012,
the estimated population of the Federation stood at
2.5 million and the RS at 1.2 million. The Bosniak proportion in the state as a whole is believed to number
over 50 percent, with Serbs forming under 40 percent.
Croatian numbers have shrunk to approximately
10 percent, with more inhabitants expected to leave
Bosnia when Croatia enters the EU in 2013.
Serbian leaders claim that their population would
also significantly diminish if they did not have the
RS to protect their interests. Indeed, a falling Serbian population could make the government in Banja
Luka more eager to push for secession to preclude
the prospect of a diminishing political role. Changing
proportions have also led to disputes over holding a
new census, as Croatian leaders in particular want to
maintain the power sharing arrangements based on
the 1991 census when their population was larger.
To protect their collective interests, some Croatian
leaders in the HDZ have voiced support for the creation of a third entity, a Croatian majority unit, to be
carved out of the Federation. Such a scenario would
also result in the establishment of a Bosniak Muslim
entity and enable the RS and a potential Herzeg-Bosnia entity to act in unison to obstruct the state government in Sarajevo. The RS leadership is supportive
of such restructuring and is reportedly coordinating its approach with the HDZ to defend the politics of ethnic blocks and nationally-based economic
interest groups.
The RS, similarly to the Federation, was also established as a multiethnic entity where no major governmental decisions were to be taken without agree-
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ment between representatives of all three nations. In
practice, the Serbian parties remain dominant, and
the RS President makes all essential decisions without consultation with Bosniak or Croatian leaders. Indeed, the RS is evolving into a one-party quasi-state.
In stark contrast, decisionmaking in the Federation
requires the consent of representatives of all three
national groups.
Role of Radical Islam.
Serb and Croat nationalist leaders claim that the
Bosniaks are becoming radicalized through militant
Islam. By alleging that Wahhabism and Salafism,
ultra-conservative streams in Islam, are growing
among Bosniaks, RS leaders can pose as defenders
of allegedly endangered Serbian national interests.
In reality, Islamist political influence is not a mainstream phenomenon, as the overwhelming majority
of Bosniak Muslims belong to the moderate Hanafi
school of Sunni Islam.63 Their secular attitudes have
sparked disputes with foreign Islamic radicals seeking
to proselytize their puritanical beliefs.64 Nonetheless,
as in other European countries, radical Salafi streams
do exist outside the control of the official Bosnian
Islamic Community, and some of their members may
be prone to a violent jihadist ideology.
A Bosniak national identity with religious identification has developed since the 1992-95 war and is
focused on maintaining the integrity of the Bosnian
state. Islam has served as a tool for building an ethnic identity rather than being the “final destination
of identity politics.”65 The notion of an Islamic Bosniak state does not attract young people. It is estimated that less than 10 percent of the Bosniak pop-
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ulation favor partition and the creation of a Muslim
Bosniak republic.
The growth of Muslim nationalism and Islamist influence is more likely if the country starts to splinter.
This would be a response to Serbian and Croatian separatism that could intensify the struggle within the Islamic Community over the future of a smaller Bosniak
state. A partitioned Bosnia would heighten the grievances felt by the chief victims of the war and would
convince a growing number of Bosniaks that they had
been betrayed by the Western powers. It could also
open up new ground for radical religious influences.
The Wahhabi movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is
not native but was “imported” during the 1992-95 war
when mujahideen fighters from different parts of the
world volunteered to defend the Muslim Bosniaks.
Their maximum number was estimated at about 4,000
by the close of the war, and they generally lived in isolated rural communities. After the signing of the Dayton Accords, about 1,300 remained in the country and
acquired Bosnian citizenship. Many of these subsequently lost their citizenship under pressure from the
government, and only 200 were left in the country by
2010, most of them married to local Bosniak women.
The terrorist Mevlid Jasarevic who fired shots at
the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo before being apprehended on October 28, 2011, adhered to the radical Takfir
ideology advocating intolerance toward non-Muslims
and defying secular laws. He reportedly communicated with Wahhabis in the village of Gornja Maoca near
Brcko.66 Members of this group were believed to have
planted an explosive device outside Bugojno police
station in June 2010 that killed one police officer. Ismet
Dahic, former head of the police in Sarajevo, claimed
it was possible that Serbian police agencies recruited
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Mevlid Jasarevic and sent him to Sarajevo to discredit
the Bosnian state.
The main recruitment center for Balkan Wahhabis
is believed to be in Vienna, while the major outside
Muslim influences in Bosnia emanate from Turkey and
other moderate Islamic states. Turkey has increased
its economic and cultural influences among Islamic
populations in the Balkans, but it does not exert a decisive role in Bosnian politics despite Ankara’s aspirations as a regional leader. Nonetheless, Turkey does
contribute to undercutting Salafi influences among
Muslim populations.
Ankara has also posed as a regional mediator with
varying degrees of success.67 For instance, Ankara
mediated a dispute between rival Bosniak groups in
the Sandzak in southern Serbia, although the deal
subsequently collapsed. It has also claimed success
in reconciliation between Belgrade and Sarajevo
through a Trilateral Consultation Mechanism that led
to the appointment of a Bosnian ambassador to Belgrade and the signing of the Istanbul Declaration that
“guaranteed the territorial integrity and sovereignty
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.”68 However, Turkey’s alleged
indispensability in this process has been disputed.
Moreover, Balkan leaders avoid creating the impression that they are moving closer to Turkey and surrendering their EU aspirations.69
Separatist Maneuvers.
For Bosnian Serbs, the prospect of EU membership is becoming less convincing than the ambition of
independence. The optimum objective for leaders of
the Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina is statehood.
To achieve such a goal, a three-pronged strategy has
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been pursued: preventing the creation of an authoritative central government in Sarajevo, fanning disputes
between Bosniak and Croat politicians by supporting
greater Croatian autonomy, and gaining prestige and
power through political brinkmanship such as preparations for public referenda in the Serb entity.
RS President Milorad Dodik has persistently
claimed that the Bosnian state is not functioning, and
the RS needs to develop its sovereignty. He has opposed the state government on the grounds that it
is abrogating powers that belong to the entities and
is engaged in a policy of centralization and Bosniak
Muslim domination.70 Dodik says he is reclaiming as
much autonomy for the Serb entity as possible and
asserts that the state government in Sarajevo should
only deal with foreign and security policy.
In public opinion surveys, majorities of Croats and
Bosniaks oppose the potential secession of RS, whereas 87 percent of respondents in the Serb entity support
the creation of an independent state if a majority of
its citizens voted for it.71 These surveys revealed that
56 percent of Croats and 86 percent of Bosniaks did
not agree with the idea of dividing Bosnia, while 61
percent of Serbs support such a plan. Additionally,
while 62 percent of Serbs identified strongly with their
entity, as did 46 percent of Bosniaks, only 11 percent
of Bosnian Croats empathized strongly with the Federation. The Bosniaks were the only group in which
a significant percentage of respondents (44 percent)
identified with the country of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Dodik claims that he does not seek RS secession
but simply the return to entity level of governing prerogatives captured by Sarajevo in recent years and
the prevention of any further erosion of entity powers such as the elimination of the “entity veto” in the
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passage of Bosnian legislation. Dodik contends that he
seeks a confederation between three sub-state entities
with a weak central government but has also indicated that Montenegro’s referendum on independence in
May 2006 may serve as a model for the RS. Although
Dodik began as an anti-nationalist, he has adopted a
more ethnocentric approach in support of RS separation. Some analysts think that Dodik sees himself as
the unifier of Serbian lands and may have ambitions
to preside over a joint state with Serbia.
Dodik benefits from provoking confrontation with
Sarajevo and courting direct talks with EU officials and
the EU Commission. This was the case during the involvement of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton in May 2011, who appealed directly to Dodik to
suspend a planned RS referendum on the State Court,
which leaders in Banja Luka claim is biased against
Serbs. They wanted to repeal a provision that allows
the state-level court to take over entity cases. The visit
of Ashton to Banja Luka raised Dodik’s stature as a
statesman and leader of an aspiring state.
Dodik has continued to dangle the specter of referenda on such issues as OHR legitimacy, state property, judicial reform, and potentially the RS abandonment of state institutions in pursuit of a confederation
of two independent states. He remains patient and
opportunistic, tests international resolve, and retreats
from some controversial step when there is a firm
international response but pushes ahead when the
reaction is tepid.72 In the longer-term, RS leaders calculate that international interest in Bosnia will wane,
the United States and NATO will become disengaged,
and the EU will remain divided. This will allow the
RS to move toward secession and unification with
Serbia, thus enabling Dodik to leave a lasting legacy
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in Serbian history.73 In the meantime, he has created
a centralized and authoritarian RS in which the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats controls the
government, presidency, and National Assembly and
in which Bosniaks and Croats play a secondary role.
The RS works more effectively as a state than
the Federation, as it is a more streamlined structure
without cantonal level administrations. In justifying
its opposition to state institutions, Banja Luka complains about the state government in Sarajevo as mismanaged, inflated, wasteful, and corrupt. RS leaders
assert that over 90 percent of their population favor
separation and claim that Bosnia is a failed state that
was incapable of forming a durable government.74 In
response, Bosniak leaders charge that the RS was created through genocide and ethnic expulsions, and it
has become increasingly autocratic and centralized
under Dodik, while Bosniaks and Croats are excluded
from decisionmaking.
Dodik also seeks to leverage the EU to neutralize
the OHR and the U.S. presence. Nonetheless, he has
also needed the OHR to claim he is defending Serbian
interests against unwarranted international interference. His evident preference would be for a weak and
temporary OHR before he makes a final decision on
separation. His game of brinkmanship with Sarajevo
and international players has thus far proved successful, but there is always a possibility of miscalculation
that may provoke a violent reaction.
Some Croatian activists angered by the exclusion
of HDZ and HDZ 1990 from the federal entity government have focused on creating a regional intercantonal
structure on 20 percent of Federation territory, styled
as the Croatian National Assembly (CNA) and based
in Mostar. The CNA is intended to coordinate munici-
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pal and cantonal administrations in which Croats form
majorities and some of its leaders have demanded the
formation of a third Bosnia entity. Their moves are
openly supported by Banja Luka. More radical Croatian activists have either called for a distinct Croatian
entity or the re-establishment of the wartime Republic
of Herzeg-Bosnia.
State institutions continue to be obstructed by distinct ethno-political interests at entity level and register minimal progress in meeting EU stipulations necessary to attain candidate status. For instance, Croat
and Serb leaders have opposed Sarajevo’s efforts to
centralize decisionmaking by transferring police authority from the cantonal to the entity level. Even at
municipal level, conflicts over inter-ethnic power sharing persist. In the starkest example, Bosniak-Croat relations remain tense over the divided city of Mostar.75
The core of the dispute revolves around two Constitutional Court rulings, one in June 2011 and one in January 2012, that the election of three delegates from each
of the six city areas to the City Council was unconstitutional. The rulings assert that it is unconstitutional
that an area of the city with a population of almost
30,000 Croats elects the same number of delegates to
the town assembly as an area with 7,000 Bosniaks.
Croat leaders propose that Mostar should be divided again into municipalities, leaving the City
Council to deal only with joint issues.76 The HDZ
contends that when the former High Representative
Paddy Ashdown abolished Mostar’s municipalities in 2004, his objective was to disable Croats from
having more power than Bosniaks, thus discriminating against Croatian residents. Among Bosniaks, the
Constitutional Court rulings are perceived as a direct
threat to their existence in Herzegovina and would
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allegedly lead to Mostar becoming a capital for the
Croatian dominated cantons. Local Croats view opposition to the recent ruling as confirmation that Bosniak
leaders are seeking to turn Croats into a minority with
lessened rights. Most Croats in Herzegovina believe
that “losing” Mostar would make life untenable for
the community throughout Bosnia. They are equally
concerned that Bosniak leaders are seeking to centralize the Federation.
One additional factor encouraging partition has
been the ongoing division of state property, including
land and utilities, and the legalization of its ownership by the two entities. The RS is preparing a new
property law that would effectively reduce Bosnian
state holdings. Such a process would make Bosnian
statehood increasingly tenuous.
Economic conditions have been stagnant in both
entities for several years. Bosnia’s budget bears a
heavy burden with the enormous state sector acquired through the Dayton Accords. Although the
five administrative levels (city, municipal, cantonal,
entity, and state) and the Brcko district government
provide thousands of civil service jobs, they also inhibit state investment in productive business. Plans to
trim the state sector and lower its budget will depend
on entity agreement. Although several cantons are financially unsustainable, the HDZ will claim discrimination if the cantons are merged or eliminated and if
the Federation government is strengthened at the expense of the cantons, as some politicians in Sarajevo
have proposed.
Bosnia’s state structures depend largely on outside funds. Any prolonged absence of a state government creates problems in releasing EU resources
and tranches of IMF loans, and it curtails prospects

48

for foreign investment. Some observers believe that financial restraints in the RS finally convinced Dodik to
allow for the creation of a state government in December 2011 to fill growing gaps in the RS budget from
EU and IMF sources. However, Dodik has also been
courting Russia, Serbia, and China to access alternative funding sources and has sought to attract foreign
investors for the RS, while bypassing Sarajevo.
Regional Reflexes.
Serbia’s President Boris Tadic walked a tightrope
between satisfying EU demands that he recognize
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s integrity and Serbian nationalist pressures that he support RS President Milorad
Dodik. Dodik’s high popularity in Serbia meant that
Tadic could not be seen to oppose him. Indeed, Belgrade intensified its relations with Banja Luka through
such mechanisms as joint intergovernmental sessions,
while Tadic rarely visited Sarajevo during his frequent
trips to Banja Luka. Although he affirmed Bosnia’s
independence, Serbia’s newly appointed Prime Minister Ivica Dacic has publicly stated that the RS and
northern Kosova should be joined with Serbia. This
has given ammunition to Bosniaks who charge that
the Greater Serbia project has not been abandoned by
Belgrade. Indeed, some Serbian politicians view the
RS as compensation for the loss of most of Kosova.
The Croatian government is generally supportive
of the HDZ in an effort to protect Bosnian Croat interests, and Zagreb was dismayed by the HDZ’s exclusion from the Federation government after the October
2010 elections. On the other hand, Croatia has sought
a closer relationship with the government in Sarajevo
and does not appear to have a parallel agenda of partition. By contrast, Belgrade remains under suspicion in
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Sarajevo that its pursuit of a special relationship with
the RS is a prelude to supporting secession.
The prospect of EU accession alone is not magnetic
enough to stimulate reform of the state, especially
as the gap between promise and reality appears to
be widening. Although over 80 percent of the public
supports EU membership, the slow process of entry
obstructed by political and structural factors inside
Bosnia fuels public frustration and susceptibility to
ethno-nationalist appeals. In terms of its EU prospects,
Bosnia-Herzegovina suffers from three core disadvantages: It is a disunited state, an unreformed state, and
an unwanted state. Sarajevo’s bid for accession will be
slowed down by its divided polity, collectivist mentality, and paternalistic state structure, as well as by
potential EU rejection of a semi-Muslim country.
The Dayton Accords do not meet the criteria for EU
entry, and it remains unclear whether the OHR needs
to be closed before the EU would consider Bosnia a
credible candidate for membership. There is an inbuilt
paradox in this equation: A strong OHR, European
Union High Representative (EUHR), or head of the
EU Delegation is evidently needed to push through
EU conditions for accession. However, EU states are
unwilling to use the Bonn Powers or any other instruments to achieve such an outcome, arguing that this
would mean international imposition. Moreover, the
EU has leaked credibility, as it moved slowly in establishing its mission in Sarajevo and only appointed Peter Sorensen as head of the EU Delegation at the end
of May 2011.
The EU set three conditions for Sarajevo to gain
access to pre-accession assistance funds and before
it could submit a formal application for membership. Bosnia’s progress toward EU accession has been
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delayed because of failure to meet these conditions.
First, the government needed to adopt a state aid law
to control the level of state subsidies to the public and
private sectors. Second, Sarajevo had to approve a
census law at state level to provide the legal basis for
the first national census since 1990.
Third, the government needed to reform the statelevel constitution and election laws to comply with
the 2009 ruling of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) and terminate ethnic discrimination
against representatives of minority groups, such as
Jews or Roma. The latter are excluded from holding
government positions as they are not members of the
three state-forming nations. Disputes raged during
the summer of 2012 over reform of the election laws,
as leaders of the three state-forming nations resisted
changes that would dilute their power by allowing for
the representation of other national groups as well as
people who did not identify with any single ethnicity.
Political developments in Bosnia will be determined by the aspirations of local leaders, the reactions
of ethnic counterparts, and the stance of international
actors. Ultimately, Bosnia faces one of two scenarios—the optimistic and the pessimistic. In the optimistic version, Bosnia experiences more rapid progress
toward NATO membership, as EU access is a much
longer-term proposition. NATO can provide an overall security umbrella, discourage separatism, consolidate Bosnian borders, promote civil-military reform,
help modernize the armed forces, and give a reformist
boost toward EU accession.
Bosnia has obtained Membership Action Plan
(MAP) status with NATO, and its Alliance entry has
been supported by leaders in both the Federation and
the RS, although growing Russian influence may tem-
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per such sentiments in Banja Luka. While the majority
of RS residents are reportedly opposed to NATO entry, a majority in the Federation remains supportive.
Progress toward NATO would be promoted through
a settlement over state property, including military
facilities that are currently claimed by entity governments. A divided military, where only the officer
corps is integrated and disputes persist over property,
cannot be a credible NATO candidate.
Dangers of Bosnia’s Division.
In the pessimistic scenario, Bosnia-Herzegovina
slides toward open conflict and violence. The deterrence capabilities of the EU may be insufficient
to stymie armed clashes, with European Forces
(EUFOR) having fewer than 1,500 troops in the country. They are poorly prepared to respond to outbreaks of violence and are likely to downsize further.
EUFOR’s crowd control and counterriot capabilities are reportedly inadequate, and reducing numbers sends the wrong signal at a time when tensions
can escalate.
Even if a new war does not materialize, Bosnia
could become increasingly ungovernable if ethnic disputes intensify and the legitimacy of the state government is further eroded. Numerous grievances remain
in Bosnian society, which hinder inter-ethnic reconciliation. These include restricted refugee returns,
the limited recovery of property confiscated during
the 1992-95 war, and lack of sufficient compensation
by the RS authorities to the Islamic Community for
destroyed mosques.77
Potential provocations could lead to violence,
such as the RS holding a referendum on sovereignty
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or withdrawing Serbian representatives from state institutions, an attempt to seize Brcko, the desecration
of a mosque, or the creation of checkpoints along the
inter-entity boundary line. RS officials plan to finalize inter-entity border demarcations, while political
leaders in the Federation remain reluctant. Representatives of the largest Bosniak nationalist formation,
the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), claim that RS
officials are intent on presenting inter-entity lines as
permanent borders.78
Conflicts can also erupt between Bosniak and
Croat activists in the divided city of Mostar, especially if Croatian national parties push for a third entity
or greater decentralization of the state or if the Federation government decides to reduce the number of
cantonal administrations. In an indication of brewing
tensions, riots broke out in Mostar on June 19, 2012, in
the wake of the defeat of Croatia’s football team at the
Euro 2012 championships.79 Hooligans from the western, Croatian part of town clashed with police as they
tried to reach the eastern, or Bosniak, section. Violent
incidents were reported near a boulevard that marked
the wartime separation line, but police prevented the
crowd from reaching the eastern part of the city.
In a survey of youth attitudes conducted in early
2012, only a few respondents thought that the root
cause of conflict might be inter-ethnic tensions. Nonetheless, many believed that once started a conflict
would play out along ethnic lines.80 Respondents felt
that violence between individuals was not caused by
ethnic differences but could acquire an ethnic dimension. Although the majority of citizens oppose a new
war, a small minority may favor armed conflict in an
environment where people are easily manipulated,
partly for fear of becoming victims themselves. Some
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respondents felt that years of political crisis have created an environment of fear, and it would take a small
spark to start a new collision. Many people listed the
poor condition of the economy as a potential trigger
for violence, as economic frustration can spill over
into inter-ethnic confrontations.
A local firefight could spark a broader conflagration. Bosniaks may be prepared to fight to keep the
country intact, as the idea of peaceful separation is
widely dismissed as illusory and opposed by the vast
majority. Bosniaks would perceive the breakup of the
country as a delayed defeat from the 1992-95 war in
which genocide would be legalized and the Greater
Serbia and Greater Croatia projects given credence.
The main reason the Bosniaks signed on to Dayton
was that it ensured state continuity in the post-war
setting. If the partition option was pursued, in addition to Bosniak nationalism, we could also witness
growing militancy among supporters of the civic option and a reaction against national divisiveness.
Some local analysts and political leaders estimate
that it would not be difficult to mobilize 100,000 Bosniak volunteers to fight against the RS.81 Sarajevo’s
strategy would be to sever the entity at several jugular
points, particularly at the Brcko intersection in northeast Bosnia and across Srebrenica or Gorazde toward
the Drina River. This could result in new rounds of
ethnic expulsion and altered dividing lines that would
favor the Bosniaks, as Serbs would be unable to defend their entire territory. Banja Luka would likely appeal to Belgrade for military assistance and raise the
danger of interstate clashes.
In such a scenario, nationalist Bosniak and civic
leaders could announce the abandonment of the Dayton two-entity system to strengthen the central gov-
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ernment in Sarajevo. Bosnian Croats may respond by
creating their own separate government in western
Herzegovina and appeal to Croatia for support and
armed volunteers. There is also a possibility that Sarajevo and Zagreb may coordinate a military response
against attempts at RS secession, especially if Banja
Luka is backed by Belgrade.
For several years, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been
ranked among the most vulnerable states in terms of
risks for internal disturbance. In October 2011, a report
released by the U.S.-based Democratization Policy
Council and the Sarajevo-based Atlantic Initiative issued warnings about renewed inter-ethnic violence.82
The authors did not predict imminent conflict, but
their observations need to be heeded by international
actors who assume that the current status quo can last
indefinitely. They criticize the role of international
agencies in their unwillingness to effectively employ
Dayton enforcement mechanisms such as OHR and
EUFOR. The “soft power” approach has enabled local
political leaders to pursue their agendas unrestrained,
and there is no collective political will to resist. The
PiC Steering Board is divided between members believing EU membership prospects will be sufficient
to prevent further deterioration and capitals such as
Washington and London who are increasingly frustrated by this approach. International disunity stimulates radical Bosnian agendas.
The Atlantic Initiative report pinpoints a number
of factors that encourage extremism and conflict, including inflammatory political rhetoric, dysfunctional
state institutions, and the impact of the global economic crisis. Political discourse in Bosnia has deteriorated
sharply since the October 2010 elections, with more
politicians questioning the existence of the Bosnian
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state and using the 1992-95 war as their main reference point. In such a climate, popular fears appear to
be rising. Confrontational relations between political
leaders and the deteriorating performance of governing institutions at every level have also contributed
to the malaise. Political leaders have been unwilling
to compromise on policies that serve the public good,
and the basic needs of citizens are largely unmet. This
raises public anger toward the state and a sense of
growing insecurity.
The global economic downturn has also affected
Bosnia, with GDP growth turning negative in 2009
and a tepid recovery in 2010 and 2011. Unemployment in Bosnia is one of the highest in Europe. Official
numbers indicate 42 percent, although the figure is
closer to 30 percent if account is taken of unregistered
employment. The onset of the recession and reductions in remittances from Bosnians working abroad
have exacerbated budgetary shortfalls, especially at
the entity level, and will impoverish more households
and raise the likelihood of social protests.
The cumbersome state structure, with five levels of
administration, remains a major burden on the state
budget. The country is also bedeviled by systemic corruption, an unreformed judiciary, and a patronage
network that drains the economy to a point of potential insolvency. Economic deterioration, the lack of opportunities, frustration with pervasive nepotism and
corruption, and rising social tensions can ultimately
lead to violent social unrest that assumes ethnic
dimensions.
There are several potential triggers for violence,
whether organized or spontaneous. Football hooliganism and juvenile delinquency imbibed with nationalist
indoctrination in the midst of a faltering economy can
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trigger intergroup conflict. Hooligan gangs and criminal networks can be manipulated for political goals
in an organized fashion, as they are relatively easy to
mobilize. Private security firms with professional personnel and an easy availability of weapons can also be
deployed if organized violence were to erupt.
Minority returnees remain a vulnerable social
group, as relations with the ethnic majority in their
neighborhood remain strained, and their access to
jobs, housing, and social services is restricted. The
increasingly heated political environment has added
to their feeling of insecurity, while incidents of violence have the potential to snowball into wider interethnic clashes.
Allegations about a growing terrorist threat in Bosnia, based on the claim that the number of Wahhabis
and Salafis is increasing, are not aimed at deterring
such a threat but at branding Bosniaks as terrorists
and delegitimizing their political aims. In response,
the official Islamic Community has denied any security threat posed by a few dangerous individuals and dismissed all such references as Islamophobic. Such hardened positions foster polarization and
mutual prejudice.
Although Bosnia has ranked for many years among
countries with the lowest recorded number of terrorism-related incidents, it does have several hundred
ultra-conservative Salafis among whom there may be
potential terrorists.83 Although these individuals currently pose a limited danger and have marginal public
support, they could exploit opportunities created by a
deteriorating political climate to pursue their agendas.
At the same time, effective deterrents remain weak,
borders are porous, and an abundance of readily
available weaponry exists.
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In an indication that religious radicals may have
an increasing influence on some aspects of government policy, Sarajevo canton’s education minister,
Emir Suljagic, resigned in February 2012 after repeated threats to his safety from hardline Muslims. The
latter opposed educational reforms that purportedly
downplayed the importance of religion and upheld
secularism.84 Some analysts believe that political clericalism among all three ethnic groups is becoming an
increasingly aggressive force.85
The Atlantic Initiative report also casts doubts on
the effectiveness of law enforcement. The police are
subjected to political pressure to submit to ethnic political loyalties. Police capacity to uphold public order
in the event of violent inter-ethnic incidents remains
in question, and the force would likely split along ethnic lines in the event of any large-scale conflict. The
professionalization of the military has also been stunted by political infighting and disputes over the ownership of defense property between entity and state
administrations. The military has downsized to under
10,000 professional soldiers. Its ethnic-based infantry
battalions could become embroiled in civil conflict, together with the country’s veterans’ organizations and
private security firms.
The abundance of weapons remaining from the
war and the relative ease with which they can be obtained is especially dangerous.86 Bosnia’s Ministry of
Defense estimates that it stores around 95,000 surplus
weapons and some 25,000 tons of surplus ammunition. Arms stockpiles under official supervision are
often poorly guarded. In addition, large amounts of
weapons remain outside government control. Many
of these arms, mostly AK-47 assault rifles, rocketpropelled grenades, handguns, and hand grenades,
were stashed illegally out of a fear of renewed conflict.
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Reportedly, every third citizen owns arms, and every
fifth citizen possesses an illegal firearm.87
Despite these negative trends, the EUFOR contingent is not an effective force for concerted deterrence. It has shrunk from 7,000 troops at its launch
in December 2004 to an estimated 1,300 by August
2011. The downsizing of the force has left it without
forward bases outside Sarajevo. It lacks helicopter lift
for operational purposes, and unilateral withdrawals
by several countries means that the force is incapable
of fulfilling its obligations. In sum, EUFOR has lost
the ability to provide a credible deterrent and may
fail to maintain or restore security, especially if hostilities were to erupt in several Bosnian towns simultaneously. Instead, militants may exploit a growing
security vacuum, and the KFOR contingent in Kosova
may not be in a position to reinforce EUFOR, as it has
also been downsized and faces its own simmering
security threats.
The Atlantic Initiative report recommends that
to deter future violence, EUFOR’s strength, posture,
mobility, and deployments need to be reinforced. Additional troops need to be brought in from EU and
non-EU members, while EU/NATO member Pacific
Island Countries not presently participating in EUFOR should also make contributions. The restoration
of credible deterrence would not only prevent a return
to violence, but also may encourage political progress by undermining the capabilities of entrenched
elites in manipulating fear. This would create space
for citizens and politicians who want the country to
function consensually.
The problems with Bosnia-Herzegovina are both
practical and psychological. Given that the EU is perceived as weak, divided, bureaucratized, and slow to
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respond, there are fears that, if the OHR is replaced
completely by the EU delegation, the American presence would largely disappear. As a consequence, any
effective response to internal violence would be seriously debilitated. This perception itself can encourage
political manipulators to test international reaction by
stirring division and provoking conflict.
The Sandzak Factor.
Although the Sandzak region, divided between
Serbia and Montenegro, did not possess a distinct administrative status or autonomy during the Yugoslav
era, the local Bosniak Muslim population has a strong
sense of regional identity.88 According to the 2002 Serbian census, the Slavic Muslim or Bosniak population
in Serbia’s Sandzak (Raska in Serbian) consists of six
municipalities and forms approximately 57 percent of
the population of 235,000, or almost 133,000 people.89
Serbs total fewer than 38 percent of the population,
or 90,000 inhabitants. The total number of Slavic Muslims throughout Serbia stands at about 3.5 percent, or
250,000 out of 7.3 million citizens.
For much of the Muslim population in Serbia’s
Sandzak, Bosnia-Herzegovina is viewed as an ethnic
and religious motherland, and such sentiments promote a cross-border Bosniak identity. In an unrecognized referendum in a meeting held during October
25-27, 1991, Sandzak Muslims voted overwhelmingly
for territorial autonomy and the right to join BosniaHerzegovina. In September 2003, the National Council of the Bosniak Community in Serbia and Montenegro was founded in Novi Pazar, the largest city in the
region, adopted a flag and coat of arms, and pushed
for the introduction of the Bosniak language in local

60

schools. Serbian officials depicted such moves as separatist provocations.
The establishment of a Bosniak Academy of Arts
and Sciences (BANU) by the heads of Muslim communities in Bosnia and Serbia, with dual headquarters in
Sarajevo and Novi Pazar, will provide intellectual impetus for a burgeoning national and religious identity
and potential unity among Slavic Muslim populations
throughout the former Yugoslavia. The creation of
BANU has been criticized in Belgrade as a mechanism
for increasing ethnic tensions, enhancing the role of
Islam in politics, and promoting Sandzak secession.90
BANU’s formation encouraged Croatian activists to
establish a Bosnian Croat Academy of Arts and Sciences in Mostar in western Herzegovina. Bosnian
Serbs founded their own Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Republika Srpska in Banja Luka in 2006.
Some observers believe that these institutions will accelerate Bosnia’s division, as intellectuals in all three
ethnic groups will operate separately.
A towering figure in Sandzak Muslim politics is
Mufti Muamer Zukorlic, head of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Serbia. Over the past
few years, he has gained popularity by organizing a
movement to increase Muslim leverage vis-à-vis Belgrade while campaigning for the region’s autonomy.91
Zukorlic has accused the Serbian government of a
slow genocide of the Bosniak population amidst allegedly widespread official discrimination.
To undercut Zukorlic’s prominence, the Serbian
government engages in a divide and rule policy by
sponsoring a rival organization, the Islamic Community in Serbia led by pro-Belgrade loyalist mufti,
Adem Zilkic. Zilkic views Hamdija Jusufspahic, the
mufti of Belgrade, as the spiritual leader of Serbia’s
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Muslims. In February 2010, Jusufspahic declared himself the Reis ul-Ulama, or spiritual leader of Muslims
in Serbia. By contrast, Zukorlic considers Mustafa Ceric, the mufti of Sarajevo, as the Reis ul-Ulama, and
invited him to visit Novi Pazar. Ceric has also visited
Prishtina to demonstrate support for Kosova’s independence, even though the Bosnian government has
not recognized Kosova’s statehood.
The Zukorlic and Zilkic factions are at loggerheads,
with both claiming to be the legitimate representatives of Sandzak Muslims. Clashes have occurred between supporters of the two leaders in various parts
of the region. A similar division exists at the political
level between Mayor of Novi Pazar and leader of the
List for Sandzak (LZS) Sulejman Ugljanin and Social
Democratic Party leader Rasim Ljajic. Ugljanin has
also vehemently opposed Zukorlic, viewing him as
a political rival. Violent incidents between supporters of the two parties have taken place and precluded
Sandzak Bosniak unity by distracting attention from
broader national questions.92
On October 16, 2011, President Tadic signed an
agreement with Bakir Izetbegovic, the Bosniak representative in the Bosnian presidency, according to
which Bosniak Muslims living in the Sandzak would
be united with Serbian Muslims residing elsewhere
in Serbia.93 The latter group has been traditionally
governed from Belgrade in a separate religious administration. The Tadic-Izetbegovic agreement was
arranged by Mustafa Ceric, Bosnia’s Reis ul-Ulama,
and Mehmet Gormez, head of Turkey’s state religious
affairs directorate. Following the accord, several Bosniak leaders attacked Ceric for betraying their Sandzak
brethren to Belgrade. They also criticized Ankara for
meddling in Bosniak Muslim affairs and favoring Serbian interests in the region.
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Among the demands in Novi Pazar are autonomy
in current state configurations or outright separation
from Serbia if the RS were to split from Bosnia. There
is no strong identification of Bosniaks with the Serbian
state but some nostalgia for the defunct Yugoslavia.
While Sandzak Bosniaks in Serbia generally supported preserving a single state with Montenegro so
that the Islamic population would not be divided, the
majority of Montenegro’s Sandzak Muslims backed
an independent Montenegro so as to remove pressure
and discrimination by Belgrade. They calculated that
minority rights in the new Montenegrin state would
be more far-reaching. The Sandzak was formally partitioned in June 2006 when Montenegro and Serbia
gained separate statehoods, thus undercutting any
Bosniak Muslim plans to unite the area into one administrative region within a single state.
The Sandzak is one of the poorest areas of Serbia,
with high unemployment fueling emigration. More
than 50 percent of the economically active population
is registered as unemployed—a factor that fosters social and political discontent. Serbian security services
allege that Islamic fundamentalism is growing in the
region with the establishment of militant organizations
run by Wahhabis or Salafis that are the main threat to
Serbia’s security and that of neighboring states.94
Critics of Belgrade believe that Serbian officials deliberately try to divide the Muslim community and to
radicalize certain activists to justify crackdowns and
anti-Bosniak propaganda. The main Muslim leaders,
including Zukorlic, have also criticized the Wahhabi
minority for trying to impose its own rituals and beliefs on the Muslim population. For instance, after
several incidents in Novi Pazar mosques, Zukorlic
banned Wahhabis from praying there.
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A few young militants have formed a jihadist
group in the Sandzak called Kelimetul-Haqq (Words
of Truth).95 However, Muslim leaders have challenged portrayals of Sandzak radicalization through
Wahhabist influence as scaremongering that could
further damage inter-ethnic relations. They point out
that manifestations of religiosity do not equal Islamic
militancy, but such equations by politicians and the
official media undermine inter-religious relations and
the feeling of safety among Bosniak residents. This
was visible in the torching of mosques and attacks on
Islamic community centers in Nis, Belgrade, and Novi
Sad in March 2004 following attacks on the Serbian
minority in Kosova.
While the vast majority of Muslims are moderates,
conservative Wahhabism has gained some resonance
among a segment of alienated and impoverished
youths. In March 2007, the police found “a training
camp for terrorists” in Zabren village, some 30 kilometers from Novi Pazar.96 They arrested a group of
young Wahhabi men, who were accused of illegal
possession of arms, planning acts of terrorism, and
preparations to assassinate Zukorlic. On October 29,
2011, Serbian police arrested 17 people on suspicion of
links to the Islamic extremist who opened fire on the
U.S. embassy in Sarajevo.97 Among those arrested, 12
were from three towns in Sandzak with large Muslim
communities. Sandzak Muslim leaders have protested
against Belgrade’s attempt to depict the region as a
stronghold of Islamic extremists. However, while not
all Wahhabis are political radicals, their stigmatization and criminalization may serve to radicalize them.
The LZS has continued to campaign for the territorial autonomy of Serbia’s Sandzak.98 Serbian laws, including the 2006 Constitution, grant wide-ranging lo-
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cal rights to national minorities, including the right to
preserve their language, culture, and identity; benefit
from representation in state institutions; and establish
minority councils to exercise self-government in specific spheres. However, the implementation of the law
has not been consistent in all parts of the country.
Grievances among the Sandzak Muslims center on
such questions as under-representation in the public
sector, including the police and judiciary, economic
stagnation, high unemployment, obstacles to cultural
autonomy, and the lack of prosecutions against those
responsible for war crimes during the 1992-95 conflict.
Such grievances can generate nationalist and religious
militancy. Moreover, any moves toward Bosnia’s partition will energize proposals for autonomy and separation in the region as a growing number of Sandzak
Muslims identify with the Bosniaks and will view the
separation of RS as a potential precedent that they can
emulate in Serbia.
In the Montenegrin Sandzak, consisting of five
municipalities and 164,000 inhabitants, the population
is made up of 40 percent Serbs, 27 percent Bosniaks,
and 17 percent Montenegrins. In the Montenegrin
national census of 2011, 15.97 percent of citizens declared themselves as “from Islam” and 3.14 percent as
“Muslim.”99 Bosniak leaders have criticized the range
of options available in declaring one’s nationality in
the Montenegrin census. It serves to dilute and divide
the percentage of the population that can be identified
as Bosniaks and can undermine their group rights and
political representation. Perceptions of discrimination,
economic neglect, and under-representation in state
institutions can also contribute to national agitation
and radicalization among Bosniaks in Montenegro.
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IV. REGIONAL ALBANIANISM
The Albanian question remains one of the major
unresolved state building puzzles in the Western Balkans and continues to preoccupy international agencies and existing states. Approximately six million
Albanians live on the Balkan Peninsula, excluding an
estimated two million Albanian descendants in Turkey. They constitute clear majorities in Albania and
Kosova.100 Albania has just over three million; Kosova, 1.8 million; Macedonia, roughly 500,000; Serbia,
50,000; Montenegro, 30,000; and Greece, approximately 750,000. Unlike its Slavic neighbors, the Albanian
population is growing and continues to have relatively high birth rates.
The break-up of Yugoslavia was propelled by
several unresolved national questions and conflictive
national elite ambitions over state structures and the
territorial parameters of nations that made up Yugoslavia. Nationalist pan-Albanian movements in the
region are small and have benefited from little public
support.101 Albania itself has steered clear of supporting pan-Albanianism, and no major party has such
proposals in its platform. Nonetheless, the question
could capture the public imagination if a confluence
of factors were to crystalize, including prolonged economic distress, alienation from mainstream political
parties, growing nationalist appeals, Kosova’s destabilization, persistent clashes between Albanians and
Slavs in Serbia and Macedonia, stalled prospects for
EU membership, and U.S. disengagement from the
Western Balkans.
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Albania’s Turmoil.
Albania has developed a bifurcated two-party
system, Democratic and Socialist, despite numerous attempts over the past 2 decades to break the
deadlock. Political life is personalized and has been
directed by strong leaders where top-down management places limits on intraparty political competition
and the input of citizens in decisionmaking. Attempts
to form durable third parties have proven difficult.
Although some have persisted through several election cycles and enter into government coalitions, the
two main parties control over three-quarters of parliamentary seats.
Albania’s political disputes are not based on ideologies or programs, as the two dominant parties
largely espouse the same goals. Instead, political divisions are grounded within group loyalties among
two mutually exclusive political camps. Political clientelism has developed over the past 20 years similar
to other Balkan countries and involves an extensive
patronage network, a spoils system of official appointments, favoritism shown to supporters of the governing party, and various levels of state-party corruption.
Clientelism undermines political competition based
on program and merit. It also ensures that political office is lucrative, and losing office is financially damaging and strongly resisted.
Albania has a zero-sum political culture evident
during elections. Each ballot is supposed to create
clear winners and losers; when the result is close, as
witnessed in Tirana’s mayoral elections on May 8,
2011, there is little willingness to engage in dialogue
and compromise. Instead, the danger persists that
disputes will escalate into open conflict. The Tirana
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elections, with a controversial vote count of misplaced
ballots, further accentuated the polarization between
the two major parties.
Political contests are not always conducted
through elections. Albania has witnessed regular parliamentary boycotts, persistent public protests against
election results, and instances of vandalism and violence intended to provoke a government overreaction.
According to a European Parliament (EP) report, the
violent incidents on January 21, 2011, which led to
the death of four demonstrators, exacerbated the climate of mistrust between the two parties and toward
state institutions.102
As a result of these factors, political confrontations
risk escalation into long-term parliamentary boycotts
and provocative protest actions. Meanwhile, necessary reforms to meet EU accession criteria are delayed,
and the passage of legislation is often blocked. Longterm paralysis will increase social frustration, raise the
risk of economic decline, and further erode Albania’s
qualifications for EU entry. If Albania were to experience prolonged political conflict and social unrest, this
could also reinvigorate dormant nationalism as politicians endeavor to gain popularity.
Albania has made limited progress in fulfilling
the political criteria for EU membership, including
effective parliamentary work, judicial reform, anticorruption campaigns, a professional civil service,
guaranteed property rights, and improved living
conditions for the Roma community. The political
stalemate has hampered parliamentary work and prevented the establishment of a consensus enabling the
implementation of relevant reforms. Opposition boycotts have obstructed the adoption of laws requiring a
three-fifths majority.
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A potentially negative scenario may unfold
through a confluence of negative factors and is more
likely to embroil an unstable Albania with limited EU
prospects than a politically stable Albania en route to
the Union. Such destabilizing elements could include
growing social unrest in Kosova as a consequence
of international isolation and economic distress that
encourage populist and nationalist elements to mushroom; the division of Kosova through unilateral partition supported by Belgrade; a de facto fracturing of
Bosnia-Herzegovina that encourages other regional
secessions; and political conflicts in Macedonia that
assume ethnic dimensions and which would be difficult for Tirana to ignore.
Long-delayed EU accession prospects, combined
with economic difficulties, will increase disillusionment with the Union and undermine its effectiveness.
Such scenarios could weaken reformist leaders and
bring more radical elements to the forefront. They will
benefit from economic stagnation and social upheaval
and may declare ethno-nationalism and state enlargement as solutions to mounting domestic challenges.
Additional pressures on Albania have been generated by the economic crisis in Greece, where hundreds
of thousands of Albanians live and work, providing
vital remittances to their families in Albania. In 2007,
migrants sent home an estimated $1.3 billion, or approximately 9 percent of Albania’s GDP, but by 2010
the total shrank to $690 million and has decreased
since then.103 Many Albanians in Greece have transferred their savings to Albanian banks, fearful that
Greece may be forced out of the Eurozone. A growing number of returning migrants will place pressure
on the availability of housing and social services. Returnees may not be easily absorbed in the Albanian
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economy, where unemployment stood at over 13
percent in 2011. Albanian officials estimate that about
250,000 illegal migrants have already returned from
Greece in the past 2 years, together with about 15 percent of the legal migrant community, totaling almost
500,000 people.104
Nationalist Voices.
The idea of a Greater Albania, or an Ethnic Albania, has been promulgated by some intellectuals but
with little political traction or popular appeal. Politically, no Albanian leader in Kosova or Macedonia has
been willing to surrender authority to a center in Tirana and become a regional administrator. Albania has
not been a magnet of attraction, either economically
or politically, for those Albanians who emerged from
a much wealthier and open Yugoslavia. Additionally,
the international environment was not conducive to
Albanian expansionism, especially as American and
European restraints on Tirana guaranteed that Albania’s political leaders did not play the irredentist card
even at the height of the war over Kosova in 1999.
However, the public mood is shifting in Albania,
and new actors are appearing on the political stage.
In mid-2011, an organization with a quasi-nationalist
platform was formed and named the Red and Black
Alliance (RBA).105 By early 2012, the RBA boasted
more Facebook members than either the Socialists or Democrats, indicating its increasing appeal
among young voters. The organization reportedly
also opened branches in western capitals among the
Albanian diaspora and claimed to be operating in
neighboring Macedonia.
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Kreshnik Spahiu, the former Deputy Chairman of
the High Judicial Council, leads the RBA. According
to his statements, the RBA does not aim to create a
“Greater Albania” but merely to foster the rights of
Albanians living throughout the region. Its leaders insist that it has no irredentist agenda despite the fact
that the Democrat-led Albanian government has depicted RBA as a potential threat to regional security.
The RBA has been building a momentum that other small nationalist parties lack, partly by challenging
the two-party establishment, calling for term limits
for politicians and parliamentarians, and denouncing
pervasive official corruption. Some observers estimate
its potential support base at between 25 percent and
40 percent of the Albanian electorate. RBA is tapping
into profound public frustration with the political
elites and the impunity of official corruption. There is
a growing sense of youth alienation from the political class, as the major parties are perceived as serving
special interests. Some analysts believe that the RBA
could become a king maker in future government coalitions following the next parliamentary elections,
scheduled to be held by June 2013.
Both the RBA and the MSD in Kosova deny that
they have close ties. Indeed, their leaders appear to
be in competition for public support throughout the
region and dismiss their rivals either as opportunists,
anarchists, Marxists, or folklorists. RBA stresses its
pro-American and pro-European credentials and its
focus on constitutional action. Nonetheless, Albania
may experience growing disillusionment with international representatives, especially if progress toward
EU membership is indefinitely delayed. This can be
coupled with a sense of frustration with the foreign
diplomatic presence that appears incapable of deal-
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ing with perceived electoral fraud and widespread
official corruption.
Religion has not determined Albanian politics, as
the nation does not identify itself with a specific denomination. Although the majority of Albanians are
nominally Muslim, there is little sense of a common
Muslim religious identity with non-Albanian Islamic
populations. Albanian nationalism has always been
secular, as Albanian leaders sought to avoid divisions between members of the Muslim, Catholic, and
Orthodox faiths in the program of nation building.106
Although Islamic organizations have raised their profile in Albanian societies, especially in Macedonia and
Kosova, conditions are not propitious for any significant growth in radical Islam. In fact, no political party
of any significance has rallied around Islamic doctrine
or symbols.
In Albania, religion has not figured as a source of
conflict, but recent developments in the Islamic community need to be monitored. Muslim leaders have
been embroiled in a dispute since early 2012 following
the dismissal of Lulzim Plloci, imam of the Madrasa
Mosque in Tirana.107 The move was perceived as part
of an attack by the leadership of the Muslim Community in Albania (MCA), which favors a Turkish brand
of Islam rather than using clerics educated in Arab
countries. The League of Albanian Imams, a splinter
group from the MCA, condemned Plloci’s dismissal,
as it favors an Arab brand of Islam. The split between
the two groups began in the wake of September 11,
2001 (9/11), when the government examined the
background of foreign Islamic charities operating in
Albania. Turkish Islam is regarded as culturally more
in tune with Albania’s Muslims and less vulnerable to
radicalism, but the MCA ruling has generated conflict
over Islamic leadership.
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Kosova’s Aspirations.
Social frustration is mounting in Kosova, as evident
in the electoral emergence of an opposition group with
a program that combines anti-corruption, full national
sovereignty, and a pan-Albanianism that could resound more broadly among the frustrated and underemployed citizenry. Social unrest can be compounded
by Prishtina’s relative international isolation, its longterm exclusion from the EU, and Belgrade’s push toward unilateral partition of the new state. Although
political dissatisfaction does not currently revolve
around ethno-nationalism, it can assume such forms
if Kosova becomes viewed as a “frozen state” blocked
from entering the major international institutions.
Key reforms have been delayed in Prishtina, especially in public administration and the judiciary and
in tackling organized crime and corruption. The EU
has called for a more proactive approach by law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities, while its
monitoring and mentoring mission, EULEX, has also
come under criticism for its shortcomings in promoting the rule of law. In the northern municipalities
where Prishtina has no control, access to justice is not
fully guaranteed, notably in northern Mitrovica where
the district court functions with limited capacity.
After 4 years of outside supervision, Kosova’s
parliament adopted a resolution on January 31, 2012,
calling for the international community to close the International Civilian Office (ICO).108 The International
Civilian Representative for Kosovo, supported by the
ICO, is also the EU Special Representative (EUSR)
for Kosovo appointed by the Council of the EU and
the final authority in interpreting the Ahtisaari Plan.
The Kosova authorities pledged to meet all obliga-
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tions under the Ahtisaari Plan that imposed supervision over the country’s institutions. On September 10,
2012, the International Steering Group (ISG), which
oversees Kosova’s independence, endorsed closing
the ICO mission while seeking firmer guarantees from
Prishtina in such areas as decentralization and minority rights. This decision will enable Kosova to demonstrate whether the state is increasingly functional or
inherently unstable.
EU monitoring through the EULEX rule of law
mission, intended to help Kosova develop European standards, expired at the end of 2012, although
it was extended for another 2 years under the name
“EULEX Kosovo.” EULEX has acquired a mixed image. Supporters in Brussels argue that it has helped
reduce crime and succeeded in training local police
and customs officials.109 Critics contend that although
the EU has investigated several corruption cases, it
has not enabled the conviction of any high-level offenders, and the local judiciary has not improved its
operations. Paradoxically, a more forceful EULEX role
against organized crime and official corruption could
undermine political stability as it may implicate some
members of the government.
The EP has periodically criticized EULEX and
urged the mission to increase its efforts against organized crime and terminate road blockades by Serbian activists in northern Kosova. The government
in Prishtina wants the EULEX role limited to dealing
with war crimes and international crime, while it takes
over full responsibility for justice and internal policing. The biggest test for Prishtina will be to integrate
its four northern municipalities where Serbs are campaigning for autonomy or secession.110 In synchrony
with EULEX, the Kosova government has drawn up
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plans to fully incorporate the northern region, including the creation of a Temporary Administrative Office
for North Mitrovica, the formation of transitional local
governments in the four northern municipalities, and
the closure of separate Serbian institutions.
The ISG is committed to Kosova’s territorial integrity and has urged the Serbian authorities to withdraw their security units from the country. Although
Belgrade denies having any official presence in the
region, Prishtina claims that Serbian Interior Ministry personnel are present and have links with local
militants and organized crime networks.111 ISG asserts
that if Belgrade took a more constructive role, it would
make it easier for the rule of law to function in Kosova
and would accelerate the transfer of power from international actors to the country’s authorities.
In the northern municipalities, neither the Kosova
police nor the Kosova Security Force can fully perform
their duties given the presence of militant opposition
and a lack of cooperation from Belgrade. Indeed, the
evacuation of EULEX may provide the Serbian authorities with a valuable opportunity to demonstrate
that Kosova is not a viable state by undermining its
territorial integrity. Serbian majority municipal assemblies in the north staged a referendum on February 14-15, 2012, to decide whether Serbs wanted to be
part of Kosova. Turnout was 75.28 percent, with 99.74
percent reportedly rejecting Prishtina’s authority.112
One additional complication is the ongoing UN
mandate over Kosova, which remains valid in the
area of rule of law. In November 2008, the UN Security Council allowed the Secretary General to transfer
UN responsibility for the rule of law to EULEX. If UN
resolution 1244 is not replaced, responsibility for the
rule of law in Kosova will reportedly revert to the UN,
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should EULEX evacuate. This could mean the return
of UN police and judges to the north, a scenario that
will be unacceptable to Prishtina and could culminate
in conflicts with the international presence.
Pan-Albanian Opportunities.
Support for a Greater or Ethnic Albania can escalate as Kosovars voice frustration with their country’s
limited progress toward membership in international
institutions, become dissatisfied with international
mediation, distrust state institutions and political
elites, and continue to suffer from economic underdevelopment. The economic situation remains precarious, and the government needs to take urgent steps to
improve the budgetary situation in close coordination
with the IMF.113
Kosova’s most severe test may come from within
the Albanian population as the youthful MSD expands its popularity and exacerbates its disputes with
the government. Led by Albin Kurti, a former Albanian student leader in Kosova during the Milosevic
years, MSD emerged on the political scene during the
December 12, 2010, general elections. The movement
captured almost 13 percent of the national vote in its
first ballot. It finished third in the elections and gained
14 out of 100 parliamentary seats.
MSD has been outspoken in its criticisms of the
Kosova administration and of foreign representatives
in Prishtina. Its program revolves around two major
planks. First, it contends that Kosova is governed by
a corrupt and incompetent political elite, which is
incapable of developing a modern and economically
prosperous state or gaining full self-determination for
the country. Second, MSD charges that international
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representatives in Prishtina simply maintain the political status quo, fail to uphold Kosova’s territorial integrity, and are insufficiently active in gaining Kosova
international recognition and membership in multinational organizations. The EULEX mission is berated
for its inability to help construct a modern state. Such
criticisms have led the MSD to oppose what it believes
is counterproductive foreign interference.
In addition, Kurti has accused the coalition government of Prime Minister Hashim Thaci of engaging
in talks with Belgrade that bring no benefits to Kosova
but may actually delay the country’s progress. MSD
activists have staged several protest actions, including the blockade of border crossings with Serbia. MSD
spokesmen asserted that the blockades were in defense of the domestic economy, as Serbia floods Kosova with goods while blocking Prishtina’s exports. It
was also intended to highlight the frontier as an interstate border and not just an “administrative line” as
claimed by Belgrade.
MSD has the potential of both rejuvenating and
radicalizing Kosovar politics. Its combination of parliamentary pressure and street politics—together with
its growing popularity, outspokenness, and confrontational stance—has unnerved international actors.
Kurti has come under criticism from several EU representatives. The EP rapporteur for the Western Balkans
Jelko Kacin charged that clashes between Kosovar
police and MSD protesters during the summer of 2012
damaged international attempts to improve relations
between Belgrade and Prishtina and undermined the
EU-sponsored talks with Serbia.
Kacin accused the MSD of acting the same way as
Serbian minority leaders in northern Kosova who have
blocked border posts to protest against the presence of
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Kosovar police and customs officials. Kacin rejected
Kurti’s explanation that the protest was a reciprocal
measure against Serbia’s failure to implement trade
and other agreements with Kosova. In an evident attempt to disguise the EU’s own shortcomings, Kacin
claimed that the border clashes retarded international
efforts to persuade Belgrade to end its obstruction of
Kosova’s participation in regional initiatives.
The MSD was energized by the February 24, 2012,
agreement between Belgrade and Prishtina on representation in regional organizations.114 According to
the deal, Kosova would be represented simply under
the name “Kosovo” and not the Republic of Kosova,
and with an added footnote that provoked widespread outrage. The wording of the footnote challenged Kosova’s independence and can be used to
undermine its statehood. It read: “This label [Kosovo]
does not prejudge the status of Kosovo and is in accordance with Resolution 1244 and the opinion of the
International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration
of independence.” Logically, if the status of Kosova is
not “prejudged,” then it is unsettled: the position the
Serbian government has maintained since the country
declared independence in February 2008. The footnote
phrasing and its interpretation contradict Kosova’s
constitution and statehood, which the United States
and most EU countries have pledged to uphold.
Subsequent arguments erupted on whether the
Kosova footnote should be mentioned only in agreements and official documents and not on nameplates
at meetings. Another complication concerned the
spelling of the country’s name—Kosova (the Albanian
version) or Kosovo (the Serbian version). The agreement reached in Brussels did not specify how name
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plates should be written and opened up the terrain to
conflictive interpretations.115
Prime Minister Thaci was under intense pressure
from Washington and Brussels to sign the footnote
agreement. He tried to put a brave face on the deal
by claiming that the designation was temporary, but
his domestic credibility suffered, as there was no
indication that the wording would be altered in the
foreseeable future. Thaci claimed that through the EUbrokered deal, Belgrade had effectively recognized
Kosova’s statehood because Prishtina could participate in regional fora in which Serbia is a member.
While the government in Prishtina claims the
footnote agreement will facilitate relations with EU
members that have not recognized Kosova, opposition leaders assert that it will damage Kosova’s international status, as many countries will remain neutral
on the question of status. The MSD described the concessions made to Serbia as a serious setback, threatening Kosova’s sovereignty and international status. It
called for street protests and challenged the personal
position of the Prime Minister, who had failed to discuss the footnote accord in parliament.
In addition to reviving Serbian nationalist claims,
the footnote agreement partially lifted the lid on a
simmering pot of Albanian nationalism. Until now,
Kosovars have been grateful to international players
for their national liberation and independence. But
a more self-confident generation is emerging that no
longer feels beholden to foreign powers. They are
neither anti-American nor anti-European but increasingly focused on Albanian and Kosovar interests and
less willing to compromise on basic principles.116
Outgoing U.S. ambassador to Kosova Christopher
Dell condemned those objecting to the outcome of the

79

talks in Brussels as “anti-American and anti-European.” Such simplified labeling no longer scares young
Albanians but may create even more resentment
against foreign interference in domestic politics and
perceptions of Kosovar submissiveness. Moreover,
any government crackdown on MSD, coupled with
perceptions of official backtracking on statehood,
could raise the movement’s support base. In March
2012, Kurti claimed that MSD could gain over 21 percent of the vote in upcoming elections.117
Neither Washington nor Brussels seem prepared
for a rising wave of Albanian self-assertion that will
not simply manifest in street protests and blockades
but may be increasingly reflected in support for nationalist parties that are less willing to follow Western recommendations. International decisions that are
seen as sacrificing Kosovar aspirations for the sake of
neighboring capitals will be resented and may spark
even more expansive nationalist demands.
The MSD possesses a pan-Albanian agenda that
favors unification between Kosova and Albania. Although it is not actively engaged in such a process,
the mere fact that its leaders openly discuss unification as a viable future option has unnerved political
parties and international actors who have avoided
or dismissed the question for over 20 years. MSD
has proposed a referendum on Kosova’s unification
with Albania, an idea that is gaining traction among
the younger generation in both countries. It considers
such a merger as creating a stronger and more viable
state. In pursuit of this project, observers claim that
MSD is developing links with Albanian nationalist
and unification groups in neighboring countries.118
As a younger generation of political activists
comes to the forefront, cross-border Albanian politics
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will become increasingly interconnected. For instance,
Kurti is a popular figure in Tirana and is considered to
be one of the most articulate Albanian leaders. His appeals to the wider Albanian nation could stir the specter of pan-Albanianism that all major political parties have eschewed since the collapse of communism
and Yugoslavism.
In denigrating Kosova’s aspirations toward independence, Belgrade has manipulated Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist stereotypes that carry resonance in the West. The term “Wahhabi” is widely
used in the region not as an accurate depiction of a
specific religious community but as a label to discredit one’s political opponents. Although some Wahhabist groups have been active in parts of Kosova
through charity work and the restoration of mosques,
their ideology has limited public resonance or
political impact.119
Nonetheless, national radicalization in Kosova
could also encourage a turn to religious conservatism
among some segments of the population.120 Observers
cite efforts by the conservative Justice Party to amend
the constitution, which declares Kosova a secular
state, to allow hijab in public schools, and to construct
a large mosque in Prishtina that would absorb the
growing numbers of worshipers. Some Kosovars attribute rising piety among poorer sectors of society to
Muslim charities. Several Muslim NGOs operate in
Kosova rebuilding mosques destroyed during the war
and offering financial help to orphans. Muslim NGOs
are also engaged in health and educational projects,
with critics accusing them of using their influence for
ideological inroads among poor Kosovars.
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More troubling for regional security has been the
re-emergence of secular guerrilla groups, such as the
Albanian National Army (ANL), which has been designated as an illegal and terrorist organization by the
UN and the United States. It is believed to have close
links with the Front for Albanian National Unification,
a group that advocates the unification of Albanian
majority territories in Albania, Kosova, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece.121 In March 2012, the
ANL claimed that it had reactivated its structures to
protect Kosova from a Serbian invasion.
Another clandestine group, the Army for the Liberation of Occupied Territories (ALOT), announced
its existence in April 2002 claiming that Serbs were
intent on truncating Kosova.122 ALOT claimed responsibility for spraying a Serb vehicle with bullets in the
village of Cabra north of Mitrovica. Serbia’s Minister
for Kosova, Goran Bogdanovic, urged KFOR to disarm Albanian militants, claiming that their extremism
could lead to escalating violence.123 Local Serbs also
felt intimidated after flyers were distributed in several
villages calling for their expulsion. The flyers were reportedly signed by the ANL.124
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon warned in his
May 2012 report on Kosova that tensions and confrontations constitute a serious risk to stability. Ban noted
that the number of crimes against ethnic minorities
increased between February and May 2012, relative
to the same period the previous year. Threats, thefts,
arson, vandalism, and attacks on the facilities of the
Serbian Orthodox Church were on the rise.125 Equally
troubling, the Serbian ultra-nationalist organization
Obraz reportedly pinned threatening messages on the
doors of Albanians living in northern municipalities.
Local Albanians subsequently demanded an increased
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security presence in their neighborhoods. In response,
NATO’s peacekeeping mission to Kosova relocated
some troops to mixed ethnic areas. Police sources in
Mitrovica reported that the Obraz leaflets raised feelings of insecurity within the Albanian community.126
Presevo Valley Conflicts.
According to the 2002 Serbian census, Albanians
form a majority in two municipalities of southern
Serbia, Presevo (89.09 percent) and Bujanovac (54.69
percent), and a sizeable minority in the municipality
of Medvedja (26.17 percent). All three municipalities
border Kosova. Unless the emigration of Albanians
accelerates, longer-term demographic trends do not
favor the Serbs.
The region experienced a 17-month insurgency in
2000-01 following the liberation of Kosova by NATO
troops during Milosevic’s campaign of expulsion and
mass murder, and with several atrocities by Serb militias reported in the Presevo region. The insurgency
ended in May 2001 with the involvement of NATO, the
United States, and the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the signing of the
Konculji Agreement between the Liberation Army of
Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac (LAPMB) and the
Serbian administration. About 100 people were killed
during the fighting, while over 12,500 Albanians fled
to Kosova.
Under the Covic Plan, in return for disarming and
demobilizing, the guerrillas were to be amnestied, refugees would be allowed to return, a multiethnic police force would be formed, and Albanians would be
integrated into state institutions after decades of exclusion and discrimination.127 Belgrade established a
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Coordination Body (CB) for the three municipalities to
defuse ethnic tensions, allow refugees to return home,
and support local economic development. However,
smaller-scale incidents continued, and tensions have
persisted. Former LAPMB fighters maintain close contacts with ex-KLA guerrillas in Kosova. Some Serbian
officials continue to view the Albanian minority as a
separatist element that endangers the country’s northsouth transportation corridor, including the probable
route of future south-north energy pipelines.
In January 2006, Albanian leaders in Presevo,
Bujanovac, and Medvedja called for far-reaching decentralization and autonomy in the Presevo valley,
reminiscent of Serbian demands in northern Kosova.
They also adopted a common platform calling for the
unification of the Presevo valley (or Eastern Kosova)
with Kosova in the event of changes to Kosova’s
northern borders.
In September 2007, representatives of the valley’s
five largest Albanian parties issued a declaration in
support of Kosova’s statehood and called for a greater
international presence in the Presevo region. The danger persists that anti-Serb violence in Kosova could
precipitate anti-Albanian violence in Presevo, and vice
versa. If the separatist agenda for northern Kosova is
pursued by Belgrade and gains some international
backing, two options would emerge: exchanging territory between northern Kosova and southern Serbia, or exchanging minority populations between the
two subregions.
Any official statements by Belgrade regarding
Kosova’s partition or the autonomy of northern Kosova creates uncertainty and tension in the Presevo region. In the event the partition of Kosova continues to
be firmly rejected by international players while the
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northern municipalities evade Prishtina’s jurisdiction,
support may grow for the transfer of Serbs from northern Kosova to the Presevo valley. This would alter the
ethnic balance in the valley in favor of Serbs, provoke
conflicts with resident Albanians, and stimulate calls
for the reciprocal transfer or expulsion of Albanians
from the Presevo valley.
Belgrade has registered some progress in Presevo
by allowing for the formation of multiethnic local governments, joint Serbian-Albanian police patrols, and
improvements in the Albanian-language media. In
January 2007, Albanians elected a representative to the
Serbian parliament. However, limited headway has
been made in educational reform and the integration
of Albanians in state institutions, including the judiciary, and tensions persist between local residents and
police units. Albanian leaders also criticize Belgrade’s
CB, which has failed to deliver on various promises of
reform and is seen as an arm of the Serbian government rather than a consultative organ.
Dissatisfaction with Serbian rule is perpetuated
by harsh economic conditions, including high unemployment, poor infrastructure, and general impoverishment, especially in rural areas. Trade between the
region and Kosova and Macedonia has also been restricted because of Belgrade’s security fears. Serbian
forces along the border conduct stringent checks on
traffic and disallow Kosovar citizens from crossing
into the region. Concerns about security have also
discouraged internal and external investment in the
Presevo valley municipalities.
Albanians in southern Serbia massively boycotted the October 2011 census, thus undermining its accuracy and legitimacy. Splits are also visible among
Albanian parties, with some adopting more radical
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positions and being less willing to seek compromises
with Belgrade. In the event of increased tensions, the
more militant factions are likely to raise their popularity and compete over pan-nationalist agendas such as
unification with Kosova.
Several additional developments have increased
tensions in southern Serbia. The announcement in
October 2010 that a Serbian-Russian center for “emergency coordination” would be built in Nis near the
Presevo region may indicate official anxiety about
Albanian unrest, while demonstrating that any moves
toward autonomy will be prohibited. Russian officials
inaugurated this “regional humanitarian center” on
October 17, 2011, by claiming that it would contribute
to a more efficient response to emergencies not only in
the Balkans but also throughout Europe. They denied
suggestions that Moscow was establishing a military
base.128 Nonetheless, speculation has persisted that the
Nis facilities could be turned to military use.
On the eve of the Serbian elections on May 6, 2012,
five Albanians were arrested in the region on suspicion of committing war crimes during the 2001 Presevo rebellion.129 Conducted in the town of Bujanovac
and in the villages of Veliki Trnovac and Breznica,
these arrests heightened tensions in the volatile area.
A local Albanian politician described the arrests as an
act of “state terror” against ethnic Albanians.130
Former Albanian paramilitaries issued warnings
in May 2012 that they would restart their operations
in the region if arrests of Albanians continued.131
Jonuz Musliu, former political chief of the Liberation
Army of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac, claimed
that Belgrade was avoiding a peaceful solution to the
conflict. Albanian leaders in the Presevo valley stated
that their biggest concern was the warning by Interior

86

Minister Ivica Dacic about continuing police actions.
Bujanovac Mayor Shaip Kamberi claimed that Belgrade’s goal was to destabilize the region and intimidate the Albanians to leave en masse.
Macedonian Pressures.
The spillover from the armed conflict in southern Serbia contributed to the outbreak of insurgency
in Macedonia in August 2001, as well as to several
clashes between Albanian guerrillas and Macedonian
government forces since then. The Ohrid Framework
Agreement, negotiated under international supervision in August 2001 between Slavic and Albanian
Macedonian representatives to provide Albanians
with more significant representation in state institutions and broaden minority rights, was largely implemented, but new frictions have arisen in recent years.
These include disputes over the allocation of state resources and protests against the fervent nationalism
of the current Macedonian administration.
Albanians complain that the percentage of minority civil servants does not correspond with the Ohrid
stipulations. In 2011, the share of Albanians reached
17.2 percent, short of the goal of 25 percent representing the estimated percentage of Albanians in the country. The figure has barely increased in recent years.132
In addition, in March 2012, the Macedonian parliament
turned down a request by Albanians to add Albanian
Flag Day to the national calendar, thus disappointing
the minority community and further estranging them
from the state.133
Islam has a more visible presence among Albanians in Macedonia than elsewhere in the Balkans because of the growing role of the Macedonian Orthodox
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Church among Slavic Macedonians in their assertion
of national identity. The urban renewal movement in
Skopje has been closely tied to the Slavic Macedonian
national renaissance and the role of the Macedonian
Orthodox Church. This has alienated many Albanians,
who increasingly view the official Islamic Community
as a defender of their interests.
Several faith-based organizations and Islamic
“missionaries” from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have
been active in Macedonia and Kosova, preaching a
conservative brand of Islam. In Macedonia, this has
contributed to a struggle within the Islamic population between the moderate mainstream of the Islamic
Religious Community and pockets of pious Wahhabis
influenced from abroad. However, it has not resulted
in the radicalization of the majority of religious believers or in the intrusion of religion into political life.
In both Kosova and Macedonia, Albanian leaders do
not want their populations radicalized as they seek
membership in both NATO and the EU. According to
local analysts, the surest way to prevent the growth
of extremist religious ideologies is to improve living
standards and instill a social safety net, which restricts
opportunities for militant proselytizers.134
Ethnic clashes have erupted in Macedonia, as
witnessed in January 2012 when both Albanian and
Slavic Muslim communities expressed outrage over
a carnival in which Orthodox Christian men mocked
Muslims by dressing as burqa-clad women.135 The
incident at the Vevcani festival prompted demonstrations in several Macedonian towns and expressions of anger against Macedonians during sports
events in neighboring Kosova. Incidents of hostility
between Albanian and Macedonian supporters have
become a regular feature of sports events in Skopje
and Tetovo.136
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Reports about the revival of guerrilla groups also
surfaced in Macedonia during 2012. Xhezair “Commandant Hoxha” Shaqiri of the National Liberation
Army (NLA), an offshoot of the KLA, asserted that the
organization’s former commanders were considering
remobilizing their troops if the “provocations continue.”137 In addition to internal Macedonian conflicts,
the unsolved status of northern Kosova was generating disquiet over territorial partition with potential
implications for Macedonia.
Recent opinion polls indicate that two-thirds of
the residents of Albanian-majority districts in western
Macedonia support the creation of a common Albanian state with Albania and Kosova, and more than
half think it will soon materialize.138 Although no active political mobilization for separation is underway
in the country, this could change if relations between
Albanians and the ruling Macedonian party were to
deteriorate. Polls conducted by the Skopje-based Center for Inter-ethnic Tolerance before tensions escalated
in 2012 revealed that 78 percent of respondents believed that inter-ethnic relations were very bad, and
71 percent considered inter-ethnic intolerance to be on
the rise.139
Montenegrin Dimensions.
According to the Montenegrin census of 2011,
Albanians account for 4.9 percent of the country’s
population of 620,000, or approximately 30,000 inhabitants.140 They are concentrated close to the Albanian
border and form a majority of 70.66 percent in the
municipality of Ulcinj and just over 50 percent in the
municipality of Tuzi. Although most Montenegrin Albanians are Muslims, there is a substantial minority of
Catholics, similar to northern Albania.
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The Montenegrin government honors several provisions to protect minority rights. For instance, Albanians have access to the minority-specific broadcasting
media, while a set number of parliamentary seats are
allocated to Albanians and other minorities. In 2005, a
total of 11 members of ethnic minorities were elected
to the 75-seat parliament and three minority members
appointed to cabinet positions. By 2006, the number
of minority members in the 81-seat assembly reached
14, although their number in the cabinet dropped to
two. In 2007, their political representation improved,
with 16 minority members in the assembly and two in
the cabinet.
Despite these positive indicators, Albanian leaders complain that their community continues to suffer from discrimination and neglect.141 For example,
although Podgorica funds Albanian-language education in local primary and secondary schools, together
with some university-level courses, Albanians still
campaign for equal rights to use their own language
and develop their education systems in areas where
they predominate. They claim that text books ignore
Albanian history and the physical condition of schools
is appalling.
Many Albanians voice disappointment that despite supporting Montenegrin independence, their
situation has not improved, and their population has
dropped through emigration. Economic conditions
have stagnated, and the country’s privatization process has contributed to social dislocation, economic
hardship, and official corruption. All these factors,
together with the weakening economy, have exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions, as each community fears
it will lose access to scarce resources.
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Albanian leaders campaign vigorously for administrative decentralization, especially in Ulcinj municipality. They complain that government measures have
stripped the municipalities of their authority over justice, education, health, and local police. Among other
grievances are the lack of funding for cultural activities; the absence of national institutions to develop
folklore and ethnography; and no national theater, arts
gallery, publishing houses, media centers, or national
institute devoted to preserving the Albanian language
and culture. Additionally, Albanians complain about
a lack of access to government jobs. Whereas over 20
percent of Slavic Montenegrins are employed by the
state, the total is under 10 percent for Albanians, and
they are particularly under-represented in justice and
internal security.
Although Montenegrin Albanians have not voiced
any secessionist demands, their extensive list of grievances could contribute to breeding dissatisfaction and
radicalize the political scene. It will also feed into the
pan-Albanian arguments and aspirations of rising political leaders in neighboring Albania and Kosova.
Chameria vs. Epirus.
Small nationalist groups in Albania have periodically raised the question of the Chameria territory in
northern Greece; and in 2011, a new party was formed,
the Justice, Integration and Unity Party (PJIU), that focuses primarily on Cham demands.142 It gained two
seats in parliament and joined the Democratic Partyled coalition government. An estimated 200,000 Cham
Albanians are mostly descendants of those expelled
from what became northern Greece after the Balkan
wars of 1912-14, following the signing of the Turkish-
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Greek Convention at Lausanne in January 1923 and
after World War II. Cham movements in Albania want
Athens to account for about 4,000 Chams who disappeared as a result of the conflicts, as well as compensation for property seized from approximately 150,000
Chams. About 40,000 Christian Orthodox Cham Albanians, mostly old people, still reside in Greece.143
The RBA and PJIU have been vociferous regarding the Cham question and the treatment of Albanian
immigrants in Greece. They also issue periodic warnings about Greek separatism in southern Albania.
They called for a boycott of the October 2011 census
and opposed the law for changing one’s nationality,
arguing that thousands of Albanians have declared
themselves as Greek over the past 20 years simply
to reside and work in Greece, which has inflated the
size of the Greek minority in Albania.144 Such a process allegedly encourages Greek irredentism toward
southern Albania, which Greek nationalists consider
to be Northern Epirus and thereby a part of Greater
Greece. Some Greek minority activists, together with
nationalists in Greece itself, have called for autonomy
for the southern Albanian region. Nationalist fervor is
also raised by difficulties in reaching an agreement on
the maritime border between the two states.
Ethnic minority representatives, including Greeks,
Macedonians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Vlachs, Roma,
and Egyptians, announced in December 2011 that they
will pursue a lawsuit at the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg following Albania’s Constitutional Court ruling to erase the category “nationality”
in legal and civil registries.145 The court determined
that nationality is not necessary to include on the census forms to enumerate the population. The Albanian
court acted on the legal challenge issued by several
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local judges and by the RBA, one of the main opponents of recording ethnicity and religious identity in
the Albanian census.
RBA leaders claim that leaders of the Greek minority may demand special status and a percentage of
parliamentary seats and government positions, along
the lines of the Ohrid model in Macedonia or the Ahtisaari plan in Kosova. Conversely, minority leaders
allege that the Albanian government is openly discriminating by making it unconstitutional for citizens
to be members of any nationality other than Albanian.
Representative of the Greek minority Unity Party for
Human Rights also condemned international representatives in Tirana for ignoring minority demands.
Subsequently, several minority leaders signed a joint
declaration refusing to recognize the results of the
2011 census.
On July 1, 2012, some 4,000 members of Cham organizations held a protest near the Greek-Albanian
border in Thesprotia demanding the abolition of
Greek laws that prevent them from accessing their traditional lands and properties in Greece.146 The leader
of the PJIU, Shpetim Idrizi, accused Greece of violating human rights by not allowing Chams to visit their
ancestral homes. A Genocide Monument has been
constructed by Chams in the southern Albanian town
of Sarandë, with plans to construct a larger monument
to the victims of genocide.
The Chameria question has been largely dormant
for 20 years, as Tirana did not want to antagonize Athens during its campaign to join the EU and NATO.
Nonetheless, Tirana has recently taken the issue to the
World Court of Justice in the hope of gaining some financial compensation for confiscated Cham property.
Cham activists in Albania who have become increas-
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ingly outspoken are campaigning for several specific
actions, including a resolution in the Albanian parliament obliging all governments in Tirana to speak up
on the Cham question, return of property and land
seized during the expulsions or appropriate compensation payments, and Greek citizenship for expellees
and their descendants so they can either return to their
ancestral areas or visit them freely.147 Cham activists
claim they have no irredentist pretensions to northern
Greece even though officials in Athens dismiss them
as radicals and separatists and reportedly prevent
them from travelling to the Chameria region.
Cham activists complain that Albanians and other
minorities in Greece are denied group rights in such
areas as education, language, or religion, in contrast to
the broad array of minority rights granted to the Greek
community in southern Albania. The Greek population is officially estimated at under 25,000, mostly residing in 99 villages in southern Albania, with their
own political organization, the Unity for Human
Rights Party (UPHR) with a seat in parliament. President of the UPHR Vangelis Dule unleashed a storm in
March 2012 during an interview with an Albanian TV
station by claiming that there was no Chameria region
in Greece and that the Cham question was a fabrication.148 He accused several Albanian deputies of nationalism, and his life was subsequently threatened.
Reports periodically surface about the existence
of a guerrilla movement styled as the Chameria Liberation Army, which seeks to create a Greater Albania through insurrection. The rumors appear to have
more propagandistic value than actual substance.
However, the Cham problem has been taken aboard
by nationalist and pan-Albanian groups in Albania
as part of their program to defend the rights of Alba-
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nians in neighboring states. The addition of Chameria
to a prospective Ethnic Albania project could become
more enticing for various pro-unification groups.
Greece could be on the verge of a social explosion
that could have an impact on its neighbors. Whether
Athens defaults on its massive debts or qualifies for
new international loans, the country faces unprecedented social turmoil. Ultra-leftist and ultra-rightist
parties benefited in the June 17, 2012, parliamentary
elections and are supported by over 40 percent of the
Greek electorate. The nationalistic and openly chauvinistic Golden Dawn party gained almost 7 percent
of the vote and 18 parliamentary seats.
Public frustration in Greece is intensifying, as the
government has pledged to make deeper cuts in the
minimal wage, pensions, and state sector jobs to reduce
the budget deficit and obtain emergency funds from
the EU and IMF. The voters’ revenge could result in a
series of weak governments or propel to power a more
radical coalition. In another destabilizing alternative,
Greece may become insolvent and leave the Eurozone with a comprehensive decimation of living standards. Unemployment among young people reached
48 percent in mid-2012, and GDP has contracted by
20 percent during the 5-year recession. Meanwhile,
the bloated state sector and powerful trade unions
continue to block structural reforms necessary for
economic recovery.
Greece’s social breakdown may become comparable to Albania’s in 1997 when the financial pyramid schemes collapsed. But instead of leading to
potential state failure, Greek turmoil can presage the
emergence of an authoritarian government that will
freeze the country’s democracy. Under the pretext of
restoring order and defending Hellenic dignity, a na-
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tionalist regime could pinpoint internal and external
enemies to deflect public rage. Minorities can become
especially vulnerable to attack and be forced to leave
the country. This can provoke conflicts with directly
affected neighbors.
The most obvious external targets for Greek nationalism would be Turkey, Macedonia, and Albania,
where it could provoke equally nationalistic reactions.
Conflicts between Ankara and Athens would affect security in Cyprus, the Aegean, and the Balkans. Athens
can also rekindle the northern Epirus (southern Albania) question to divert attention from internal turmoil.
On February 20, 2012, during demonstrations in Athens against government austerity measures, a delegation of Greeks from southern Albania laid a wreath
at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in commemoration of the anniversary of the declaration of the Autonomous Republic of Northern Epirus in 1914.149
The ceremony demonstrated that the manipulation of
historical anniversaries and territorial grievances by
political leaders on both sides of the border should not
be underestimated.
V. MACEDONIAN IMPASSE
The Macedonian state has stalled in its moves toward membership in both NATO and the EU, and this
is both a cause and a consequence of rising national
assertiveness. Several dangers lurk ahead for Skopje
if the country’s progress into NATO and the EU remains indefinitely blocked.150 The absence of a solution to the ongoing name dispute with Athens will
rebound negatively on Macedonia’s political stability,
undermine economic development, diminish foreign
investment, halt progress in necessary structural re-
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forms, intensify manifestations of ethno-nationalism,
and potentially lead to escalating inter-ethnic conflicts
that will endanger the country’s territorial integrity
and challenge regional security.
Nationalist Resurgence.
Since it declared independence from Yugoslavia
on September 8, 1991, the Republic of Macedonia, according to its constitutional name, or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia (FYROM), according
to its designation in major international institutions,
has made substantial progress in transforming itself
into a contender for both EU and NATO membership.
In particular, following the brief Albanian insurgency
in the summer of 2001 and with intense Western involvement, significant steps were undertaken by the
government to integrate the large Albanian minority
into the country’s institutions. However, the path to
both NATO and the EU has not proceeded smoothly
because Macedonia needs to resolve its dispute with
Greece over the country’s name and other national
identifiers, as this has become a primary condition for
incorporation in both the Alliance and the Union.
On June 5, 2011, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DMNE) was re-elected
and formed a coalition government with the major
Albanian party, the Democratic Union for Integration
(DUI). VMRO leaders have demonstrated little willingness to make concessions over the name dispute
with Athens, so that Macedonia’s progress toward
both NATO and EU membership stands at an impasse.
Indeed, VMRO’s populist credentials in staunchly defending Macedonian national interests are strength-
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ened by its opposition to any compromise with Greece
over the country’s name, the definition of its people,
and the designation of its language.
In addition to the dispute with Greece, Macedonian and Bulgarian authorities have sparred over VMRO’s appropriation of Bulgarian Tsars as ethnic Macedonian rulers, even though the historical record does
not mention Macedonia as an administrative structure
or a distinct national identity until the end of the 19th
century. For instance, a statue has been erected in the
middle of Skopje to Bulgaria’s Tsar Samuel, the ruler
of the First Bulgarian Empire (997-1014 AD), to link
him with a purportedly longer Macedonian historical
identity. Such moves and the “Macedonianization”
of Bulgarian history in school textbooks have provoked angry exchanges with Bulgarian government
representatives.
To preserve their influence and power, and riding
on a nationalist wave, VMRO leaders have expanded
the state administration to reward party supporters.
The civil service has been transformed into a largely
partisan network driven by nepotism, patronage, and
clientelism.151 The party seeks control over various
key social sectors, including business, the media, the
health system, academia and education, trade unions,
NGOs, and professional organizations. State expenditure on administrative expansion and prestige projects in the capital have damaged the national budget
and curtailed investment in national infrastructure.
These problems are compounded by widespread corruption and mismanagement, stalled prospects for
EU and NATO entry, and global economic trends
that have squeezed economies such as Macedonia’s,
which remains dependent on foreign investment
and assistance.
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Macedonia’s opposition parties have regularly
protested against the extensive renovation work that
has dramatically altered the center of Skopje, erected
kitschy statues and other expensive monuments in
the capital, and foresees the renaming of hundreds of
streets after Macedonian national heroes. The opposition Social Democratic Party accuses the authorities of
rewriting history and selecting figures from the past
that conform with VMRO’s nationalist ideology.152
Despite its hardline stance, time appears to be
working against Skopje for several reasons. First, EU
countries have either lined up behind Greece as a comember or have remained neutral and will not support Skopje in its name dispute with Athens. This is
especially evident at a time when the Greek government is desperate to maintain social stability while
pursuing austerity measures to reduce the country’s
mammoth budget deficit.
Second, the VMRO-led government made several
provocative decisions designed to reinforce claims to
an ancient regional identity that raised the temperature with Athens and reinforced Greek intransigence.
For instance, the decision in 2007 to rename the airport
in Skopje after Alexander the Great, the ancient king of
pre-Slavic Macedonia, seemed calculated to provoke
Greek sensitivities over ancient Macedonia’s Hellenic
heritage. By blocking the country’s NATO and EU entry, Greece appeared to contravene its undertaking in
the 1995 Interim accord not to allow the name issue to
stand in the way of the country’s membership in international organizations. Athens countered that Skopje
had broken its own pledges by usurping the heritage
of Ancient Macedon and implicitly making claims to
Greek territory through symbolic gestures and educational textbooks.
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Third, the long-term failure to find a renaming
solution for Macedonia could negatively affect the
Albanian coalition partner, the DUI, especially as the
key foreign policy priority for all prominent Albanian
leaders in the Balkans is to join NATO and move closer
to the United States. Macedonia’s stalled NATO accession is a source of frustration for Albanian representatives as it could lead to isolationism and nationalism
in which the Albanians will be left stranded or even
the targets of ethnic conflict.
Skopje’s obstructed progress toward NATO and
the EU will increase opportunities for political disputes to assume ethnic dimensions. The VMRO government could find itself facing a spiral of instability in
which the Albanian position hardens and increasingly
criticizes Skopje for failing to devise a solution with
Greece. The VMRO-DUI coalition could dissolve, and
Albanian party leaders may push for decentralizing,
confederalizing, or even fracturing the state, a scenario that would send political shockwaves throughout
the region. Albanian parties may begin to compete
with each other—not for a share of government portfolios with the Slavic Macedonian parties, but over
programs for autonomy or even separation and union
with Kosova or Albania. The danger of a unilateral
partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova, coupled
with Macedonia’s national isolation and its poor economic prospects, would also encourage such internal
destabilization.
A fourth negative scenario could witness Macedonia devolving into another exploitable “frozen state”
for the Russian authorities in South Eastern Europe,
alongside Kosova and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moscow
calculates that a Macedonian state that remains outside of NATO and the EU will become a growing
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source of dispute and even conflict that can preoccupy Washington and Brussels. This can enable Russia to expand its geopolitical agenda in Europe’s east
aimed at rolling back U.S. influence and neutralizing
NATO’s security functions.
Disputes with Greece.
Opinion polls in Macedonia indicate strong support for retaining the country’s current name and
dismissing any compromises with Greece. Some observers and officials have suggested a geographical
qualifier for the country such as “North Macedonia”
or “Vardar Macedonia,” and there has been limited
support in Athens for such options. However, the
hard-pressed Greek government, in the midst of an
economic crisis, may be less inclined to accept “Macedonia” in any part of the name of its northern neighbor in the future.
The VMRO government continues to tap into sentiments of national pride and needs Athens as a counterpoint to its national agenda. It has used the emotional issue of the state name and national identity to
garner public support on the premise that it is defending the distinctiveness of the Macedonian nation. In
this quest, history has been revised and manipulated
by government officials to depict the current Slavicspeaking Macedonians as the direct genetic descendants of Ancient Macedonians, mirroring the historical nationalism in Greek policy.153
Any alterations to the country’s name agreed to
by Skopje can be exploited politically by government
opponents and could even lead to conflicts between
Slavic Macedonians. Officials in Skopje claim that
about 70 percent of the country’s population opposes
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any change in the country’s name, and over 80 percent
of Slavic Macedonians are against any adjustments. In
the event of a referendum that rejects modifying the
country’s name and in effect disqualifies Macedonia
from NATO and the EU, conflicts with Albanians are
likely to intensify. Although the nationalist vote ensures VMRO a majority among Slavic Macedonians,
in the long term, it undermines its attractiveness as a
coalition partner for the Albanian parties. Some observers believe that Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski
is less interested in NATO and EU membership than
in staying in power by using to his political advantage
the issue of unfair exclusion by Greece.154
The Greek government is mired in internal economic crisis and growing social unrest and can ill afford to be seen to surrender any element of Hellenic
heritage over Macedonia. Facing even more stringent
austerity measures demanded by international lenders to keep Greece solvent, Prime Minister Antonis
Samaras has compared the country’s predicament to
the Great Depression in the United States following
the Wall Street crash in October 1929.155 As a consequence, future governments could prove more nationalistic and less willing to compromise with Skopje than its predecessors. Some analysts and officials
in Macedonia believe that the Greek authorities are
deliberately biding their time on the name agreement, calculating that Macedonia’s position will be
steadily weakened through internal instability and
international exclusion.156
Some Macedonian observers speculate that Athens
is actually promoting insecurity in the country by encouraging and exploiting ethnic and religious cleavages to achieve its objective of obliterating the Macedonian name altogether from its northern neighbor.
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The simmering dispute has also boiled over in periodic incidents with Greece that further sour relations
between the two countries.
In June 2012, Greek border services started covering the letters “MK” on Macedonian car number plates
with a FYROM sticker.157 Macedonia introduced new
number plates in February 2012, saying they were
needed to meet EU standards. The Greek move will
have a negative impact on tourism, as Greece is a leading summer destination for many Macedonians, and
drivers may object to having border officers tamper
with their cars. It will also feed into nationalist polarization on both sides of the border.
Prime Minister Gruevski benefited from the visit
of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to Skopje on
July 24, 2012, by accusing Athens of deliberately stalling negotiations on the name dispute and blocking
Macedonia’s entry into NATO.158 Gruevski also told
Ban Ki-moon to urge Greece to respect the rights of
the Macedonian minority in Greece, whose existence
Athens does not even recognize. Raising the Slavic
Macedonian minority question with Athens is guaranteed to exacerbate conflict and close more doors to
further negotiations.
The number of people speaking Slavic Macedonian dialects in Greece has been estimated at between
10,000 and 250,000. However, the majority do not
openly exhibit an ethnic Macedonian national consciousness and identity themselves as Greek. The
government in Skopje claims that their avoidance of
Macedonian identification is primarily due to fears of
discrimination and repression by Greek officialdom.
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Minority Frustrations.
Following the Albanian insurgency in northwestern Macedonia during the summer of 2001, the Ohrid
Framework Agreement was brokered between Albanian guerrillas and the Macedonia government under
the supervision of U.S. and EU mediators.159 Much of
the agreement has been implemented, including cultural autonomy, proportional Albanian representation in state institutions, and use of the Albanian language in municipalities where Albanians constitute 20
percent or more of the population.
Nonetheless, several factors have undermined Albanian commitments to the Macedonian state. These
have included the rise of Slavic Macedonian nationalism inflamed by the name dispute with Greece, state
capture by the VMRO party, an ethnically assertive
Prime Minister who has headed the government since
August 2006, the growing prominence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, a decline in the independence
of the media and judiciary, the limited number of Albanians in senior positions in government institutions
and public enterprises, and setbacks in administrative
decentralization and Albanian language use. Within
the framework of the Ohrid agreement, there has been
progress on implementing the law on languages, on
decentralization, and on more equitable minority representation. However, continued efforts are needed in
various domains, such as providing education in native languages and strengthening political dialogue.
The rights given to Albanians under the Ohrid
Accords have also led to dissatisfaction among the
Slavic Macedonian majority, especially among those
who feel a loss of privileged status in the state sector amidst charges that merit has been sacrificed for
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ethnic quotas. This has caused resentment against Albanians and latent opposition to power sharing and
the redistribution of public resources. In the event of
economic stress, such resentments can be politically
manipulated to fuel inter-ethnic disputes. According
to some surveys, more than two-fifths of Macedonians
believe there is a high risk of violent ethnic conflict.
Their views are shared by a slightly lower number of
Albanians in Macedonia.160
The “national renaissance” campaign and costly
urban renewal program (Skopje 2014) pursued by the
VMRO administration is focused on asserting Macedonian identity and developing an ancient heritage
that largely neglects Albanians and other minorities.
The attempt to depict the current Slavic-speaking
Macedonians as direct descendants of ancient Macedonians has magnified conflicts with Greece and
contributed to excluding and alienating the Albanian
population, which is characterized as outsiders rather
than the claimed descendants of ancient Illyrians who
inhabited parts of the Macedonian region since before
1000 BC. The nationalist focus on identity and deepening divisions between “patriots” and “traitors” will
contribute to exacerbating inter-ethnic tensions at a
time of economic uncertainty.
If the “national renaissance” or “antiquization”
program of state-promoted nation building is pursued at the cost of international integration, it will
delegitimize the Macedonian state among Albanians
and increase demands for federalization and bilingualism. As both propositions remain unacceptable
to the Macedonian majority, this will provide another
recipe for conflict. The opposition Democratic Party of
Albanians (DPA) has already called for “nonterritorial
federalization” and a bicameral legislature to accommodate Albanian political aspirations.161
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According to the EU Commission, Macedonia has
continued with reforms related to its EU accession bid,
although several challenges remain.162 The parliamentary elections on June 5, 2011, were generally in line
with international standards. Progress has been made
in the fields of the judiciary and public administration,
notably with regard to the legal framework. However,
problems are also evident in such areas as freedom of
expression in the media, judicial and administrative
reform, and combating pervasive corruption. Additionally, the absence of constructive dialogue between
government and opposition elements weakens the
functioning of state institutions.
Critics charge the VMRO administration with state
capture, combined with autocratic and populist politics that are promoting instability and diminishing the
country’s chances for EU and NATO accession. Indeed,
EU officials have expressed worries that Macedonia is
backsliding on reform in the face of Greece’s blockade of the country’s EU membership talks. Macedonia
gained EU candidate country status on December 17,
2005; and since 2009, the EU Commission has recommended a start to accession talks but failed to offer an
actual date.163
In an indication of growing frustration among
Macedonia’s Albanians, on October 14, 2011, the national census was abruptly terminated following the
resignation of the State Census Commission, which
protested against various counting irregularities.164
The previous census, held in 2002, recorded Albanians
at 25 percent of a total population of 2,022,000. The
figure is dismissed by all Albanian leaders, who claim
that the actual number exceeds 30 percent of the population, while some Slavic Macedonian spokesmen
maintain that the figure is under 20 percent.
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Population numbers have important ramifications
for such questions as language use and representation in state institutions. In the 2011 census, Albanian
members of the Census Commission demanded that
expatriate citizens who visit Macedonia at least once a
year should also be counted. This was rejected by the
Macedonian members. Moreover, there was a broader
lack of clarity regarding counting methodology, and
the entire exercise became heavily politicized.
The economic recession and high unemployment,
estimated at 31 percent by the close of 2011, has exacerbated public distrust in state institutions and in the
governing coalition. The state debt is growing, while
economic growth is stagnant and lagged behind most
countries in the region. The resources spent on renovating Skopje and creating an ancient heritage have
led to charges by Albanian leaders that only limited
resources have been invested for the benefit of the Albanian community and disparities in living standards
with Slavic Macedonians are rising. If these negative
trends are prolonged, they can precipitate social unrest and rekindle latent inter-ethnic tensions. Political
leaders in both the Slavic and Albanian communities
may divert dissatisfaction with their own performance
into communal confrontations to masquerade as the
protectors of distinct ethno-national interests.
Ethnic Escalation.
Ethnic tensions in Macedonia are not confined to
relations between Slavic and Albanian Macedonians
but have involved Slavic Muslims and Turkish populations. In February 2012, OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities Knut Vollebaek, who was visiting Skopje, stated that the upsurge in ethnic tensions
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was a wakeup call for the country to make greater efforts to rebuild community trust.165
On January 13, 2012, Macedonia’s Muslim communities expressed their indignation over a carnival
in which Orthodox Christian men mocked Muslims
by dressing as women wearing burqas.166 The Vevcani
carnival attracts thousands of visitors, and local residents traditionally wear elaborate masks. The most
common costumes include devils and demons. The
festival incident prompted violent demonstrations by
Muslims, who accused members of the majority population of stoking hatred against them. Some protesters
attacked buses and defaced a Macedonian flag in the
town of Struga and replaced it with a green flag to represent Islam. The Saint Nikola church in Labuniste, a
village near Struga, was partially burned by unknown
perpetrators at the end of January 2012 as tensions between Christians and Muslims accelerated.167
Macedonian Muslim leaders called for restraint
while accusing the government of promoting Islamophobia through the organs of official propaganda. The
head of the Islamic Community demanded an apology
from the mayor of Vevcani, a Slavic Macedonian village in an Albanian majority region. Following a number of violent incidents, the national Commission for
Religious Communities held an emergency session.
Some locals claimed that the incidents were politically
motivated, evidently to sow divisions between Christian and Muslim Macedonians and between Slavs and
Albanians. The incidents in Macedonia also had reverberations in Kosova, where the Macedonian embassy
building in Prishtina was attacked during a protest
organized by radical groups.168
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In a further indication that ethnic relations remained tense and liable to provocations, the shooting
of five unarmed young Slavic Macedonians near Skopje on April 12, 2012, raised fears of revenge attacks
on Albanian communities even though there was no
evidence that Albanians were involved in the shootings.169 On May 4, 2012, several thousand Albanians
protested in Skopje against the arrest of Muslims allegedly implicated in the murders. Police arrested
20 Albanians during an operation in several villages
around the capital, and five were subsequently detained on terrorism and murder charges.170
Government officials claimed that radical Islamists
were using the arrests as an excuse to whip up tensions. Shukri Alia, blacklisted by the EU and sought
by the Macedonian police for murder and armed attacks on two Skopje police stations, is reportedly leading the efforts to organize protests. Police believe he is
hiding in Kosova and planning to provoke a civil war
by pushing for the secession of western Macedonia.171
According to Macedonia’s security experts, an estimated 5,000 battle hardened nationalists are in the
country, including some radical Islamists from the
wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosova, and Macedonia. Other analysts believe that the threat is exaggerated and used as a smokescreen for anti-Albanian and
anti-Muslim militancy. Radical Islam has a toehold
in Macedonia through the Salafist and other ultraconservative movements, and Muslim identity may
figure more prominently where there is conflict with
the government over its close ties with the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Any favoritism shown to the
Orthodox Church serves to strengthen an Islamic
identity among Slavic, Turkic, and Albanian Muslims.
Additionally, radical Islamists are seeking inroads
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through charitable, humanitarian, and educational
work among the poorest sectors of society. This could
constitute a long-term danger to moderate Islamic traditions and to interconfessional tolerance.
Various theories have been offered regarding the
cause and context of the post-carnival protests and violence, and to what degree these were spontaneous or
pre-planned.172 These have included alleged collusion
between the Greek government and local Albanian
radicals to destabilize Macedonia; attempts by panAlbanian nationalists from Albania and Kosova to
provoke intercommunal disputes; conflicts between
Albanians and Slavic Macedonian Muslims instigated
by the latter’s allegations that they are pressured to
declare themselves as Albanians; disputes within the
Slavic Muslim community for political influence and
greater rights commensurate with the post-Ohrid Albanians; attempts to demonstrate the existence of a
distinct ethnicity, the Torbeshi, who consider themselves neither Bosniak nor Macedonian Muslims while
demanding distinct political benefits and institutional
representation; and a foreign terrorist threat promoted by Tablighi Jamaat, the Islamist missionary group
active among various Balkan Muslim populations.
Some local analysts believe that the clashes may
have been engineered by the VMRO administration to
test the waters for future conflict and raise nationalist sentiments from which it will benefit among Slavic
Macedonians. Many Macedonians resent the Ohrid
peace accord because they feel Albanians have gained
special privileges. They view the Albanians as a fifth
column planning to divide Macedonia and merge
territories with Albania and Kosova. There is also
rising resentment that Slavic Macedonians in Greece
and Bulgaria have not been accorded commensurate
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rights with Albanians in Macedonia, and indeed that
Macedonian ethnic identity has been denied by Athens and Sofia. Bulgarian officials in turn have claimed
that Bulgarians in Macedonia face official discrimination and persistent human rights violations.173
Inter-ethnic incidents continued throughout 2012,
including gang attacks on Albanian and Macedonian students and the shooting of two young Albanians in Gostivar by an off-duty Macedonian policeman. This led to a demonstration on March 1, 2012,
by some 10,000 Albanians in Gostivar remonstrating
against alleged police brutality.174 Minister of the Interior Gordana Jankulovska asserted that radical forces
wanted to disturb inter-ethnic relations. Protesting
Albanians described the killings in Gostivar as ethnically motivated and accused the police of downplaying their significance. Sociology professor Hasan
Jashari concluded that ethnic tensions were again on
the rise and blamed poor political leadership, which
allowed national identities to be strengthened at the
expense of a civic identity.175 In response to growing
ethnic tensions, the emergence of ultra-nationalist
Macedonian groups was reported throughout 2012
and included the Christian Organization (Hristianska Organizacija), which released a video showing members burning Albanian flags and chanting
anti-Albanian slogans.176
Another source of friction has been over historical
interpretations, especially over the longevity of habitation by different ethnic groups in the Macedonian
region. In the spring of 2012, the Macedonian and Albanian academies of arts and sciences sought to settle
such disputes, but government officials charged that
they were interfering in Macedonia’s internal affairs.177
One of the key issues to be addressed concerned the
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Macedonian encyclopedia. Albanian historians dispute the text because it claims that Albanians were
newcomers to the Balkans and not native to Macedonia. The encyclopedia describes Albanians as “mountain people” who descended into Macedonia during
the Ottoman conquest in the 15th and 16th centuries.
The Albanian Academy considers this a skewed nationalist interpretation that blatantly disregards the
Illyrian roots of contemporary Albanians.
Meanwhile, some historians in Skopje claim that
Macedonians are not recognized as a distinct and ancient people in Albanian text books but as “Slavomacedonians,” thus indicating that they are relative newcomers to the Balkans, dating to the Slavic migrations
in the 5th and 6th centuries AD. Neither side seems
to recognize that ethnogenesis and nation building involve a long and complex process, and that few, if any,
modern European nations can claim direct genetic or
cultural ancestry from any distinct ancient population.
This is due to centuries of mixture and assimilation
between older and newer populations. If language is
a relatively constant variable in an otherwise shifting
structure of group identity, then it is especially difficult for present-day Macedonians to claim a pure
pre-Slavic heritage. Nevertheless, contrasting and
conflictive interpretations about historical lineages
and territorial longevity impregnate contemporary
politics and intercommunal relations. Identity, territory, and statehood will continue to be contested, and
such disputes may increasingly resonate among a discontented public.
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VI. INTERNATIONAL DEFICIENCIES
For over 20 years, international actors have been
involved with the Western Balkans in a multitude of
roles: as diplomatic mediators, humanitarian agencies,
peacekeepers, combat forces, democracy promoters,
and state builders. In their most recent incarnation,
international institutions are engaged in a policy of regional integration into the EU and NATO. However,
the process of accession has taken much longer than
initially expected at the end of the Yugoslav wars. As
a result, several Western Balkan states are in danger
of being left out of both institutions indefinitely, thus
contributing to uncertainties about domestic reform
and regional stability.
The EU is mired in its own internal economic crisis, which will have repercussions for social stability,
political decisionmaking, and institutional development, and with profound reverberations for further
Union enlargement. In addition, the United States has
been reducing its military and political presence in
the Western Balkans on the assumption that the EU
would complete the task of international inclusion
and permanent regional security with Washington’s
secondary support. The danger persists that insufficient impetus from Brussels and an inattentive or
diplomatically disengaged America may allow for the
mushrooming of conflicts that could increasingly destabilize the region.
European Stagnation.
The EU is wracked by internal confusion and indecision, which will have a direct impact on Brussels’
policy toward the Western Balkans and the member-
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ship prospects of each state. While the immediate
concern is the future of the Monetary Union—the
feasibility of a fiscal union, and eventually a political
union—the ultimate danger is runaway debt that can
generate a deeper economic and social crisis. In stark
figures, government debt as percentage of GDP has
ballooned to unmanageable proportions in several
countries. In Greece, the figure stands at 165 percent;
in Italy, 120 percent; in Portugal, 108 percent; and in
Spain, almost 70 percent and growing.178 Meanwhile,
the Union as a whole appears to be heading toward
prolonged recession, as even the larger economies remain stagnant.
On June 18-19, 2012, EU leaders agreed at the G20
Summit in Mexico to construct a more integrated
banking system. This was an effort to stem a debt
crisis that threatens the survival of the euro and undermines the global economy.179 Although Germany
and several Eurozone partners laid out concrete steps
toward financial integration, EU President Jose Manuel Barroso asserted that it would take time for the
17 Eurozone capitals to agree on establishing a fiscal
union. Moreover, countries that are fearful of losing
their sovereignty will resist such measures.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been supportive of closer fiscal integration that would involve
ceding sovereignty over national budgets to a central
authority in Brussels. Other leaders, including French
President Francois Hollande, have doubts about transferring fiscal powers but support the issuing of Euro
bonds that would involve a sharing of debts—a plan
that Berlin opposes. Meanwhile, financial markets are
desperate for an EU roadmap leading to closer fiscal,
banking, and political integration necessary to make
the single currency a viable long-term proposition.
Without assurances that the Eurozone is planning to
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“mutualize” the debt owed by all members, bond investors will accelerate their departure from the struggling Mediterranean economies.
As European governments ponder, the financial
crisis is deepening, economic performance is deteriorating, and the common currency is in danger of
unraveling. In addition to the Greek economic meltdown, investors and depositors have lost faith in other
weak economies, especially those of Italy, Spain, and
Portugal. This has raised anxieties about government
debt defaults amid preparations for rescue packages
from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), established in 2011 to shield heavily indebted governments
but whose funds remain limited.
The majority of voters in Germany and most West
European states oppose further EU bailouts for Greece
or other Mediterranean economies, as they feel they
are carrying too much of the financial burden. However, economic stagnation in the larger Mediterranean
economies such as Spain and Italy will also hurt Germany, as it will scale back demand for German exports
on which Berlin’s fiscal strength depends. In addition,
demand for EU imports is weakening global markets.
If the European-wide recession deepens, north European leaders will experience more problems in acquiring the finances necessary to contribute to fiscal
lifelines to southern Europe. Conversely, accelerated
borrowing will only buy limited time for confronting
the spiraling debt.
Deep spending cuts and austerity measures may
be the only way to avert even more catastrophic debt
that will be passed on to the next generation and necessitate huge tax hikes, drastic cuts in public expenditure, and lower living standards.180 The financial crisis
has resulted in increased borrowing, especially in the
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south European economies, and the accumulation of
massive debts to stimulate economies out of recession.
Unfortunately, this may be a short-term palliative disguising a long-term fiscal disaster.
EU governments are also curtailing spending to
stymie ballooning national debts, but deeper austerity
will raise unemployment levels across the Eurozone.
The International Labor Organization, in its 2012
report on global trends, warned about mass unemployment because of cuts in government spending.
It forecasts that 4.5 million more jobs could be lost in
the Eurozone over the next 4 years and that the total
number of jobless will reach 22 million.181
A growing army of unemployed, combined with
unsustainable government debt, will fuel social unrest
and political turmoil in the years ahead. Deficit spending cannot continue indefinitely where debts exceed
productivity, borrowing becomes prohibitive, defaults are threatened, and investors abandon unprofitable countries. To become competitive in an increasingly complex global market and to ensure steady
economic growth, the EU needs to stimulate business.
The southern part of Europe, in particular, needs to
undergo a business revolution to emerge from austerity and restore economic confidence. Politicians need
to dispel the false dichotomy between austerity and
growth, as the most sustainable solution necessitates
both budgetary discipline and the stimulation of private enterprise.
Europe’s financial crisis and economic underperformance have contributed to the economic downturn
in the Western Balkans by diminishing direct foreign
investment, international aid, and diaspora remittances. Economic prospects for the region as a whole
remain uncertain. Financial sector vulnerabilities con-
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stitute the biggest risk, because much of the banking
system is foreign owned and most countries are reliant on funding from abroad. Economic activity in the
region continued to weaken throughout 2012.182
The Greek crisis is also having a direct impact on
several Western Balkan banks, which are either Greekowned or exposed to Greek debt. If they collapse, this
will have a visible impact on business and the availability of credit in the region. If the EU’s economic
malaise, driven by the sovereign debt crisis and the
necessity of protracted governmental austerity measures, persists, this will usher in an era of economic
stagnation in the Western Balkans as fewer resources
will be available for non-EU countries.
EU Leadership Deficit.
With Europe’s sovereign debt crisis accelerating, fingers point at the absence of EU leadership.
No single official in the beleaguered bloc exhibits the
charisma and courage necessary to push through difficult decisions, and no official benefits from a broad
international consensus. The EU has created a thick
web of structures and authorities to create an impression of effective leadership, but without a credible political union, none of these carry significant
weight. President of the European Council Herman
Van Rompuy, President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, and President of the European Parliament Martin Schultz each have limited
responsibilities, and two of them have not even been
democratically elected.
Neither Rompuy nor Barroso are in a position to
determine key EU decisions, such as the proposed
creation of a fiscal union or tighter political integra-
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tion, and neither will challenge the leadership in Berlin or Paris. However, Germany and France no longer
have leaders with the stature of Konrad Adenauer or
Charles de Gaulle, but instead have politicians whose
chief concern is re-election. Additionally, the faltering
performance of the French economy has dissipated
the voice of Paris in European affairs, while German
Chancellor Angela Merkel is wary of turning the EU
into a political union, lest this is perceived as a cloak
for German hegemony.
The lack of leadership has been evident in foreign
policy, which was supposed to become coherent under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, and in EU internal policy.
Union leaders have acted slowly and inadequately in
response to the escalating financial crisis among several Mediterranean members. As a result, the EU’s
monetary union may be fragmenting faster than policymakers can pour money in to repair it.
Eurozone leaders recently agreed to establish a
joint banking supervisor for the single currency area
based on the European Central Bank. This is envisioned as a first step toward a European banking
union to prevent bank runs or collapses that send
shock waves around the continent. The Eurozone’s
permanent bailout fund, the ESM, containing 500
billion euro, could inject capital directly into banks
once the joint supervisor is established. However,
critics charge that this move is too little, too late. In
actuality, the Union is dividing between the northern creditor countries such as Germany and Holland,
whose borrowing costs are at an all-time low, and
southern debtor countries such as Spain and Italy,
who find it difficult to borrow money to service their
ballooning debts.
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With EU leadership adrift, the wealth gap between
north and south is accelerating, and even large bailouts from the ESM will only delay the crisis for a few
months. Given the current trajectory, the collapse of
the monetary union may well occur before the creation of the projected fiscal or banking unions. Some
analysts claim that the looming collapse of the Monetary Union will finally force its leaders to push for a
political union and a joint European constitution that
would centralize decisionmaking. But given the prevarications and half-measures witnessed over recent
years, the Union is more likely to disintegrate before it
becomes an actual Union.
Some analysts contend that for the euro to survive,
Eurozone members need to establish federal institutions with a common budget and undertake deep
economic reforms to ensure a rate of growth sufficient
to decrease public debt. Throughout this transformation, defense spending would diminish even further,
and the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy
(CSDP) would lose its remaining relevance. These factors would precipitate the wholesale decline of the EU
and encourage the emergence of a core group increasingly divorced from other member states and from
non-EU aspirants.
Even if the EU survives, it would be in a weak
position to act as a security provider or an effective
deterrent of conflict. As a result, the security situation
could deteriorate in some sub-European regions, including the Western Balkans, which could be “left in
a limbo between Russia and Turkey on the one hand,
and an Asia-focused U.S. and a federalizing European
core on the other.”183
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Nationalist Specters.
Economic recession has led to growing feelings of
economic and social insecurity that inflame protest
movements and more radical political options. Extensive austerity measures can lead to social conflicts
that will further handicap EU reform. Opposition to
neo-liberalism and globalism, which are currently
perceived as worsening socio-economic inequalities,
could favor protectionist and economic nationalist positions in several member states.
No one is certain whether a solution to the EU’s
financial crisis can be found within the existing institutional framework. According to one prominent
French analyst, the combination of low growth and
inadequate federal mechanisms in budgeting casts
doubts on the Union’s existence in its current form.184
A possible collapse of the euro would undermine the
single market and precipitate the disintegration of the
EU itself. In a worst case disintegrative scenario, the
EU would acquire populist, protectionist, and nationalist governments, and NATO and the EU would need
to develop ways to manage crises within EU countries
as well as possible conflicts among member states.185
For several decades, the pendulum between centerleft and center-right has swung within relatively narrow confines. Two or three major parties monopolized
governments in EU states, sometimes in coalition with
smaller formations, but their policies and ideologies
overlapped. This structure was stable when economic
conditions for the majority of citizens were favorable.
But in recent years, it has been unbalanced through
growing economic uncertainty and grievances against
mismanagement by the governing elite. While one
election cycle may simply switch the center-right
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with the center-left or vice versa, two cycles of budget
cuts and austerity measures can bring new players to
the forefront.
Lurking in the political wings and seeking to
benefit from public fear, confusion, and anger are
three radical tendencies: the brown, the red, and the
black.186 Citizens disillusioned with the political establishment can veer toward these extremes. Radical nationalist and populist groupings have always existed
on the political margins. They may acquire greater
popularity as the prospect for Union disintegration
looms on the horizon. Some are heralding the dawn
of a “Europe of nations,” free from the shackles of the
Brussels bureaucracy.
The radical browns dismiss the centrist politicians
as traitors to the nation, whether because they bow
to Brussels or open doors to immigrants who allegedly steal jobs and welfare from local inhabitants.
Anti-immigrant passions are combined with Islamophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism; and the brown
patriots are depicted as protecting the nation from
assimilation or extinction. Golden Dawn in Greece is
the most successful example of this phenomenon; others are waiting for their opportunity in Italy, Spain,
France, and elsewhere, and they could serve as examples or stimulators for ultra-nationalists in the
Western Balkans.
Economic hardship has also raised the specter of
the radical reds. They are less coherent than in their
20th century incarnation but share with the brown nationalists a disdain for globalization, which is often a
shorthand for anti-capitalism and anti-Americanism.
The third stream, the black nihilists, have no credible
political or economic solutions, as their primary aim
is to destroy the existing system. They tap into the
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frustrations of unemployed youth or romantic revolutionaries from the middle class. Although they do
not participate in elections, their street protests, vandalism, and attacks on law enforcement contribute to
radicalizing and polarizing the political atmosphere.
The three colors can converge during times of
troubles, whether through joint actions or violent
street clashes against each other. A more ominous
scenario would materialize if they succeed in using
the political process to capture seats in parliament or
positions in local, regional, or national governments,
or if some of their political prescriptions are adopted
by mainstream parties in attempts to regain broader
public support.
Weakening EU Magnetism.
In 1999, the European Commission initiated the
Stability and Association Process (SAP) with the
Western Balkan countries.187 At the Feira Summit in
June 2000, the EU explicitly offered all states in the region a credible prospect of membership once a series
of conditions for qualification had been met. SAP was
boosted in June 2003 when the Thessaloniki Summit
specified the full range of necessary reforms for all
Western Balkans states to become EU members. Since
that time, the region has witnessed uneven progress
toward accession and a waning EU appetite for further enlargement among citizens of member states.
Albania entered into an Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU on June 12, 2006, and
applied for EU membership on April 28, 2009. It was officially recognized by the EU as a “potential candidate
country” but was not awarded candidate status, as it
failed to meet specific political recommendations pre-
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pared by the European Commission.188 On October 10,
2012, the Commission’s Progress Report recommended candidacy status for Albania once it complies with
recommendations to complete key judicial and public
administration reforms.
Serbia obtained an SAA on April 29, 2008, and applied for EU membership on December 22, 2009. The
European Commission recommended making Serbia an official candidate on October 12, 2011, which
was granted on March 2, 2012.189 Bosnia-Herzegovina
signed an SAA on June 16, 2008, which will enter
into force once its ratification process has been completed.190 Macedonia was the first country to sign the
SAA on April 9, 2001, and has been a candidate for EU
accession since December 2005. In 2008, the resolution
of the name dispute with Greece was added to official
preconditions for EU entry.191 Montenegro signed an
SAA in 2007 and officially applied to join the EU on
December 15, 2008. It obtained official candidate status on December 17, 2010.192
The shortcomings displayed by Romania and Bulgaria since they entered the EU on January 1, 2007,
in combating official corruption, ensuring judicial independence, and curtailing political influence in state
institutions has led EU capitals to conclude that more
extensive preparations by candidates were necessary
before EU entry was permitted.193 Hence, more stringent benchmarks are in place for the Western Balkan
aspirants, and their entry is unlikely to be hastened by
political or geostrategic calculations. Indeed, the pace
of accession talks with candidates is unlikely to accelerate after Croatia’s expected accession in the summer
of 2013.
EU magnetism is weakening in the region. The
premise that Union membership would become a
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source of irresistible attraction that would propel forward the reform process in every capital has not come
to fruition. Euroscepticism has increased among politicians and publics in the Western Balkans. For many
current office holders, EU membership would necessitate stricter compliance with standards of transparency and competition, thus threatening their positions
and incomes. For many citizens, the pull of EU membership has diminished amidst doubts that the EU will
quickly absorb new states. Both factors have tempered
the appetite for domestic reform.194
Given the long drawn-out process even before
accession talks actually begin, the prospect of EU
membership alone does not automatically provide an
impetus for structural reform or resolve lingering conflicts. For example, in Serbia, support for EU accession
dropped from 76 percent in 2003 to 46 percent in October 2011, with 36 percent actually opposed to membership.195 This is the result of skepticism over the likelihood of accession and a diminishing desirability for
membership in the light of the EU’s economic crisis.
Although EU candidate status was achieved in March
2012, Belgrade did not receive a date for the start of accession talks, and the entry process is likely to stretch
well beyond 2020.
Visa-free travel to the EU has been interpreted in
the region not as a step toward membership but as a
side-step to delay and prolong the accession process
by offering attractive palliatives. The EU lifted visa
requirements for citizens of Serbia, Macedonia, and
Montenegro in December 2009 and for citizens of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina in November 2010.196
In June 2012, Kosova received a roadmap for gaining
EU visa liberalization, specifying conditions Prishtina
needs to fulfill before its citizens can travel to Schen-
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gen states without visas. EU officials have warned
that unless the Western Balkan governments reduce
the high number of asylum seekers, visa liberalization could be suspended.197 Schengen members may
be allowed to restore normal border controls for a period of 6 months with the possibility of extending the
measure for a further 6 months. Any reversal of the
visa liberalization program will in turn undermine the
Union’s credibility throughout the region.
“Accession fatigue” or “reform fatigue” is becoming more noticeable in the region, and EU membership
may be viewed increasingly as a mirage. In the case
of Macedonia, disillusionment is linked with blocked
EU accession prospects because of the name dispute
with Greece. In opinion polls conducted during 2011,
72 percent of Macedonians expressed a lack of trust in
EU policy toward the country.198 Similar feelings are
likely to grow in Kosova if the country’s prospects toward EU accession are blocked by the five EU states
that do not recognize its independence.
Another criticism of the EU is that certain initiatives supported by Brussels failed to have a significant
regional impact. For instance, one of the objectives of
the SAP was to enhance regional cooperation especially in the economic domain.199 Despite the forging of bilateral free trade agreements and the extension of the
CEFTA in 2006 to encompass the Western Balkans, the
economic impact has been marginal. CEFTA is seen as
secondary to EU accession and has added little competitive advantage in attracting foreign investment.
Western Balkan leaders and publics harbor resentments against EU conditionality, prolonged or indefinite timelines, and unclear signals on membership
criteria. This has created the perception of receding
accession targets, as numerous additional conditions
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are required and a sense that the EU is seeking to indefinitely postpone the process. For example, Union
representatives have adopted an ambiguous position
on the necessary modifications to the Bosnian constitution to bring it in line with EU standards.200 While
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso
stated that constitutional reform was not a condition
for signing the SAA with the Union, EU Enlargement
Commissioner Olli Rehn stressed that such reform
was vitally important for Bosnia-Herzegovina to make
progress toward EU membership.201 The EU appeared
to lack consensus about its norms for state building
and membership conditionality.
Such confusion has contributed to the evasion or
even reversal of reform programs and accentuated
the notion that EU conditionality is flexible and negotiable and lacks a timetable and a clear list of statebuilding targets. Moreover, if EU conditionality is
intended to create a functioning state, political leaders who are preparing partition will not comply with
such programs. Indeed, Serbian political leaders in
Bosnia-Herzegovina do not view the benefits of EU
accession and the construction of a more functional
central state as outweighing the costs of abandoning
RS autonomy and its attendant political powers and
economic benefits.202
The EU has failed to demonstrate its effectiveness
in helping Bosnia-Herzegovina move toward EU candidacy and to resolve deep-rooted ethno-political disputes. It has been unable to buttress a stronger and
more functional state government, which is essential
for purposes of EU integration. This fits with broader conclusions that the EU state-building model has
failed to live up to expectations in the Western Balkans and has inadequately addressed the question of
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ethno-national representation in state institutions.203
EU members possess a diversity of state structures,
from highly centralized states, which do not recognize minority rights, such as France and Greece, to
decentralized federations, including Germany, Spain,
and the United Kingdom. As a result, there is no
single standard that could be applied to all Western
Balkan countries.
Europe’s Softening Power.
The EU has prided itself on its “soft power” attributes that enabled it to exert significant influence
over aspirant countries. However, the impact of the
accession weapon is weakening the EU’s “soft power”
arsenal. For instance, Bosnia-Herzegovina signed an
SAA with the EU in June 2008, but since then Sarajevo has failed to implement the reforms necessary to
move forward in the integration process, and the EU
seems largely powerless to encourage faster progress.
There has been no implementable agreement between
political leaders on three key EU conditions: passing
a law on state aid, organizing a national census, and
amending the constitution to preclude discrimination
for elected office on ethnic grounds, in line with the
ruling of the ECHR.
Divisions among EU states on recognizing Kosova’s independence, with five countries abstaining,
have had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the
EULEX mission and sparked disputes whether the EU
representation in Prishtina should be called a liaison
mission or an office. Moreover, as the EULEX presence is “status neutral,” it is not mandated to play a
role in state building and ensuring progress toward
Union integration.
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EULEX has also failed to establish its mission in
the north of the country, to control the northern border with Serbia, to prevent smuggling, or to convict
and imprison criminal kingpins and corrupt officials.
Kosova is the only country that does not have contractual relations with the EU because five EU member
states have not recognized its statehood. Four of the
five states are also NATO members; hence, Kosova is
also obstructed from NATO integration. Additionally,
the EU has no jurisdiction over border demarcations
and has not developed applicable rules or procedures,
even though regional cooperation is supposed to be
an essential part of qualifying for EU integration.204
The EULEX mission has proved disappointing to
many Kosova citizens and is perceived as failing to
fulfill its mandate to build a strong system of laws to
combat corruption and organized crime.205 This has seriously dented public trust in EU institutions. Even the
dialogue initiated by EU mediators between Belgrade
and Prishtina has had mixed results. Discussions between Belgrade and Prishtina on Kosova’s representation in regional organizations ended in agreement on
February 24, 2012.206 But they also unleashed a storm
of controversy among Kosovar Albanians regarding
amendments to the country’s name.
For Kosova, which currently does not have membership prospects, EU conditionality is irrelevant, and
the Union lacks the leverage to reward compliance
or penalize noncompliance. As one analyst from the
region concluded, “either the EU will devise a bold
strategy for accession that encompasses all Balkan
countries as new member states, or it will become
mired as a neo-colonial power in places such as Bosnia
and Kosova.”207
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There is a core disagreement on the nature of international involvement in the Western Balkans between proponents of “guided reform” and of “local
ownership.” The debate on the degree of involvement by outside actors may actually contribute to
paralyzing decisionmaking. It has also confused citizens in the region, who veer between supporting a
greater EU role to push through necessary domestic
reforms and rooting out local corruption and resentment against overbearing international interference in
domestic affairs.
The proponents of “local ownership” and a less
obtrusive outside role argue that effective state building can only be accomplished when international intervention is reduced and local communities have a
commitment to national institutions. In contrast, the
interventionists argue that allowing local politicians
to determine the future of the state could result in
disputes that lead to government paralysis, territorial
division, and regional conflict that would in turn necessitate an even more intrusive international role.
In practice, it is difficult for international actors to
assist in constructing a functioning and stable state
where there is insufficient domestic consensus among
political leaders with regard to its structure and functions, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina.208 On the other hand,
any existing consensus would be seriously challenged
if international instruments are weakened or key international players disengage from the region. Maintaining post-conflict stability was understandable in
the first few years after the Yugoslav wars. However,
it has become increasingly tied to maintaining a political status quo and tolerating inadequate or dysfunctional governments.
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Such short-term stability may not engender
long-term security as corruption and mismanagement among governing elites, in combination with
their personal and national ambitions, undermines
economic development, raises social tensions, delegitimizes state institutions, and disqualifies these
countries from EU entry and leaves them exposed to
renewed conflicts.
U.S. and NATO Downsizing.
There is a pervasive feeling in the Western Balkans
that without the presence of American troops, regardless of the precise number of ground forces, stability
cannot be guaranteed if the simmering conflicts over
statehood or political representation were to escalate.
There is also a growing sense that U.S. interest, involvement, and effectiveness are dissipating because
Washington is focused on more pressing national security questions. As a result, the U.S. ability to control
or manage developments in the region may be diminishing.209 The absence of European military deterrents
and decreasing U.S. engagement could encourage
nationalist and revisionist forces to raise their profile
and provoke fresh conflicts in the years ahead.
Kosova presents a pertinent example of the challenges of military downsizing in an uncertain political
and economic climate within a disputed state.210 Since
2000, NATO has consistently reduced its KFOR troop
presence in the country. In the immediate aftermath
of NATO’s bombing campaign in June 1999, KFOR
deployed around 60,000 troops in the country. This
total was periodically reduced; in October 2010, the
North Atlantic Council announced plans to streamline
KFOR’s presence from under 10,000 troops to 5,500.
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The United States deployed 7,000 troops in Kosova
in June 1999, and the total shrank to approximately
2,500 by 2004. By early 2012, there were 1,447 U.S.
Soldiers in Kosova stationed at Camp Bondsteel and
Camp Nothing Hill near Leposavić.211 Despite their
modest current number, the presence of U.S. troops is
considered by the Kosova government and citizens as
an invaluable deterrent to new outbreaks of violence.
NATO forces also continue to perform an important
role in de-escalating potential conflicts in northern
Kosova and demonstrating to outside powers that the
Alliance is committed to regional security.
At least three challenges must be considered when
assessing the security situation in Kosova during
NATO’s downsizing: the situation in northern Kosova; relations between Kosova and Serbia; and the
development of Kosova’s own security capacities in
assuming NATO responsibilities. Although the main
security challenges are unresolved political issues,
economic and social factors also generate tensions
and could contribute to violent conflict. KFOR’s troop
reduction in Kosova should be conducted in relation
to the capacities of local institutions to assume responsibility for a secure environment. In this regard, it is
necessary to increase the professional capacities of the
Kosova Security Force (KSF) to assume appropriate
responsibilities.
Northern Kosova presents a serious obstacle to
security, as over 60 percent of the border line is not
under the control of the Prishtina authorities. If account is taken of further NATO troop reductions, the
government must increase its level of responsibility
in border control. The KSF was established within a
fixed mandate as a civilian protections force. To date,
its competencies only entail crises response, including
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fire fighting, handling hazardous material, search and
rescue, demining, and disaster relief. Additionally,
Kosova’s police need to develop cooperation with
international organizations, such as the European
Police Office (EUROPOL) and European Agency for
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), which are responsible for
preventing and combating terrorism, drug trafficking,
and organized crime.
After 9/11 and Washington’s preoccupation with
military operations and political missions outside of
Europe, there was a prevailing realization that the
United States would gradually withdraw its forces
from Bosnia-Herzegovina and leave the country to EU
supervision en route to Union integration. The initial
U.S. military presence in NATO’s 54,000 strong Implementation Force in December 1995 numbered 15,000.
This total shrank to about 900 by 2004 and then to a
handful of military personnel by 2012.212 The NATO
operation was replaced by the smaller EUFOR Althea
in December 2004, consisting of approximately 2,500
troops from EU member states. The number was subsequently reduced to about 1,300, although EU officials claim that they can be augmented by Over the
Horizon Forces consisting of up to four battalions.213
Meanwhile, the OHR was rendered powerless after 2006, and the Bonn Powers that enabled a more
direct role for the OHR in pushing through reforms
were largely discarded. Since 2002, the High Representative also serves as the EU Special Representative
(EUSR) to Bosnia. All of the High Representatives
have been from EU countries, while their principal
deputies have been Americans. Several EU countries would prefer to see the OHR closed, thus fur-
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ther undercutting the American role, because Washington needs the OHR to operate legally in Bosnia.
Washington has sought to preserve the OHR and to
maintain the Bonn Powers that allow for greater political intervention in cases where the principles of the
Dayton Accords are undermined by Bosnia’s leaders.
Bosnian politicians are aware that U.S. involvement
is declining and its leverage is decreasing, while the
EU without American leadership is notorious for its
slow motion and national divisions. This can embolden political forces seeking greater decentralization or
outright separation.
If other security priorities and prolonged budget
cuts result in the United States withdrawing from
several NATO missions, the Western Balkans may
pose one of the immediate tests.214 The U.S. President
may find it difficult to make the case for renewed
American involvement even if security in the region
begins to unravel. The EU or the European pillar of
NATO would be expected to handle any local crisis
without any significant American military engagement, especially of U.S. ground forces, in a region no
longer viewed as a priority for America’s national
interests. This would also place new stresses on the
NATO alliance and herald potential disputes between
European capitals over the merits and methods of
military intervention.
In the event of violent clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUFOR would be dependent on a considerable
external backup of European troops. An additional
complication would be simultaneous conflicts in different states that prevent military forces from responding adequately in each scenario. According to local
analysts, EUFOR’s current configuration, strength,
deployments, and posture place it in danger of failing
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even under moderate strain.215 It has lost its ability to
provide a credible deterrent, while its reactive capacity may be insufficient to defuse an escalating conflict.
Given the persistent political tensions in BosniaHerzegovina, EUFOR may be increasingly called
upon to maintain or restore a safe and secure environment. However, without the political will and
military capabilities to handle such a challenge, the
Althea mission would face potential failure, and the
competence of the EU’s CSDP would come under increasing question. In such an eventuality, Washington
may be pressed by its European allies to participate
in deploying ground forces to restore stability. If violence escalates significantly, calls for peacemaking or
peacekeeping missions will increase in the region and
in several European capitals. The U.S. administration
would then have to weigh the costs and benefits of
recommitting ground forces in the Western Balkans.
Russia’s Interventions.
Russia sees an opportunity to expand its reach in
the “European space” given that the EU is beset by
economic crisis and political indecision, with uncertain prospects for further enlargement beyond Croatia. Concurrently, NATO’s further expansion in the
Western Balkans, beyond the absorption of Montenegro, remains on hold. Macedonia is blocked, Serbia is opposed, Bosnia-Herzegovina is disunited, and
Kosova is ineligible. Meanwhile, the United States is
focused on other regions of the world, and its disengagement can weaken NATO’s impact in Europe. As
a result, Moscow seeks to intensify its political influence, particularly among states with no immediate
prospect for Western integration, by employing three
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key tools: diplomatic assertiveness, conflict prolongation, and economic dependence.
Moscow is outspoken in support of Serbia, especially in its struggle over Kosova and in blocking
Prishtina’s membership in major international institutions such as the UN and the OSCE. Serbia remains
the Kremlin’s most reliable political link in the region,
not because of any Slavic-Orthodox fraternity but as a
consequence of cold political calculation. Belgrade has
consistently appealed to Russian solidarity, whether
over preserving Yugoslavia’s integrity, creating a
Greater Serbia, or retaining control over Kosova. Moscow in turn exploits Serbia’s grievances against the
United States and NATO to demonstrate that Russia
remains a major factor in European affairs and in resolving intra-European disputes. Such symbiosis has
proved beneficial for both capitals.
The Kremlin perceives Serbia as a useful proxy in
the middle of the Balkans, and the country is promoted
as a bastion against American influence. Moscow has
increased its presence in Serbia during recent years,
especially by exploiting its support for Belgrade’s position on Kosova to keep Serbia outside NATO. In a
display of strategic blackmail, Russia’s ambassador
to NATO threatened that Moscow would reconsider
its attitude toward Kosova’s statehood if Belgrade petitioned to join NATO.216 In sum, Kosova remains a
useful bargaining chip for the Kremlin in undermining European unity and maintaining close relations
with Belgrade.
On November 2, 2011, Serbia’s President Boris Tadic sharply criticized a speech by the Russian ambassador to Belgrade, Aleksander Konuzin, at a nationalist rally and accused him of meddling in Serbia’s
internal affairs. 217 Six weeks after he blasted Serbian
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politicians at a Belgrade security forum for leaving it
to Russia to defend Serbia’s interests abroad, Konuzin praised the nationalist Serbian Progressive Party
(SNS) at a rally in Belgrade on October 29, 2011. The
Russian Foreign Ministry expressed its full support
for Konuzin, saying his participation at the rally was
“normal diplomatic practice.” The ambassador also
threatened Serbia with a downgrading of relations
if Belgrade made major energy and other economic
deals with third countries. The Serbian media also
revealed the existence of agents of influence working
within Serbian institutions and businesses on behalf
of Russian interests.218
The Kremlin would also prefer that Serbia remain
outside the EU and avoid its onerous legal standards
in business transparency that would affect the operations of opaque Russian companies. Instead, Moscow proposes that Serbia join its planned Eurasian
economic bloc, a centerpiece of Putin’s approach toward the former Soviet Union. The Serbian media reported Moscow’s plans for EU expansion by 2020 to
include countries such as Serbia, together with other
states excluded from the EU.219 The EU purportedly
plans to have centers in St. Petersburg, Kyiv, Almaty,
and Belgrade.
In an indication of the importance that Moscow assigns to Serbia, Putin visited Belgrade on March 23,
2011, to discuss boosting Russian investment through
the planned South Stream natural gas pipeline. He
reiterated Moscow’s opposition to Kosova’s independence and Serbia’s NATO membership. In November 2011, more than 50,000 Kosova Serbs petitioned
the Russian Embassy in Belgrade to grant them Russian citizenship.220 According to Zlatibor Dzhordzhevich, leader of the Old Serbia movement that organized
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the petition, “dual citizenship would prevent the further Islamization of the Kosovo Serbs.”221 Volunteers
traveled throughout Kosova listing names of those
wishing to obtain Russian citizenship. In reality,
Kosova Serbs have sought political support from Russia but have no intention of relocating to Russia.
Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov jumped
at the opportunity by claiming that Russia would examine requests for citizenship, describing the position
of Serbs in Kosova as desperate.
In terms of conflict prolongation, the limited international recognition of Kosova has provided Russia
with an opportunity to depict itself as the defender
of international legality and the promoter of multilateralism, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
Concurrently, it also promulgates the thesis of a panAlbanian fundamentalist menace in attempts to forge
pan-Slavic Orthodox unity under Russian patronage
throughout the Western Balkans.
Moscow has also focused on the struggle over
Bosnia-Herzegovina by supporting the leaders of the
Serbian entity in their determination to resist streamlining the state and providing greater powers to the
central government in Sarajevo. Having recognized
the independence of two separatist regions in Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, in August 2008,
Russia retains the option of recognizing Bosnia’s autonomous RS as an independent state. The Russian
government is widely perceived to be supporting
President Dodik and encouraging Banja Luka to undermine the authority of the OHR and to promote an
American withdrawal.
Moscow employs two parallel tracks toward Bosnia-Herzegovina: an overt policy that recognizes Bosnia’s state integrity and independence, and a covert
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policy that strengthens relations with the RS. The latter may enable Moscow to block Bosnia’s entry into
NATO. Moscow expands its influence by manipulating four tools: economic contracts, energy dependence,
political corruption, and obstruction of Western initiatives. By exacerbating the prospect of RS secession, it
intends to maintain Bosnia as a frozen or paralyzed
state that can generate long-term problems for Washington and Brussels.
Through its vehement opposition to U.S. policy
over Kosova and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia’s government contributes to prolonging disputes and uncertainties within the region. The calculation is that
Western preoccupation with inter-ethnic reconciliation and state building will dissipate and even terminate the region’s integration into NATO and the
EU. This will serve to justify Kremlin contentions that
NATO cannot guarantee European security and a
new continental security structure is needed in which
Russia would play a major role. In sum, conflict provides Moscow with political leverage to advance its
state ambitions.
The third Kremlin tool in the Balkans is the promotion of economic dependence by deploying energy resources, state loans, and business investments to gain
political inroads. Plans to build major energy transportation systems between the Black Sea and the Adriatic
Sea and Central Europe place the Balkans at the center
of Russia’s south European strategy. Moscow seeks to
monopolize the supply of gas and oil passing through
the region to Western Europe. Supply contracts and
investment incentives provide significant inroads in a
targeted country’s economy and substantial influence
over its foreign policy. The planned South Stream
pipeline is calculated to place Serbia and Bulgaria at
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the center of Russia’s ambitions and prevent the construction of a European energy network linking Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe outside of
Russia’s control.
Russia’s state company Gazprom owns the major
share of Serbia’s NIS oil company, and Belgrade is
eager to host the southern hub of the planned South
Stream pipeline through which Moscow seeks to
eliminate the West’s Nabucco gas pipeline project. A
protocol on the Serbian section of South Stream was
signed in October 2009 with Gazprom holding 51 percent and Serbian Gas holding the remaining 49 percent of shares in the project company. The pipeline
is planned to cross from Serbia into Hungary while
Russia entices the RS, Croatia, and Slovenia, with the
prospect of including them in South Stream. Construction of South Stream is planned to start by the end of
2012 and finish in 2015, although the project has been
riddled with doubts over routes, costs, and sources
of gas.
On May 29, 2012, during his first foreign trip after
the elections, President Tomislav Nikolic was warmly
received in the Kremlin by President Putin.222 Nikolic
was seeking an $800 million loan, as Russia had previously promised a $1 billion dispersal but only delivered $200 million. However, the new Serbian government needs to carefully consider the conditions of
any loans, as Russia’s objective is to control Serbia’s
energy infrastructure and develop pipeline projects
across the Balkans.
Macedonia’s blocked path toward NATO and EU
accession provides additional opportunities for Russia
to expand its regional influence. Moscow can pose as
the defender of Macedonian interests against alleged
Albanian separatism and Islamic radicalism. Moves to
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extend Albanian political rights in Macedonia through
the Ohrid Framework accord have been depicted as a
subversive anti-Slavic and anti-Orthodox operation
with the goal of creating a Greater Albania and dissolving Macedonia.223
In June 2012, Prime Minister Gruevski spent several days in Russia and announced that Macedonia
was determined to deepen economic ties with Moscow by obtaining investment in the energy sector and
scrapping visa requirements for Russian citizens visiting for less than a year to boost tourism.224 Russia
and Macedonia may also establish a free trade zone
tying Skopje with the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.225 On July 3, 2012, Skopje and
Moscow signed a draft agreement that would provide
Macedonia with an arm of the South Stream gas pipeline.226 Whether any of these projects come to fruition,
the promise of economic bounties lures cash-strapped
Balkan governments into closer ties with Moscow,
raises their susceptibility to political pressure, and undercuts the involvement of Western companies.
Two Russian state companies, Gazprom and
Rosneft, have aimed to penetrate Albania’s energy
industry by purchasing state-owned energy companies. Moscow also wants to use Croatia to facilitate
its energy penetration in the Adriatic. Gazprom has
offered lucrative deals to Zagreb to export Russian
oil through the Adria oil pipeline instead of Middle
Eastern oil to Central Europe. Such a reversal would
reduce Central European access to international oil
markets, leaving them more dependent on Russian
supplies. By offering an extension from South Stream
to Croatia, Gazprom also intends to block the Adria
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal project on Krk
Island to prevent it from undercutting Gazprom’s
monopolistic ambitions.
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Moscow has criticized the Montenegrin government for its NATO membership bid and has threatened
to curtail traditionally friendly relations between the
two countries.227 The Russian presence in Montenegro
has grown in recent years and includes the purchase
of real estate along the coast and in the capital Podgorica, Montenegro’s large aluminum factory KAP, a
bauxite mine in Niksic, and a string of gas stations.228
Through these purchases, Russian oligarchs obtained
greater influence over the country’s economy. Russian immigration has also mushroomed, and several
thousand Russian citizens are believed to reside in a
country with a population of 620,000 inhabitants.229
Several Montenegrin parliamentarians have criticized the government for allowing Russian companies to purchase enterprises at low rates during the
privatization process. By 2007, Russian investment
comprised 27 percent of the foreign total. The global
economic crisis after 2008 curtailed Russia’s economic
involvement and undermined trust in the commitment of Russian investors who failed to fulfill their
contracts and pay workers’ wages. The Montenegrin
government needed to bail out several companies to
prevent major unemployment and social turmoil, including the KAP aluminum plant, the biggest contributor to the country’s GDP, which faced bankruptcy
after its purchase by a Kremlin-connected oligarch.
Outside the energy sector, Russian companies
have been particularly active in acquiring telecommunications, engineering, and banking interests in
South East Europe.230 For instance, in August 2012,
Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank, purchased the Austrian based financial conglomerate Volksbank International AG Group and was poised to take over Volksbank’s branches in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
and Serbia.231
141

VII. WEST BALKAN CONFLICTS: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES
This chapter summarizes the policy challenges
facing the Western allies in the Western Balkans. It
outlines the factors that engender tensions, disputes,
and unrest, and considers a number of existing and
emerging conflict scenarios. In sum, 11 years after the
last armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia was extinguished in the summer of 2001, long-term stability
and security in the region is not fully assured and can
be threatened by a number of internal and external
factors.
The region can descend into a gray zone where
splutters of progress in pursuit of reform are followed
by prolonged periods of stagnation or even reversal.
Such conditions provide fertile terrain for varieties
of political radicalism and nationalist extremism. Although these are unlikely to generate outright war,
they can create pockets of insecurity, conflict, and
violence that would disqualify several states from EU
membership. Such exclusion would in turn prolong
and exacerbate local disputes and place enormous
strain on international actors. It may even pull Washington back into the region through more intrusive diplomacy and mediation or even participation in new
military missions.
The following challenges to state stability and
regional security need to be carefully monitored
and addressed.
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International Exclusion.
There are two major alternatives for the Western
Balkan states—Europeanization or marginalization.
Europeanization means entry into both the EU and
NATO, as was the case with Central Europe, the two
East Balkan countries, and Slovenia and Croatia from
the former Yugoslavia. If there are long delays in accession or the prospect disappears altogether, there
will be little incentive for further reform to meet international standards. This could assign the region
to a peripheral gray zone, increase opportunities for
cross-border criminal organizations, result in depopulation as locals seek to escape to the EU, and radicalize
a younger generation facing declining opportunities
for employment and material advancement.
European Union Shortcomings.
While the EU’s limitations as a hard power have
been evident in its disjointed foreign policies and restricted military capabilities, its political and economic
model may also be fading as an instrument of attraction. Skepticism about the future of the EU has grown
within member states as the budgetary squeeze and
debt crisis in several EU Mediterranean countries has
generated profound economic uncertainty. Disappointment is also visible inside the EU over the performance of recent members, as well as with several older members encumbered by massive sovereign debts.
Enlargement exhaustion among EU publics promotes
reform fatigue among aspirant countries. Publics are
becoming frustrated with seemingly endless entry requirements and prolonged timetables. Moreover, the
long-term benefits of EU membership will also be seri-
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ously questioned if the Union’s economic crisis deepens, and the EU itself appears to be splintering.
Economic Distress.
Economic problems are common to all Western
Balkan states. These include the impact of the global
credit crunch and economic recession, which has curtailed foreign investment, limited the availability of
bank credits, and reduced worker remittances. Government debt, budget deficits, unemployment rates,
and the number of citizens below the poverty level
have soared, while economic growth rates have either
decreased or remained static.232 For instance, the gross
national debt in Albania almost reached 60 percent of
GDP in 2012 and 42 percent in Montenegro; unemployment was registered at 45 percent in Kosova, 32
percent in Macedonia, 27 percent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 20 percent in Serbia; while 32 percent of the
Macedonian population is registered below the poverty line. A prolonged economic downturn, coupled
with receding EU benefits, can stimulate populism
and nationalism in several states.
Deficient State Building.
International supervision has suffered setbacks in
Bosnia-Herzegovina as Serb leaders have campaigned
to roll back the integration process. Herzegovina Croats are also reviving their pursuit of entity status and
even prospective unification with Croatia. The EU is
seen to be faltering in restitching multiethnic states
or helping establish authoritative central government
institutions in former war zones. Kosova’s persistent territorial division, despite the presence of both
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NATO and EU missions, reinforces this perception. In
sum, a decrease in the U.S. role will expose the EU to
potential failure.
Democracy Deficits.
The political status quo controlled by entrenched
parties, coupled with growing economic inequalities,
limited judicial reform, the pervasiveness of official
corruption, and unfulfilled economic and occupational expectations, all have a negative social impact.233
They heighten public alienation, demoralization, resentment, and anger; increase crime and lawlessness;
provide ammunition to new protest movements; and
encourage political extremism. Such movements can
scapegoat ethnic and religious minorities or raise demands for revising borders or acquiring territories
and fuel conflicts with neighboring states and international players.
Inadequate Leadership.
At a time of economic distress, government coalitions remain weak and indecisive, and they lack broad
public legitimacy. Perceptions of widespread favoritism, nepotism, and corruption, and the persistence of
cronyism and clientelism, have resulted in falling confidence in political leaders. In many cases, there is an
absence of political unity on vital national questions,
which in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosova, and Macedonia is coupled with incomplete state building. Government failings and slow international integration contribute to convincing compact minority populations
that territorial partition or merger with a neighboring
state is a viable option.
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Nationalist Surpluses.
Various forms of nationalism continue to pose
challenges to democratic consolidation and regional
cooperation. For instance, in its 2012 report on democratic developments, Freedom House underscored
that nationalism in much of the Western Balkans hampers regional reconciliation and obstructs relations
with the EU.234 Populist and nationalist elements benefit from economic stagnation and public disaffection
and advocate xenophobia as a solution to numerous
domestic challenges. Nationalists thrive where government institutions are not viewed as fully legitimate, especially where state building is incomplete.235
Nationalism and populism are also enabled when internally undemocratic parties win elections, emplace
loyal supporters in key institutions, and prolong their
rule through institutional, financial, and informational
manipulation.236 Religious radicalism has not been an
important factor in the region, as the Muslim population is largely moderate, secular, and divided by ethnicity, language, and doctrine, but a pauperized minority may become susceptible to ultra-conservative
anti-Western influences.
Generational Challenges.
One cannot assume that the younger generation
with no immediate experience of war will not resort to
conflict. Ethnic separation in education, employment,
residence, and marriage, even in a single state such
as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova, can foster ignorance, fear, victimhood, and marginalization. In the
midst of economic stagnation, this can generate feel-
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ings of injustice and anger and leave people susceptible to nationalist appeals. A comprehensive survey
conducted in all former Yugoslav republics during
2011 concluded that differences between generations
were less pronounced than differences between ethnic
groups in shaping attitudes.237 Moreover, inter-ethnic
distrust is commonplace among the post-1991 generation, and most people do not view the Western Balkans as a single cultural space.
Citizens may also be increasingly drawn toward
the pan-European alienation felt by many young people with restricted opportunities in EU member states.
Unfulfilled expectations and thwarted ambitions can
lead to the rejection of existing political structures
and gravitation toward extremist movements. Young
people, especially the less educated, are more gullible
to manipulation through a naïve belief in conspiracy
theories promulgated by radical political groups to
gain adherents.
Conflict Scenario.
In the midst of the destabilizing factors outlined
previously, ethnic tensions can escalate and spark
flash-points of conflict in the Western Balkans. The
following potential conflict scenarios should be considered, as they would prove the most threatening to
regional stability and could escalate toward armed
conflicts.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the standoff between the
Serbian entity and the government in Sarajevo comes
to a head. The RS entity representatives withdraw
from Bosnian government institutions and stage a
referendum on separation and independence. Such
moves provoke calls among Bosniaks to eliminate the
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Serbian autonomous region and centralize the state.
Croats capitalize on the unrest to declare an autonomous region in western Herzegovina. This triangular
radicalization leads to violent incidents and a war
footing in various parts of the country in anticipation
of further conflict.
In northern Kosova, Serbian minority leaders stage
a referendum on independence and unification with
Serbia and appeal to Belgrade for protection as Albanian Kosovars are radicalized by Serbian separatism and prepare for a showdown. In southern Serbia,
Albanians in the Presevo valley boycott state institutions, stage rallies, declare an autonomous region, and
announce that they seek unification with Kosova. The
escalating division of Bosnia-Herzegovina encourages
Bosniak Muslims in Serbia’s Sandzak region to push
for autonomy. In reaction, the Serbian government
cracks down on Albanian activism in the Presevo valley and Bosniak agitation in the Sandzak. It also escalates its nationalist agenda by openly supporting the
partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova.
In Montenegro, the pro- and anti-independence
divisions take on a territorial and ethnic dimension,
with Serbs in the north of the country establishing a
National Council and claiming separate status. The
Montenegrin government moves to regain control
over the region, while Serbian activists appeal to Belgrade for direct assistance.
In Macedonia, Albanian frustration with government policy and escalating inter-ethnic incidents leads
to a collapse of the ruling coalition. Albanian leaders
declare an autonomous region along the Albanian and
Kosova border and call for a division of the country.
Belgrade offers assistance to Skopje against Albanian
militants, while Albania is drawn into the conflict to
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protect its ethnic kindred. Macedonian politics radicalize and the government declares the cancellation of
the Ohrid agreements and the defense of Macedonia’s
territorial integrity.
Pursuing Partition.
Some Western Balkan politicians and analysts contend that international actors should not block the option of state partition and territorial exchange if this is
acceptable to both sides in a dispute. While U.S. and
EU policymakers oppose any further state divisions,
some observers believe that the disintegration of Yugoslavia has not been completed. For example, trying
to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state or
maintaining Serbian majority municipalities inside
Kosova may be costly, conflictive, and ultimately
counterproductive.
If violence is to be avoided, such partition proposals are only realistic where they are acceptable to all
parties in the dispute and are seen as part of an amicable territorial exchange. It may be feasible to exchange
the four northern municipalities of Kosova containing
a Serbian majority for three southern municipalities
in Serbia with an Albanian majority or to exchange
minority populations between the two regions. However, this would require several conditions, including
a bilateral agreement between the two governments
recognizing each other’s statehood, a public referendum and agreement by the affected populations to
join a new state, appropriate compensation for civilians displaced by the arrangement who do not wish to
join another state, and international supervision of the
entire process to guarantee that it is conducted fairly
and peacefully.
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Without these conditions, the secession of RS from
Bosnia-Herzegovina will spark demands for the separation of Sandzak from Serbia, and the secession of
northern Kosova will stimulate demands for the separation of the Presevo valley from Serbia. This is likely
to encourage other secessionist movements, whose
leaders will calculate that the most effective strategy
for success is to provoke violence and government
retaliation, capture international media attention, and
thereby gain the political initiative. Such scenarios
will also encourage governments to stage crackdowns
to prevent separatism, while nationalist militants may
arm themselves on the pretext of defending national
integrity and ensuring state survival.
Armed Militancy.
The prospect for full-scale war between states or
proxy insurgencies directly sponsored by Western
Balkan governments appears remote at present. Nonetheless, low-level armed conflicts, whether generated
by insurgent groups, vigilante militias, or armed civilians, are possible in parts of the region. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosova, and Macedonia remain candidates
for armed clashes if minority grievances expand and
inter-ethnic discords escalate. For example, Kosova
will require a NATO presence for several years to
deter and prevent armed conflict, especially in the
northern part of the country where the Serbian minority does not accept the legitimacy of the Kosova state.
With limited international deterrents, weak governments, growing ethnic polarization, and rising
nationalism, armed groups may become active with
covert support from some governments or opposition
parties in neighboring states. The KLA can be resus-
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citated, with links to Albanian militias in southern
Serbia, southern Montenegro, and western Macedonia. Serbian radicals can also recreate militia groups
to protect the Serbian minority in Kosova, reinforce
the RS in Bosnia-Herzegovina, establish a Serbian autonomous region in Montenegro, and attack Albanian
targets in the Presevo valley. Macedonian nationalist
militias can also be mobilized to defend the country’s
territorial integrity.
Terrorist Threats.
Spreading lawlessness, militia mobilization, and
organized criminality enable terrorist cells to infiltrate
the region. They can exploit growing militancy among
various Muslim populations to gain recruits for attacks on government targets or foreign interests. The
terrorist attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria on July
18, 2012, focused attention on a region that some observers view as a potential hub of anti-Western terrorism. Although militant Islamist influence in the Western Balkans is a marginal phenomenon, the extreme
acts of individuals can upset intercommunal relations
and provide ammunition to radicals. A few acts of
terrorism, as in Sarajevo in October 2011 or in Burgas
in July 2012, can misrepresent the Balkans as a major
recruiting ground for jihadists. Such misperceptions
feed the ambitions of nationalist leaders who claim
that Wahhabism and Salafism are growing among
Muslim populations and that they need to actively
protect endangered Christian interests.
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Additional Conflicts.
An additional source of conflict has been visible
between Roma communities, present in most Western
Balkan countries, and extremist members of the majority population. There is a potential for inter-ethnic violence provoked by poverty, organized racist attacks,
and the creation of Roma self-defense groups. Violent
anti-Roma attacks seen in 14 Bulgarian towns in the
fall of 2011 can be replicated in other parts of the region. The Roma population is growing in the Western
Balkans, with an estimated half a million in Serbia and
165,000 in Macedonia. The Roma are often the most
vulnerable minority and the most obvious targets of
police violence, forced evictions, societal discrimination, and verbal and physical harassment.238 As living
standards stagnate during the economic recession,
Roma communities are likely to be scapegoated by
local gangs. Conflicts with the Roma population will
radicalize both victims and perpetrators and contribute to broader social turmoil and inter-ethnic tensions.
Neighborhood Factors.
If Greece leaves the Eurozone and its living standards fall precipitously, this would send a negative
signal to all EU candidates in the Western Balkans
and accentuate anti-enlargement sentiments within
the EU. A potential social explosion in Greece can
have an impact on the stability of neighbors. In the
most damaging scenario, expanding impoverishment
and ejection from the Eurozone will precipitate the
emergence of an authoritarian government. Under the
pretext of restoring order and defending national dignity, a nationalist regime could target minorities and
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neighboring states, thus generating conflicts with both
Macedonia and Albania.
Russian Penetration.
Declining EU and U.S. influence, diminishing or
receding prospects for EU and NATO integration,
and falling Western investment would encourage
more intensive Russian political penetration through
diplomatic offensives, energy contracts, and business
purchases. Some Western Balkan governments or separatist movements may welcome Moscow’s support
against internal and external threats, while diluting or
discarding their integrationist orientations toward the
EU and NATO.
Interstate Disputes.
Neighborhood relations can become increasingly
conflictive. The Albanian government may succumb
to nationalist and irredentist sentiments, whether toward unification with Kosova or in defense of allegedly threatened Albanian interests in Macedonia and
over compensation from Greece for the expelled and
dispossessed Cham population. This will heighten
tensions between Tirana and Belgrade, Skopje, and
Athens. Interstate disputes will undermine regional
cooperation, foster radicalism, and subvert security
throughout the Western Balkans.
In a further negative development, rival Balkan
alliances may be formed, with a Russo-centric bloc
including Serbia, Macedonia, and the breakaway
Serbian autonomous regions of Kosova and BosniaHerzegovina, confronting a Western-centric bloc that
includes Albania, Kosova, and the Muslim Bosniaks.
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Lacking sufficient protection by either Washington
or Brussels, the beleaguered governments may welcome assistance from various Muslim states, including a less secular and more ambitious Turkey, while
reducing their European and American connections.
Greece could also veer toward Russia if the bankrupt
country leaves the Eurozone and Moscow solicits for
its own naval base in the Mediterranean by offering
funds and investments to a cash-strapped Athens.
This could heighten tensions with several neighbors,
including Turkey.
EU members, particularly Bulgaria, Romania, and
Croatia, would also suffer the negative consequences of neighborhood instability and find themselves
pulled into the regional struggle due to their ethnic
or political connections with conflicted states. Such
conditions can precipitate a wider ripple of insecurity in the Balkan-Black Sea region, with an impact on
numerous trans-regional and pan-European factors,
from state stability to economic development and energy security. All of these causes and consequences
would also play a role in determining the future role
of NATO as a security provider, the effectiveness of
the EU as a pan-European institution, and the stature
and position of the United States throughout South
East Europe.
VIII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The following prescriptions and recommendations
are offered to both Washington and Brussels in dealing with the uncertain political climate in the Western Balkans. The policy focus should combine several
approaches, including deterring and preventing new
rounds of destabilizing conflict while encouraging
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each government to pursue policies that consolidate
the country’s statehood, its democratic institutions,
and its public legitimacy, regardless of the timetable
for inclusion in either NATO or the EU.
Role of U.S. Military.
Uphold a Credible NATO Presence.
NATO is viewed in the West Balkan region as the
only credible international military force. Additionally, NATO membership remains a barometer for
enhancing national security, pursuing military modernization, and ensuring an effective trans-Atlantic
alliance. Nevertheless, the attractiveness and impact
of the Alliance could significantly weaken if the U.S.
disengages militarily from the broader European
theater to a level that reduces effective deterrents in
the event of a national or regional emergency. In
such conditions, NATO’s European pillar will need
to carry the burden of guaranteeing durable security
in unsettled zones such as the Western Balkans, with
uncertain consequences.
Maintain U.S. Engagement.
The current U.S. ground force deployment in
NATO’s KFOR mission in Kosova should be maintained until the new state has developed an effective
indigenous defense force and its entire territory is under Prishtina’s political authority. The U.S. presence
within the NATO operation significantly contributes
to deterring local actors from provoking conflicts
and reassures the local population that their security
is protected.
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In the absence of a NATO mission with a U.S. component and without a stronger Kosova defense structure, local clashes between Albanians and Serbs could
escalate and the likelihood will grow that vulnerable
communities will arm themselves for self-defense or
support militias that provide them with protection.
This can lead to intensified violence that may necessitate the return of a more sizable and robust international force to disarm local militias and restore a
semblance of security. Similar developments could
also unfold in Bosnia-Herzegovina if clashes between
Bosniaks and Serbs were to erupt in several parts of
the country and exceed the capacities of the EU Althea
force in defusing tensions and stemming conflict.
Assess Need for Military Deployments.
Any serious deterioration in regional security
would increase the pressure on Washington from its
European allies to participate in deploying fresh
ground forces in Kosova or in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
especially since the use of air power for the purpose
of restoring stability at the local level would be largely
ineffective. In effect, if violence escalates significantly,
the calls for peacemaking or peacekeeping missions
will increase in the region and in several European
capitals. The U.S. administration would then have to
weigh the costs and benefits of committing ground
forces back into the Western Balkans.
Given current U.S. security priorities and budgetary constraints, Washington will expect its core European allies, either within a NATO context or acting in a
cooperative coalition, to assume primary responsibility in reducing tensions and restoring peace. Although
the United States would, in all likelihood, provide
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strong diplomatic, political, and logistical support for
a European-led operation, there would be little appetite in the country for direct military engagement in
the Western Balkans.
Decisionmaking on possible deployments would
also depend on the effectiveness of any projected European military mission and whether violence and attempts at state partition can be contained by NATO’s
European pillar. In addition, a temporary suppression
of violence may not guarantee long-term stability,
political progress, or economic development, without which the affected states would further distance
themselves from EU and NATO membership and sow
the seeds for future unrest and conflict. In such conditions, the nature and degree of American involvement
would remain a factor in policymaking, as Washington will need to closely monitor the broader dangers
to European security stemming from any persistent
failure to contain instability and institutionally integrate the Western Balkans.
Prevent Conflict Escalation.
Several priorities need to be pursued by Washington to preclude a scenario whereby U.S. ground forces
are requested by European partners to participate
in renewed peacemaking or peacekeeping missions
in the Western Balkans. These policy priorities must
include the following: more comprehensive strategic
intelligence gathering; the identification and monitoring of local and foreign political actors promoting instability; early warning signals that can pinpoint and
defuse impending conflicts; a strong Allied diplomatic
response to any deterioration of political conditions or
inter-ethnic relations in each Balkan state and at the
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interstate level; and a firmer trans-Atlantic strategic
commitment to bringing all countries in the region
into both NATO and the EU.
Primary Regional Objectives.
Regional Political Security.
The onus must be on incumbent governments
forging interstate agreements that acknowledge each
other’s sovereignty, independence, and statehood,
and accept common borders with no ambitions or pretensions to neighbors’ territories. Each capital must
clearly and openly revoke any support for irredentism
toward nearby states.
Institutional Development.
Political institutions in each state must continue
to be strengthened through competitive elections, the
rule of law, official accountability, the separation of
powers, citizens’ participation, extensive minority
rights, and the combating of official corruption, nepotism, clientelism, and organized criminality. While
the EU has become a less magnetic force, democratic
consolidation under the rule of law is beneficial for
each country regardless of its eventual institutional
destination.
Common Market.
To increase attractiveness for investors, the small
economies of the Western Balkans need to deepen
their coordination by creating a genuine common
market. A combined regional effort can focus on four
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domains: energy, transport, environment, and trade.
Such an initiative would also give fresh impetus to
preparations for EU membership. It would create a
larger market of almost 20 million people, where the
free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor
could bring immediate benefits instead of simply
waiting for EU accession.
Business Growth.
Greater emphasis must be placed on developing
an interconnected class of entrepreneurs that will help
moderate the impulses of local nationalism. The initiative can be promoted through business loans, crossborder commerce, and joint corporations in specific
sectors between neighboring states.
Energy Security.
The development of a common regional approach
toward fossil fuels and renewable energy will help
attract investors, connect Balkan and EU energy networks, promote the diversity of supplies, and generate more sustainable economic growth. Such a strategy will also undercut Russia’s attempts at energy
monopolization throughout South East Europe.
NGO Networking.
NGOs perform three important tasks that can be
expanded. First, they mobilize citizens in a plethora
of activities that empower their lives and improve
their living conditions. Second, NGOs pursue high
standards of government transparency and effectiveness by holding politicians fully accountable to the
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electorate. Third, they develop parallel networks for
interstate cooperation in various domains, from human rights and consumer protection to architectural
conservation and environmental activism.
Serbia-Kosova Relations.
Integrating Kosova.
The Belgrade-Prishtina relationship remains one
of the keys to stability in the region, and northern
Kosova remains a constant flashpoint. Both Brussels
and Washington must focus on restoring Kosova’s territorial integrity, as a divided Kosova will remain a
permanent source of dispute. The EU-sponsored talks
can become a mechanism and a catalyst for integrating
the northern municipalities into the country’s institutions. They must focus on promoting the rule of law
in the northern municipalities and holding legitimate
local elections.
Demarcating Serbia-Kosova Border.
NATO’s KFOR mission, working in tandem with
the KSF and local police, should be mandated to demarcate the border with Serbia. This frontier is notorious for smuggling and trafficking. The Kosova police
have already started to take over responsibility for border protection from KFOR along the frontier with Albania and Macedonia. Integrated border management
is a condition that Kosova must meet to be included
in the EU’s visa liberalization. Such an initiative will
enhance regional security, particularly if joint border
demarcations are agreed to with Serbian authorities.
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Kosova’s Development.
Expanding International Recognitions.
This approach must concentrate on the five EU
nonrecognizers (Greece, Spain, Romania, Slovakia,
and Cyprus). Otherwise, these states could block some
of the outcomes of the Serb-Kosovar dialogue by disabling the EU from acting in unison. A more concerted
EU position will have a positive impact on Kosova’s
domestic reform process and Prishtina’s steps toward
international integration.
Transitioning from Supervision to Accession.
Although formal international supervision over
Kosova was terminated in September 2012, the dependency relationship with the United States and the EU
may continue if Prishtina does not achieve a clear path
toward both EU and NATO membership. Dependence
on outside actors undermines domestic responsibility
for policy implementation and limits political transparency, as the government will feel more accountable to foreign powers than its own citizens. It can also
butress charges that the EU does not perceive Kosova
as a candidate for integration and thereby engender
Euroskeptic inclinations.
Establishing a Contractual EU Relationship.
The EU needs to initiate a contractual relationship
between Prishtina and Brussels with specific conditions, roadmaps, and focused assistance, as has been
the case in all other West Balkan states. This can lead
to preparations for an SAA on track toward candidate
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status and provide the EU with greater leverage in
Kosova because of the prospect of membership.
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Functionality.
Limiting Entity Vetoes.
In building a more effective and functional state,
a precise list should be enumerated where entity vetoes can be applied vis-à-vis the state government. For
instance, vetoes can be relevant in the event of war,
states of emergency, or other forms of national danger,
and must not be exploited to obstruct the functioning
of central or entity administrations.
Supporting the Civic Option.
Western powers must support the civic option in
Bosnian politics. Bosnia-Herzegovina as a divided
tri-ethnic state dependent on foreign largesse is not
a durable proposition. The alternative to a civic state
that can wean itself from foreign dependence is to be
partitioned into two or three ethno-national units, a
process that can unleash armed conflicts and instigate
regional instability.
Clarifying EU Integration.
The EU accession process needs greater clarity,
momentum, and commitment. The EU delegation
offices in Sarajevo must involve citizens in the EU
project and enable them to pressure their leaders to
implement necessary reforms. This requires a more
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extensive outreach program with the Bosnian public
and mass media to inform citizens about the Union
and encourage them to canvass for Bosnia’s EU entry.
Maintaining an International Role.
A formula needs to be devised whereby either the
OHR or the EUSR retains the powers necessary to
forestall the weakening of state institutions and the
secession of RS, while invigorating the reform program necessary for EU accession. Simply removing
the OHR without an effective EU replacement may be
a recipe for state fracture.
Ensuring Military Deterrence.
Emplacement of a small NATO unit in the Brcko
district, supervised by an American civilian official, would send a strong political message and
deter any moves toward land seizures and armed
conflicts at this vital choke point between the two
Bosnian entities.
Promoting Regional Dialogue.
Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to be involved in a trilateral dialogue with Serbia and Croatia to supplement
the bilateral dialogue between Zagreb and Belgrade.
This could be modeled on the Visegrad initiative in
Central Europe and include an extensive agenda of
consultation and mutual support.
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Macedonia’s Progress.
Mediating Name Dispute.
The dispute between Athens and Skopje over Macedonia’s name remains deadlocked. An interminable
delay in resolving the dispute can raise nationalist fervor in both countries and destabilize the Macedonian
state. International actors need to influence both sides
involved in the controversy by tying an agreement to
financial and other incentives and underscoring the
negative consequences of an indefinite impasse.
Dampening Polarizing Nationalism.
Closer attention must be paid to the simmering
tensions between Albanian and Slavic Macedonians,
as they may have grave consequences for the survival of the state. The focus should be on preventing any rollback of the Ohrid Framework Agreement while developing new channels of political
and social coexistence between Macedonian and
Albanian communities.
Alternative Recommendation.
With several EU representatives urging full “local ownership” of the state-building process and a
less intrusive international role, the prospect of state
fracture and partition may need to be taken more seriously. Arguments can be made that if the majority
of the population in a distinct region within an existing state favors separation and statehood and holds a
referendum on such a decision, then the territory in
question should be allowed to secede. Such a process
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could entail the merger of separated territories with
existing states, as well as territorial or demographic
exchanges between neighboring countries.
However, such proposals are only feasible where
they are acceptable to all parties in the dispute. They
would therefore require several specific conditions,
including a bilateral agreement between the two
governments recognizing each other’s statehood and
independence and agreeing to specific border adjustments; an internationally monitored public referendum and agreement by the majority of the affected
populations to join a new state; appropriate compensation and housing for civilians displaced by the arrangement who do not wish to join another state; and
international supervision of the process of territorial
transfer or population exchange to guarantee that it is
conducted fairly and peacefully. Without such conditions and with a diminished international deterrence,
the pursuit of territorial partition, merger, and expansion could precipitate a cascade of violence throughout the Western Balkans. This would once again ensnare international organizations and necessitate new
military missions, whether in combat operations or
peacemaking and peacekeeping assignments.
POSTSCRIPT
The EU-brokered agreement between Serbia and
Kosova on April 19, 2013, was declared a breakthrough in “normalizing” relations between the two
states. An Association of Serbian Municipalities is to
gain limited autonomy while recognizing the overall authority of the Kosova state. The government in
Prishtina claimed that the plan will bring the northern municipalities under the control of central institu-
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tions. However, political opponents view the arrangement as the thin end of the wedge toward Serbian
autonomy similar to the Bosnian model. Meanwhile,
Serbian minority leaders asserted that the denial of
self-determination will either lead to a Serbian exodus
or to local unrest. The struggle over Kosova’s statehood and stability will continue as the agreement is
implemented.
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